Browse Topic: Safety management systems
Current regulations (e.g., Title 14 of the United States Code of Federal Regulations, or 14 CFR) define design requirements for oxygen system provisions for protection of crewmembers and passengers following emergency events such as in-flight decompression. This aerospace information report (AIR) addresses the operational oxygen system requirements for a decompression incident that may occur at any point during a long-range flight, with an emphasis for a decompression at the equal time point (ETP). This AIR identifies fuel and oxygen management contingencies and presents possible solutions for the efficient, safe, and optimum fuel/oxygen flight continuation. Oxygen management is a critical concern for all aircraft, ranging from single-engine types operating above 10000 feet to complex, high-performance aircraft equipped with supplemental oxygen systems. Proper planning ensures compliance with regulations and supports pilot and passenger safety at higher altitudes. This document
Safety Management Systems (SMSs) have been used in many safety-critical industries and are now being developed and deployed in the automated driving system (ADS)-equipped vehicle (AV) sector. Industries with decades of SMS deployment have established frameworks tailored to their specific context. Several frameworks for an AV industry SMS have been proposed or are currently under development. These frameworks borrow heavily from the aviation industry although the AV and aviation industries differ in many significant ways. In this context, there is a need to review the approach to develop an SMS that is tailored to the AV industry, building on generalized lessons learned from other safety-sensitive industries. A harmonized AV-industry SMS framework would establish a single set of SMS practices to address management of broad safety risks in an integrated manner and advance the establishment of a more mature regulatory framework. This paper outlines a proposed SMS framework for the AV
Advanced Autonomous Vehicles (AV) for SAE Level 3 and Level 4 functions will lead to a new understanding of the operation phase in the overall product lifecycle. Regulations such as the EU Implementing Act and the German L4 Act (AFGBV) request a continuous field surveillance, the handling of critical E/E faults and software updates during operation. This is required to enhance the Operational Design Domain (ODD) during operation, offering Functions on Demand (FoD), by increasing software features within these autonomous vehicle systems over the entire digital product lifecycle, and to avoid and reduce downtime by a malfunction of the Autonomous Driving (AD) software stack. Supported by implemented effective management systems for Cyber Security (R155), Software Update Management System (R156) and a Safety Management System (SMS) (in compliance to Automated Lane Keeping System (ALKS) (R157)), the organizations have to ensure safe and secure development, deployment and operation to
ABSTRACT
ABSTRACT Australia has embarked on an extraordinary reform to design, develop and implement a new and contemporary Defence Aviation Safety Framework. The program seeks to establish a single Defence Aviation Safety Authority (DASA) and issue a comprehensive and integrated suite of Defence Aviation Safety Regulation (DASR) for initial and continuing airworthiness, flight operations, air navigation, aerodromes (inclusive of ship-borne heliports) and safety management systems. While reforms of this scale can often be triggered by reviews into major aircraft accidents, such as The Nimrod Review by Charles Haddon-Cave QC in October 2009, Australia initiated the reform when new aircraft fleets were being introduced and at a time of arguably high-levels of aviation safety. The purpose of this paper is therefore to explain the compelling reason for change; providing a twenty-five-year retrospective analysis of Australia’s previous Defence aviation safety framework to give a rich picture of the
This document describes guidelines, methods, and tools used to perform the ongoing safety assessment process for transport airplanes in commercial service (hereafter, termed “airplane”). The process described herein is intended to support an overall safety management program. It is associated with showing compliance with the regulations, and also with assuring a company that it meets its own internal standards. The methods identify a systematic means, but not the only means, to assess ongoing safety. While economic decision-making is an integral part of the safety management process, this document addresses only the ongoing safety assessment process. To put it succinctly, this document addresses the “Is it safe?” part of safety management; it does not address the “How much does it cost?” part of the safety management. This document also does not address any specific organizational structures for accomplishing the safety assessment process. While the nature of the organizational
ABSTRACT Helicopter Flight Data Monitoring (HFDM) can be a central and effective component of an operator's safety management strategy. By capturing and processing operational information from aircraft flight data, the operator/owner can identify safety hazards, facilitate monitoring and assessment of the interaction between the pilot and the aircraft, initiate remedial actions, and support continuous improvement of the safety management system. The Robust HFDM system described in this paper also provides improved results via automation of data download and reporting. Automation is achieved by formalizing the concept of a flight operation, adding exceedance reporting, and improving the HFDM architectural design to allow for the transfer of data to secure ground based storage. In the extreme, robust HFDM also provides protection of data in the event of a mishap event that would usually only be available via post incident analysis of a crash survivable memory. This paper discusses the
ABSTRACT Safety Management Systems (SMS) are mainly based on an operational feedback approach for continuous safety enhancement. Closed loop approaches have been dramatically developed and applied in aeronautics by control engineers. In this article, SMS is redefined in terms of automatic control and this analogy leads to the identification of three classical feedback strategies. The theoretical effect of these strategies on performances is also discussed. As in any closed loop systems, the importance of understanding how the mission stakeholders react will be found to be particularly crucial. The last aspect of this analogy is discussed through quantitative SMS, or the standard use of SMS indicators. Several aspects of decision making and quantitative analysis are then discussed.
