Browse Topic: Electronic warfare
This paper proposes a UAV combat simulation method integrating AFSIM and DoDAF to address the complexity of UAV combat systems. DoDAF establishes a multi-view architecture mode to clarify logical relationships between UAVs and weapon systems, laying a structured foundation. AFSIM implements dynamic simulation of combat processes by mapping DoDAF’s static architecture to its dynamic elements, simulating UAV maneuver, situation awareness, and strikes. A UAV search-and-strike mission scenario test shows the method accurately simulates collaborative behavior in target searching, tracking, and engaging. This method features a high degree of standardization and normalization, providing a foundation for the evaluation of UAV combat effectiveness and strategy optimization.
RF and fiber have long co-existed within modern military and aerospace systems, with each medium dedicated to separate, mission-critical roles. Increasingly, however, system designers are turning to RF-over-fiber (RFoF) architectures to bridge the gap between over-the-air RF interfaces and the long, interference-resistant transport advantages of fiber. When it comes to over-the-air communications uses like tactical radio or satellite communications terminals, radio frequency (RF) is still the dominant signal format. RF is also commonly used at the front end of radar and electronic warfare, supporting search, tracking, fire control radar, missile seekers, jammers and electronic support measures.
Deliberate RF jamming of drones has become one of the most common battlefield tactics in Ukraine. But what is jamming, how does it work and how can it be countered by unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) in the field? Radio frequency (RF) jamming of drones involves deliberate interference with the radio signals used for communication between drones and their operators.
The final frontier in digital transformation is the analog edge, where apertures and actuators meet the mission. Buried behind layers of firmware and analog mitigation, open architecture has a new frontier to conquer, and the opportunity starts at the component level, where digital transformation and the miniaturization enabled by Moore's Law is having its biggest impact. Miniature, modular, and intelligent gateways can be embedded into analog components to replace and re-imagine old firmware and analog mitigation circuitry. These new, embedded gateways promise to bring open architecture deeper into the tactical edge and realize a new level of agility throughout the lifecycle of a system, from design through sustainment of hybrid digital and analog systems.
Anduril Industries Orange County, CA Contact@anduril.com
Northrop Grumman San Diego, CA jacqueline.rainey@ngc.com
In the ever-evolving landscape of electronic warfare (EW), the imperative for technological prowess has never been more pronounced. At the vanguard of this evolution stands a technological marvel-high-performance software defined radios (SDRs). This article provides on an in-depth exploration of the transformative potential embedded in SDRs, focusing on their remarkable attributes of very high bandwidths, wide tuning ranges, and high channel counts. From the foundational principles of SDRs to their nuanced applications in modern warfare, this narrative endeavors to unravel the complexities and possibilities presented by these cutting-edge systems.
Modern armed forces require advanced signal transmission systems for mission success. Military operations, including those utilizing aircraft and warships, are reliant on receiving and transmitting high-speed data at RF and millimeter wave (mmWave) frequencies. In today's battlefield, high-speed cables must perform to specification under any condition, which in turn necessitates innovative test solutions that can conduct accurate and repeatable measurements. Mission success, aircraft survivability, and troop safety depend on critical defense systems. Signals intelligence (SIGINT), electronic warfare (EW), Command, Control, Communication, Computers, Cyber, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (C5ISR), and other systems must reliably provide global situational awareness. System interference can be caused by multiple factors - intentional and unintentional. Advancing EW technologies have led to an increase in nefarious acts by adversaries with the goal of intentionally creating interference. Because these systems operate in the most demanding environments, identifying, mitigating and preventing interference that can degrade performance is one of the biggest challenges.
As radio frequency (RF) and digital hardware have advanced over the years, radar capabilities have progressed to provide higher resolution, greater tracking ranges and higher frequency agility as well as data processing and electronic counter-countermeasures (ECCM) for protection. Technology advancements in RF, digital hardware, active electronically scanned arrays (AESA), synthetic aperture radar (SAR) and cognitive electronic warfare (cogEW) have necessitated advances in test and training systems.
As radio frequency (RF) and digital hardware have advanced over the years, radar capabilities have progressed to provide higher resolution, greater tracking ranges and higher frequency agility as well as data processing and electronic counter-countermeasures (ECCM) for protection. Technology advancements in RF, digital hardware, active electronically scanned arrays (AESA), synthetic aperture radar (SAR) and cognitive electronic warfare (cogEW) have necessitated advances in test and training systems.
