Browse Topic: Driving automation
This SAE Recommended Practice defines requirements for equipment and supplies to be used in measuring shot peening intensity and other surface enhancement processes. It is intended as a guide toward standard practice and is subject to change to keep pace with experience and technical advances. Guidelines for use of these items can be found in SAE J443 and SAE J2597.
Treat foundational AV safety like seatbelts - make it non-proprietary and universal. An open safety stack, shared scenarios, benchmarks, and core validation tools can speed certification, reduce duplicated V&V and build public trust while preserving vendor differentiation. The bottleneck isn't compute - it's verification. Autonomous features are shipping in more vehicles and markets, but the gating factor is no longer raw compute. It's whether developers and regulators can verify systems against requirements and validate them against real-world operating design domains (ODDs) with confidence and repeatability. Today, many safety-critical components, from scenario libraries to pass/fail criteria, live in proprietary silos. That fragmentation slows regression testing, complicates regulator audits across regions, and duplicates effort across the industry. The result is an expensive, bespoke path to certification for every program and geography.
The automotive industry is rapidly advancing towards autonomous vehicles, making sensors such as Cameras, LiDAR, and RADAR critical components for ensuring constant information exchange between the vehicle and its surrounding environment. However, these sensors are vulnerable to harsh environmental conditions like rain, dirt, snow, and bird droppings, which can impair their functionality and disrupt accurate vehicle maneuvers. To ensure all sensors operate effectively, dedicated cleaning is implemented, particularly for Level 3 and higher autonomous vehicles. It is important to test sensor cleaning mechanisms across different weather conditions and vehicle operating scenarios to ensure reliability and performance. One crucial aspect of testing is tracking the trajectory of the cleaning fluid to ensure it does not cause self-soiling of vehicles and affects the field of view or visibility zones of other components like the windshield. While wind tunnel tests are valuable, digitalizing
The rapid introduction of new Automated Driving Systems (ADS) in the last years has led to an urge for robust methodologies for the type approval of vehicles equipped with such technologies. As a result, different Regulations addressing this field have been adopted. These Regulations are mainly based in the New Assessment and Testing Methodology (NATM) developed within the World Forum for the Harmonisation of Vehicle Regulations (WP29). However, the complexity of the regulatory ecosystem extends beyond type approval. This complexity requires a thorough analysis in order to avoid any possible gap which may jeopardise the feasibility of Automated Driving Vehicles deployment. This paper analyses the possible mismatches among the different regulations currently in place or under development and proposes a holistic approach, where the concept of the Operational Design Domain (ODD) takes a relevant role.
This study presents a structured evaluation framework for reasonably foreseeable misuse in automated driving systems (ADS), grounded in the ISO 21448 Safety of the Intended Functionality (SOTIF) lifecycle. Although SOTIF emphasizes risks that arise from system limitations and user behavior, the standard lacks concrete guidance for validating misuse scenarios in practice. To address this gap, we propose an end-to-end methodology that integrates four components: (1) hazard modeling via system–theoretic process analysis (STPA), (2) probabilistic risk quantification through numerical simulation, (3) verification using high-fidelity simulation, and (4) empirical validation via driver-in-the-loop system (DILS) experiments. Each component is aligned with specific SOTIF clauses to ensure lifecycle compliance. We apply this framework to a case of driver overreliance on automated emergency braking (AEB) at high speeds—a condition where system intervention is intentionally suppressed. Initial
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