Achieving functional safety in mechatronic systems with growing product functionality is a major challenge in systems engineering. Following the current discussion, this challenge is mostly allocated to electronics and software development. For most of the scenarios this focus is feasible. Product design - the construction of the product - defines the properties and the appearance of the product by shape, material and assembly. So, the product design is often not under control of the safety management system. A hazardous deviation of part shape can be easily identified after the parts product or at least at its mounting. A wrong assembly is controlled by assembly documentation or data (e.g. screw torques) and identified at end of assembly line checks. The identification of a hazardous material choice depends on the product material class. Product materials can be separated into two classes: passive or active materials. Passive materials (e.g. car body) can be distinguished in as
ABSTRACT Northrop Grumman has developed a software and hardware solution to provide enhanced 360 degree local situational awareness (LSA) to enable the warfighter with an overmatch capability on today’s modern battlefield. The architecture exploits technological gains in cameras, video processing, and video compression. The approach allows rapid comprehension of local and remote situational views presented with operational relevance for a ground combat platform or tactical wheeled platform crew. The 360 Degree LSA approach provides direct visualization of relative positioning of targets, threats, and lines of fire; and additionally offers common situational understanding / operational picture from the dismounted soldier to higher echelon commands. The approach provides prioritized information through LSA software to provide an enhanced view to the warfighter whereas the squad leader becomes an integral part of the crew with a view of the common operating picture (mounted) and
ABSTRACT While helicopters are used for a myriad of purposes in rural and urban environments, their true potential can be measured by the support they can offer in extreme and remote areas. This paper describes a Northern Canadian operator, Universal Helicopters Newfoundland and Labrador LP, the equipment used, the tasks performed, the working conditions and the risks and challenges faced . The principal areas of operation include the Province of Newfoundland and Labrador, the Ungava Peninsula and Canada's high and eastern Arctic. The company operates 19 light and intermediate helicopters in one of the most challenging environments in the world. The aircraft are equipped with operational equipment and accessories for operation in temperature extremes which test not only the machinery but the crews that fly and maintain them. A Safety Management System is in place to properly identify and manage the unique risks of operating in the north as well as logistical support that recognizes
This document describes a process that may be used to perform the ongoing safety assessment for (1) GAR aircraft and components (hereafter, aircraft), and (2) commercial operators of GAR aircraft. The process described herein is intended to support an overall safety management program. It is to help a company establish and meet its own internal standards. The process described herein identifies a systematic means, but not the only means, to assess continuing airworthiness. Ongoing safety management is an activity dedicated to assuring that risk is identified and properly eliminated or controlled. The safety management process includes both safety assessment and economic decision-making. While economic decision-making (factors related to scheduling, parts, and cost) is an integral part of the safety management process, this document addresses only the Ongoing Safety Assessment Process. This Ongoing Safety Assessment Process includes safety problem identification and corrective action
Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) emerge as a viable, operational technology for potential civil and commercial applications in the National Airspace System (NAS). Although this new type of technology presents great potential, it also introduces a need for a thorough inquiry into its safety impact on the NAS. This study presents a systems-level approach to analyze the safety impact of introducing a new technology, such as UAS, into the NAS. Utilizing Safety Management Systems (SMS) principles and the existing regulatory structure, this paper outlines a methodology to determine a mandatory safety baseline for a specific area of interest regarding a new aviation technology, such as UAS Sense and Avoid. The proposed methodology is then employed to determine a baseline set of hazards and causal factors for the UAS Sense and Avoid problem domain and associated regulatory risk controls.
Safety control and protection strategy of high-voltage system of electric vehicles include analysis of circuit condition before connection to high voltage terminal, transient current prevention for capacitive load, real-time monitoring and analysis of high-voltage system during operation, disconnecting strategy of high voltage terminals, vehicle dynamic safety and cooperative management of electrical systems, etc. Monitoring and analysis of some critical parameters of high voltage system such as insulation, electrical harness and connector condition are the basis and difficulties in high-voltage safety and protection. This paper presents several mathematical models of monitoring critical parameters, and experiments were also done to evaluate the model. Disadvantages of the commonly used calculation method are discussed. Single point insulation defect model is introduced and diagnosis method of multiple points defect is also discussed. To satisfy high voltage safety management system
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