Software Defined Radios or SDRs are used in a wide variety of design requirements. This includes spectrum monitoring and analysis, control and management of a network of radios, and designing and deploying next-generation wireless communications systems. These capabilities can lend themselves to applications such as drone detection/control and deterrence, controlling the wideband spectrum for electronic warfare, secure communications and networking, massive MIMO testbeds, passive RADAR, signals intelligence, and much more. There are various solutions for these applications, but one of the most ubiquitous approaches is utilizing NI's Ettus Research brand of SDRs. We'll use these enclosures for many of our examples, but a similar approach could apply to all types of SDR or radio frequency (RF) communications devices. All types of engineers and specialists in the RF communications and control arena have done prototyping and analysis using these kinds of lab and controlled-environment commercial grade systems. A key challenge has been adapting the systems to a wider range of environments. This includes outdoor applications; deployments in land, sea, and airborne craft; colder or hotter environments, or other implementations where the units are exposed to shock/vibration or debris ingress (sand, dust, salt-fog, etc.).
ABSTRACT The U.S. Army must adapt and upgrade ground platforms at the speed of technology advancement to maintain competitive advantages over adversaries. The Program Executive Office (PEO) Ground Combat Systems (GCS) Common Infrastructure Architecture (GCIA) is a new ground systems approach to enable persistent modernization of future platforms. For legacy platforms, Project Lead Capability Transition and Product Integration (PL CTPI) is developing plans to incrementally incorporate standards and portions of GCIA where feasible and affordable on legacy platforms. The GCIA will enable rapid integration of ground system capabilities, increasing the Army’s ability to counter emergent threats on the battlefield. Citation: PEO GCS / PL CTPI, “Architecting for Persistent Modernization,” In Proceedings of the Ground Vehicle Systems Engineering and Technology Symposium (GVSETS), NDIA, Novi, MI, Aug. 16-18, 2022.
The critical role of spectrum superiority in the success of battlefield campaigns is evidenced by the enormous investments being made in electronic warfare (EW) capabilities by governments worldwide. Communication technologies, such as 5G, are quickly being adopted by militaries in an attempt to satisfy the demand for exponentially larger amounts of data transmission in a shorter period of time. As quickly as secure communication strategies are being developed to encrypt mission critical data, so too are the technologies used to detect, decode, and disrupt such communications. The security and integrity of critical communications is of the utmost importance as the world progresses towards an increasingly networked theater of operations.
The critical role of spectrum superiority in the success of battlefield campaigns is evidenced by the enormous investments being made in electronic warfare (EW) capabilities by governments worldwide. Communication technologies, such as 5G, are quickly being adopted by militaries in an attempt to satisfy the demand for exponentially larger amounts of data transmission in a shorter period of time. As quickly as secure communication strategies are being developed to encrypt mission critical data, so too are the technologies used to detect, decode, and disrupt such communications. The security and integrity of critical communications is of the utmost importance as the world progresses towards an increasingly networked theater of operations. The militaries of the world appear to be in widespread agreement that the critical communication infrastructure of tomorrow's battlefields need to be: Rapidly deployable and reconfigurable for mission readiness. Designed for minimal spectral footprint to minimize risk of detection. Secure against spectral manipulation tactics and immune to remote disruption. Ruggedized to survive harsh environment deployment, but small enough in form factor to enable maximum mobility. Open-source and future-proof to enable the seamless integration of next-generation systems and technologies.
Reliably operating electromagnetic (EM) systems including radar, communications, and navigation, while deceiving or disrupting the adversary, is critical to success on the battlefield. As threats evolve, electronic warfare (EW) systems must remain flexible and adaptable, with performance upgrades driven by the constant game of cat and mouse between opposing systems. This drives EW researchers and systems engineers to develop novel techniques and capabilities, based on new waveforms and algorithms, multifunction RF systems, and cognitive and adaptive modes of operation.
