Browse Topic: Driving automation
The concept of the vehicle has changed as a result of many innovations over the last decade in the fields of connected, autonomous/automated, shared, and electric (CASE) technologies. At the same time, labor shortages in Japan are becoming more serious due to a decline in the working population. To help resolve these issues, a remote-controlled autonomous vehicle driving system called Telemotion has been developed that automates the movement of vehicles in production plants. This system is an autonomous driving and transportation system in which the recognition, judgment, and operation functions of driving are handled by a control system outside the vehicle that communicates wirelessly with the vehicle. This system utilizes artificial intelligence (AI) and other advanced technologies to realize safe unmanned autonomous driving, and is already in operation in production plants. Currently, efforts are under way to build a digital twin environment and conduct AI learning using computer
Avoiding and mitigating any potential collision is dependent on (1) road user ability to avoid entering into a conflict (conflict avoidance effect) and (2) road user response should a conflict be entered (collision avoidance effect). This study examined the collision avoidance effect of the Waymo Driver, a currently deployed SAE level 4 automated driving system (ADS), using a human behavior reference model, designed to be representative of a human driver that is non-impaired, with eyes on the conflict (NIEON). Reliable performance benchmarking methodologies for assessing ADS performance are an essential component of determining system readiness. This consistently performing, always-attentive driver does not exist in the human population. Counterfactual simulations were run on responder collision scenarios based on reconstructions from a 10-year period of human fatal crashes from the Operational Design Domain of the Waymo ADS in Chandler, Arizona. Of 16 simulated conflicts entered, 12
Precision control in Level 4 Automated Vehicles is essential for enhancing operational efficiency, accuracy, and safety. This work, conducted as part of ARPA-E’s NEXTCAR program, focuses on developing a robust hardware and software control solution to enable drive-by-wire functionality. A previous publication by the authors presented the hardware solutions for overtaking stock vehicle controls. This paper focuses on a model-based and data-driven control algorithm to enable drive-by-wire functionality for longitudinal and lateral motion control for a 2021 Honda Clarity Plug-In Hybrid Electric Vehicle. This vehicle was equipped with a set of sensors and an onboard processing unit to enable Level 4 automation. For lateral controls, an algorithm was developed to command steering torque to the electronic power steering module, ensuring the vehicle could attain the desired steering angle position at varying speeds. The system leveraged feedforward and feedback mechanisms. Feedback controller
Treat foundational AV safety like seatbelts - make it non-proprietary and universal. An open safety stack, shared scenarios, benchmarks, and core validation tools can speed certification, reduce duplicated V&V and build public trust while preserving vendor differentiation. The bottleneck isn't compute - it's verification. Autonomous features are shipping in more vehicles and markets, but the gating factor is no longer raw compute. It's whether developers and regulators can verify systems against requirements and validate them against real-world operating design domains (ODDs) with confidence and repeatability. Today, many safety-critical components, from scenario libraries to pass/fail criteria, live in proprietary silos. That fragmentation slows regression testing, complicates regulator audits across regions, and duplicates effort across the industry. The result is an expensive, bespoke path to certification for every program and geography.
The automotive industry is rapidly advancing towards autonomous vehicles, making sensors such as Cameras, LiDAR, and RADAR critical components for ensuring constant information exchange between the vehicle and its surrounding environment. However, these sensors are vulnerable to harsh environmental conditions like rain, dirt, snow, and bird droppings, which can impair their functionality and disrupt accurate vehicle maneuvers. To ensure all sensors operate effectively, dedicated cleaning is implemented, particularly for Level 3 and higher autonomous vehicles. It is important to test sensor cleaning mechanisms across different weather conditions and vehicle operating scenarios to ensure reliability and performance. One crucial aspect of testing is tracking the trajectory of the cleaning fluid to ensure it does not cause self-soiling of vehicles and affects the field of view or visibility zones of other components like the windshield. While wind tunnel tests are valuable, digitalizing
The rapid introduction of new Automated Driving Systems (ADS) in the last years has led to an urge for robust methodologies for the type approval of vehicles equipped with such technologies. As a result, different Regulations addressing this field have been adopted. These Regulations are mainly based in the New Assessment and Testing Methodology (NATM) developed within the World Forum for the Harmonisation of Vehicle Regulations (WP29). However, the complexity of the regulatory ecosystem extends beyond type approval. This complexity requires a thorough analysis in order to avoid any possible gap which may jeopardise the feasibility of Automated Driving Vehicles deployment. This paper analyses the possible mismatches among the different regulations currently in place or under development and proposes a holistic approach, where the concept of the Operational Design Domain (ODD) takes a relevant role.
This study presents a structured evaluation framework for reasonably foreseeable misuse in automated driving systems (ADS), grounded in the ISO 21448 Safety of the Intended Functionality (SOTIF) lifecycle. Although SOTIF emphasizes risks that arise from system limitations and user behavior, the standard lacks concrete guidance for validating misuse scenarios in practice. To address this gap, we propose an end-to-end methodology that integrates four components: (1) hazard modeling via system–theoretic process analysis (STPA), (2) probabilistic risk quantification through numerical simulation, (3) verification using high-fidelity simulation, and (4) empirical validation via driver-in-the-loop system (DILS) experiments. Each component is aligned with specific SOTIF clauses to ensure lifecycle compliance. We apply this framework to a case of driver overreliance on automated emergency braking (AEB) at high speeds—a condition where system intervention is intentionally suppressed. Initial
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