Browse Topic: Safety management systems
Urban air mobility with electric Vertical Take-Off and Landing (eVTOL) aircraft faces critical micro-weather and infrastructure readiness challenges. This paper proposes a novel socio-technical solution: a tokenized gamification platform that crowdsources hyper-local wind and weather data to enhance operational resilience. We outline the safety gap left by traditional aviation weather systems (METAR, AWOS, ASOS) in urban environments, and leverage community engagement to fill it. The proposed system integrates with Unmanned Traffic Management (UTM) and Safety Management Systems (SMS) to validate user-contributed micro-weather observations, incentivize accurate reporting through tokens and skill-level progression, and feed data into AI-driven forecasts. Early proof-of-concept results indicate improved wind hazard detection and robust user participation. By aligning with emerging regulations (FAA, EASA, DGCA) and test frameworks, this crowdsourced micro-weather ecosystem shows potential to uplift eVTOL safety, build public trust, and support city-scale planning for advanced air mobility.
Safety Management Systems (SMSs) have been used in many safety-critical industries and are now being developed and deployed in the automated driving system (ADS)-equipped vehicle (AV) sector. Industries with decades of SMS deployment have established frameworks tailored to their specific context. Several frameworks for an AV industry SMS have been proposed or are currently under development. These frameworks borrow heavily from the aviation industry although the AV and aviation industries differ in many significant ways. In this context, there is a need to review the approach to develop an SMS that is tailored to the AV industry, building on generalized lessons learned from other safety-sensitive industries. A harmonized AV-industry SMS framework would establish a single set of SMS practices to address management of broad safety risks in an integrated manner and advance the establishment of a more mature regulatory framework. This paper outlines a proposed SMS framework for the AV industry based on robust taxonomy development and validation criteria and provides rationale for such an approach.
Advanced Autonomous Vehicles (AV) for SAE Level 3 and Level 4 functions will lead to a new understanding of the operation phase in the overall product lifecycle. Regulations such as the EU Implementing Act and the German L4 Act (AFGBV) request a continuous field surveillance, the handling of critical E/E faults and software updates during operation. This is required to enhance the Operational Design Domain (ODD) during operation, offering Functions on Demand (FoD), by increasing software features within these autonomous vehicle systems over the entire digital product lifecycle, and to avoid and reduce downtime by a malfunction of the Autonomous Driving (AD) software stack. Supported by implemented effective management systems for Cyber Security (R155), Software Update Management System (R156) and a Safety Management System (SMS) (in compliance to Automated Lane Keeping System (ALKS) (R157)), the organizations have to ensure safe and secure development, deployment and operation to fulfill legal requirements. Based on senior expert interviews from relevant AD stakeholders, a blueprint is developed to support the deployment and scalability of AD systems. Relevant roles for the operation will be presented and current gaps in the industry, regulation and academia are highlighted.
ABSTRACT
Australia has embarked on an extraordinary reform to design, develop and implement a new and contemporary Defence Aviation Safety Framework. The program seeks to establish a single Defence Aviation Safety Authority (DASA) and issue a comprehensive and integrated suite of Defence Aviation Safety Regulation (DASR) for initial and continuing airworthiness, flight operations, air navigation, aerodromes (inclusive of ship-borne heliports) and safety management systems. While reforms of this scale can often be triggered by reviews into major aircraft accidents, such as The Nimrod Review by Charles Haddon-Cave QC in October 2009, Australia initiated the reform when new aircraft fleets were being introduced and at a time of arguably high-levels of aviation safety. The purpose of this paper is therefore to explain the compelling reason for change; providing a twenty-five-year retrospective analysis of Australia’s previous Defence aviation safety framework to give a rich picture of the difficulties faced by increased commercialization from the late 1990s, globalization in the 2000s, and the recent emergence of strict work, health and safety legislation in Australia.
Safety Management Systems (SMS) are mainly based on an operational feedback approach for continuous safety enhancement. Closed loop approaches have been dramatically developed and applied in aeronautics by control engineers. In this article, SMS is redefined in terms of automatic control and this analogy leads to the identification of three classical feedback strategies. The theoretical effect of these strategies on performances is also discussed. As in any closed loop systems, the importance of understanding how the mission stakeholders react will be found to be particularly crucial. The last aspect of this analogy is discussed through quantitative SMS, or the standard use of SMS indicators. Several aspects of decision making and quantitative analysis are then discussed.
Helicopter Flight Data Monitoring (HFDM) can be a central and effective component of an operator's safety management strategy. By capturing and processing operational information from aircraft flight data, the operator/owner can identify safety hazards, facilitate monitoring and assessment of the interaction between the pilot and the aircraft, initiate remedial actions, and support continuous improvement of the safety management system. The Robust HFDM system described in this paper also provides improved results via automation of data download and reporting. Automation is achieved by formalizing the concept of a flight operation, adding exceedance reporting, and improving the HFDM architectural design to allow for the transfer of data to secure ground based storage. In the extreme, robust HFDM also provides protection of data in the event of a mishap event that would usually only be available via post incident analysis of a crash survivable memory. This paper discusses the formalized concept of a flight operation, how regime recognition has been tailored to support the more robust application, and finally the addition of exceedance monitoring. The changes in architecture, processing and data transfer, result in a new and more robust HFDM system.