Like commercial communications, radar and electronic warfare (EW) systems must now function successfully in an increasingly crowded and, therefore, unpredictable electromagnetic spectrum operations environment (EMSO). In fact, the radio frequency (RF) spectrum grows only more congested as these intentional aerospace defense systems intersect with everything else that might interfere, such as terrestrial broadcast signals, different generations of cellular communications, and satellite communications. Modern threats and countermeasures flood the modern EM spectral environment with thousands of emitters, including radios, wireless devices, and radar transmissions. This, in conjunction with advanced digital signal processing (DSP), creates a dramatically complex electromagnetic spectrum.
Now a critical part of worldwide defense strategy, Electronic Warfare (EW) must continually adapt in order to meet new threats. To do so, new technology together with emerging standards must be incorporated into EW system designs.
The US Army Combat Capabilities Development Command Army Research Laboratory (ARL) has been evaluating and designing efficient broadband high-power amplifiers for use in sensors, communications, networking, and electronic warfare (EW). ARL submitted designs of Ka-band low-noise amplifiers (LNAs), power amplifiers (PAs), and transmit/receive (T/R) switches using Qorvo Inc.’s high-performance 0.15-μm gallium nitride (GaN) fabrication process. These amplifiers were fabricated as one- and two-stage designs, as well as integrated T/R modules for bidirectional transceivers as part of a recent ARL Qorvo Prototype Wafer Option (PWO), which yields many different designs from two full 4-inch GaN wafers. This research documents testing and analysis of these designs, as well as lessons learned for improvements to future design efforts.
While the basic physics of beamforming were first identified more than a century ago, it wasn’t until the past two decades that advances in supporting technology enabled the rapid expansion of the types of applications that can take advantage of this technology.
Phased arrays have been used in radar applications for many decades. Recent trends are driving their adoption into other applications such as Electronic Warfare (EW), satellite systems, and even 5G communications. There are several new component technologies that are driving this migration: multiple transmit/receive (T/R) modules on a chip, higher-performance PCB laminates, and the acceptance of GaN as a power amplifier (PA) semiconductor process.
Over the past decade, preeminent countries involved in major military conflicts mainly focused on asymmetrical warfare — surprise attacks by small groups armed with modern, high-tech weaponry. During that same period, however, near-peer adversaries began attaining impressive electronic warfare (EW) capabilities. As a result, a plethora of new, dynamic threats flooded the EW spectrum, pushing threat detection and analysis to keep pace. Large military forces now face ongoing development and evolution to stay ahead of their adversaries, leading to a need for a more flexible, scalable approach to threat detection, analysis, and response.
An industry-leading military radar receiver manufacturer needed to deliver radar receivers that met tough new customer specifications. To ensure a quality product, the manufacturer reviewed many aspects of its test strategy, focused on ensuring its radar receivers could meet the new specifications. Radar receiver sensitivity is critical for electronic warfare (EW) applications. A radar receiver that is outside specifications will fail to decipher signals properly from long distances. This is not an option in military applications.
ABSTRACT The confluence of intra-vehicle networks, Vehicular Integration for (C4ISR) Command, Control Communication, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance/(EW) Electronic Warfare Interoperability (VICTORY) standards and onboard general-purpose processors creates an opportunity to implement Army combat ground vehicle intercommunications (intercom) capability in software. The benefits of such an implementation include 1) SWAP savings, 2) cost savings, 3) simplified path to future upgrades and 4) enabling of potential new capabilities such as voice activated mission command. The VICTORY Standards Support Office (VSSO), working at the direction of its Executive Steering Group (ESG) members (Program Executive Office (PEO) Ground Combat Systems (GCS), PEO Combat Support and Combat Service Support (CS&CSS), PEO Command Control Communications-Tactical (C3T) and PEO Intelligence, Electronic Warfare and Sensors (IEW&S)), has developed and demonstrated a software intercom prototype that proves out the concept and sets the stage for development of a deployable software intercom capability. This paper describes that effort to date including benefits to the Army, technical trades explored and potential for extended capabilities.
The miniaturization of Digital RF Memory (DRFM) products is paving the way for a new generation of military products with tactical missions never before considered. Although DRFM products have been available and used in various capacities for many years, a reduction in size, weight, power, and cooling (SWAP-C) will allow the repurposing of an already proven technology.
ABSTRACT The Vehicular Integration for Command, Control, Communication, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance / Electronic Warfare (C4ISR/EW) Interoperability (VICTORY) standards is an open architecture that defines how software and hardware are shared as common resources among services that make up a platform’s capabilities such as Ethernet switches and routers, end nodes, processing units, as well as functionality such as position and navigation systems, radios, health monitoring, and automotive. The VICTORY standard enables reducing the total Size, Weight, and Power (SWaP), and Costs (SWaP-C) on a platform. As part of the Information Assurance (IA) capabilities of the VICTORY standard, the VICTORY Access Control Framework (VACF) provides protection to these shared resources in the form of an Attribute-Based Access Control (ABAC) system. The VACF is composed of five VICTORY component types: Authentication, Attribute Store, Policy Store, Policy Decision, and Policy Enforcement Services. This paper will discuss how the VICTORY Access Control Software (VACS), an implementation of VACF developed by the U.S. Army Tank Automotive Research, Development, and Engineering Center (TARDEC), can enable authentication and authorization on ground combat vehicles.
ABSTRACT Standard specifications give programs the flexibility of developing large systems from smaller pieces that can communicate between one another in a standard fashion. This benefit is lost, however, if there is no way to verify that vendors successfully adhere to the standard in question. The Vehicular Integration for Command, Control, Communications, and Computers (C4), Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) Electronic Warfare (EW) Interoperability (VICTORY) standards aim to create interoperability across various C4ISR/EW and platform systems installed on military ground vehicles while reducing size, weight, and power (SWaP) and enabling additional capabilities. The VICTORY Compliance Test Suite (CTS) provides a method to test hardware and software according to the standard specifications to ensure interoperability between VICTORY compliant components.
Calculate the sensitivity of a CS based EW receiver using two modulation schemes. Air Force Research Laboratory, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio Electronic Intelligence Receiver (ELINT) is an important component in electronic warfare (EW) and layer sensing. The information it provides by constant surveillance can be used to detect, track and classify signals across the electromagnetic spectrum. The proper identification and reaction to the threat can avoid disaster and assure spectrum dominance for Air Force systems. To meet the challenges in today's and tomorrow's EW environment where signals are increasingly sophisticated, more dynamic, and more crowded in radio frequency (RF) spectrum than before, digital wideband receivers are being developed.
Electronic Intelligence Receiver (ELINT) is an important component in electronic warfare (EW) and layer sensing. The information it provides by constant surveillance can be used to detect, track and classify signals across the electromagnetic spectrum. The proper identification and reaction to the threat can avoid disaster and assure spectrum dominance for Air Force systems.
ABSTRACT Global Positioning System (GPS) technology has become absolutely indispensable to today’s warfighter. GPS signals provide Positioning, Navigation, and Timing (PNT) data that are needed by virtually every critical military system. Digital radio networks require precise time to operate. Direct and indirect fires systems need precise coordinates to accurately determine firing data. Individual soldiers and vehicles need positioning and navigation data to coordinate offensive and defensive maneuver. Battle management systems require the location of every friendly unit in order to provide commanders with an understanding of the battlefield. The list goes on and on. In short, PNT has become a critical element in the ability to shoot, move, and communicate. The dependency on PNT is well understood. The Secretary of the Army recently testified to Congress, “Having accurate PNT information is fundamental to our forces’ ability to maintain initiative, coordinate movements, target fires and communicate on the move.” (Coggins, 2016) The most common source of PNT data is GPS. GPS is extremely cost effective, supporting unlimited users through its space based radio broadcasts. And, until recently, GPS has been universally available and has been a very reliable source of PNT. However, recent events have shown several world powers are in the process of re-invented land warfare. Certain state actors have revealing an advanced ability to disrupt precision navigation and timing capabilities (Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 2016). Our adversaries have increased their levels of sophistication and have attacked existing GPS capabilities with notable skill (Defense One, 2016). Global threats have questioned whether systems relying on PNT will work as expected on the modern battlefield. As Lt. Gen. H.R. McMaster shared in a recent brief, should the U.S. forces find themselves in a land war with Russia, they would be in for a rude, cold awakening (Defense One, 2016). It is clear that an uninterruptable and reliable source of PNT is essential to the warfighter. It is also clear that solely relying on GPS is not a viable course of action for long term