Achieving functional safety in mechatronic systems with growing product functionality is a major challenge in systems engineering. Following the current discussion, this challenge is mostly allocated to electronics and software development. For most of the scenarios this focus is feasible. Product design - the construction of the product - defines the properties and the appearance of the product by shape, material and assembly. So, the product design is often not under control of the safety management system. A hazardous deviation of part shape can be easily identified after the parts product or at least at its mounting. A wrong assembly is controlled by assembly documentation or data (e.g. screw torques) and identified at end of assembly line checks. The identification of a hazardous material choice depends on the product material class. Product materials can be separated into two classes: passive or active materials. Passive materials (e.g. car body) can be distinguished in as passive materials with constant shape (stiff) and variable shape (flexible) (e.g. damper, spring). The liability of those materials regarding their usage in the product is tested in labs in prototypes in prior. Active materials (e.g. fluids, gases), or functional materials fulfill, trigger or directly influence the functionality of the product. The choice of a functional material is not always made by the electronics engineering. Therefore, it is not under control of safety management processes. Never the less functional material, especially with radical behavior, underlie other safety regulation. Explosives for example, can be integrated in a product or system and are restricted by specific standards. This technology report reflects the verification methods of functional materials today. The responsibility of the product design engineer is discussed as well as the relevant standards. The challenge of achieving complete product compliance with functional materials is shown by the technology analysis of the Takata airbag recall. The required and available methods to control risks of functional materials choice and change are listed and rated. Gaps in existing engineering processes and regulations are identified. A strategy to close those gaps is explained.
ABSTRACT Northrop Grumman has developed a software and hardware solution to provide enhanced 360 degree local situational awareness (LSA) to enable the warfighter with an overmatch capability on today’s modern battlefield. The architecture exploits technological gains in cameras, video processing, and video compression. The approach allows rapid comprehension of local and remote situational views presented with operational relevance for a ground combat platform or tactical wheeled platform crew. The 360 Degree LSA approach provides direct visualization of relative positioning of targets, threats, and lines of fire; and additionally offers common situational understanding / operational picture from the dismounted soldier to higher echelon commands. The approach provides prioritized information through LSA software to provide an enhanced view to the warfighter whereas the squad leader becomes an integral part of the crew with a view of the common operating picture (mounted) and additional sensors on tablet or handheld device (dismounted via wireless). The approach uses a platform agnostic form factor with components that can be selected and applied to legacy or new platforms based on their size, weight, power, and mission constraints.
ABSTRACT While helicopters are used for a myriad of purposes in rural and urban environments, their true potential can be measured by the support they can offer in extreme and remote areas. This paper describes a Northern Canadian operator, Universal Helicopters Newfoundland and Labrador LP, the equipment used, the tasks performed, the working conditions and the risks and challenges faced . The principal areas of operation include the Province of Newfoundland and Labrador, the Ungava Peninsula and Canada's high and eastern Arctic. The company operates 19 light and intermediate helicopters in one of the most challenging environments in the world. The aircraft are equipped with operational equipment and accessories for operation in temperature extremes which test not only the machinery but the crews that fly and maintain them. A Safety Management System is in place to properly identify and manage the unique risks of operating in the north as well as logistical support that recognizes associated added costs. The presence of multiple aircraft and their adjacency to remote communities often results in requests from authorities to assist in Search and Rescue operations. Despite challenges from wildlife, weather, topography and a long distance supply and communications chains, operators are able to conduct helicopter operations to support scientific research and natural resource development.
This paper describes the process in which Atlantic Software Technologies (AST) and Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation (Sikorsky) developed a web-based Aviation Safety Management System. The system as an aviation operations management tool improves overall fleet safety and business quality while also reducing cost and redundancy. Adaptive Safety Management System (ASMS) serves as a proven safety risk management tool in support of the much anticipated FAA regulation which will soon require a Safety Management System (SMS) throughout the vertical flight industry.
Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) emerge as a viable, operational technology for potential civil and commercial applications in the National Airspace System (NAS). Although this new type of technology presents great potential, it also introduces a need for a thorough inquiry into its safety impact on the NAS. This study presents a systems-level approach to analyze the safety impact of introducing a new technology, such as UAS, into the NAS. Utilizing Safety Management Systems (SMS) principles and the existing regulatory structure, this paper outlines a methodology to determine a mandatory safety baseline for a specific area of interest regarding a new aviation technology, such as UAS Sense and Avoid. The proposed methodology is then employed to determine a baseline set of hazards and causal factors for the UAS Sense and Avoid problem domain and associated regulatory risk controls.
Safety control and protection strategy of high-voltage system of electric vehicles include analysis of circuit condition before connection to high voltage terminal, transient current prevention for capacitive load, real-time monitoring and analysis of high-voltage system during operation, disconnecting strategy of high voltage terminals, vehicle dynamic safety and cooperative management of electrical systems, etc. Monitoring and analysis of some critical parameters of high voltage system such as insulation, electrical harness and connector condition are the basis and difficulties in high-voltage safety and protection. This paper presents several mathematical models of monitoring critical parameters, and experiments were also done to evaluate the model. Disadvantages of the commonly used calculation method are discussed. Single point insulation defect model is introduced and diagnosis method of multiple points defect is also discussed. To satisfy high voltage safety management system based on micro-controller, online diagnosis method of related parameters is studied. Hardware-in-loop (HIL) and complete vehicle experiment were conducted to prove the validity, response and reliability of the proposed method.
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