sustainability. Although GPS can be encrypted and the upcoming M-Code signals will be stronger, the inherent vulnerability of a weak, space based, sole source solution remains. Independent sources of PNT must be used for validation of GPS and generation of PNT when GPS is unavailable or untrusted. This capability, known as PNT Assurance provides an uninterrupted flow of reliable Positioning, Navigation, and Timing data. Today’s warfighter needs PNT Assurance. Given our reliance on PNT and the vulnerability of GPS, PNT Assurance is not an option, it is a requirement. Having said this, developing a PNT Assurance capability is much easier said than done. Formidable challenges present themselves in developing a solution that will detect threats to GPS, create accurate PNT in the absence of GPS, and then distribute valid PNT to all clients. Once the system is developed, fielding the solution will see challenges regarding integration into existing vehicle architectures along with the requirement to support legacy and future PNT clients. It will not be feasible to require replacement of every Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance and Electronic Warfare (C4ISR/EW) system in a modern vehicle to field a PNT Assurance capability. Finally, ever present budget pressure will require a PNT Assurance solution that is cost effective, scalable, and upgradable. An expensive or “one size fits all” solution is not realistic. When will this critically needed capability be available? Is it possible to move forward with existing vehicle architecture without waiting for new distribution methods (i.e., Ethernet VICTORY)? Can the U.S. and its NATO allies use currently available Commercial Off The Shelf (COTS) items to ensure PNT data accessibility no matter what the threat? Can the U.S. ensure adequate, authenticated PNT data regardless of GPS availability or integrity? Finally, how can cost effective fielding, scalability and sustainment be addressed? This paper will address the challenge of developing a PNT Assurance capability. We will discuss the drivers and benefits using various sensors such as Chip Scale Atomic Clocks (CSAC), Inertial Navigation Systems (INS), and existing vehicle data sources such as a vehicle Controller Area Network (CAN) Bus to implement and field PNT Assurance. It will also discuss migrating to PNT Assurance while living within the constraints imposed by legacy systems that will never be completely updated. It will address the risks that must be mitigated and benefits achieved from a centralized PNT source distributing PNT to each client (a distributed architecture). Finally, this paper shall serve as a baseline recommendation to the ground vehicle community for bridging the gap between legacy systems deployed today and the C4ISR/EW architectures of the future by the distribution of valid PNT data across all formats (coaxial, wireless, serial data, Ethernet). The conclusion supported shall be that a cost-effective strategy can be adopted by a joint industry/Government team for the implementation of PNT Assurance within an existing non-VICTORY architecture and that this solution shall support future VICTORY enabled architecture. The baseline PNT Assurance capability shall also serve as a proof of concept and a development platform for future developments in PNT resiliency.
Interference mitigation is crucial in modern radio frequency (RF) communications systems with dynamically changing operating frequencies, such as cognitive radios, modern military radar, and electronic warfare (EW) systems. To protect sensitive RF receivers in these systems, frequency agile RF filters that can remove interferers or jammers with large variations in frequency, power, and bandwidth are critically sought. Unfortunately, an RF bandstop or notch filter that can simultaneously provide high resolution, high peak attenuation, large frequency tuning, and bandwidth reconfigurability does not presently exist. Microwave photonic (MWP) filters are capable of tens of gigahertz tuning and have advanced in terms of performance, but most are limited in stopband rejection due to the challenge in creating a high-quality-factor optical resonance used as the optical filter. To achieve MWP filters with similar performance to state-of-the-art RF filters in terms of isolation bandwidth and rejection is still very challenging, especially in compact integrated photonic chip footprint. Microwave photonic filters based on stimulated Brillouin scattering (SBS) have shown excellent properties in terms of high resolution and extinction. Although efficiently generated in soft glasses such as chalcogenides, there is a strong demand to harness SBS in silicon, a material platform that supports large-scale integration between photonics and electronics. For the CMOS-compatible silicon-on-insulator (SOI) platform, SBS has been elusive. The low elastic mismatch between the silicon core and the silicon dioxide substrate results in weak acoustic confinement, preventing buildup of the SBS process.
ABSTRACT This paper focuses on the use of PKI within intra vehicle networks in compliance with the VICTORY specification. It will describe how the use of PKI within vehicle networks can leverage and integrate with the other PKI efforts across the Army to ensure a consistent and interoperable solution. It will also describe some of the challenges with implementing PKI as part of VICTORY and introduce possible solutions to address these challenges.
Items per page:
50
1 – 50 of 71