Browse Topic: Risk management
This document applies to the development of Plans for integrating and managing COTS assemblies in electronic equipment and Systems for the commercial, military, and space markets, as well as other ADHP markets that wish to use this document. For purposes of this document, COTS assemblies are viewed as electronic assemblies such as printed wiring assemblies, disk drives, servers, printers, laptop computers, etc. There are many ways to categorize COTS assemblies1, including the following spectrum: At one end of the spectrum are COTS assemblies whose design, internal parts2, materials, configuration control, traceability, reliability, and qualification methods are at least partially controlled, or influenced, by ADHP customers (either individually or collectively) or by industry standards. An example at this end of the spectrum is a VME circuit card assembly. At the other end of the spectrum are COTS assemblies whose design, internal parts, materials, configuration control, and
This study presents a structured evaluation framework for reasonably foreseeable misuse in automated driving systems (ADS), grounded in the ISO 21448 Safety of the Intended Functionality (SOTIF) lifecycle. Although SOTIF emphasizes risks that arise from system limitations and user behavior, the standard lacks concrete guidance for validating misuse scenarios in practice. To address this gap, we propose an end-to-end methodology that integrates four components: (1) hazard modeling via system–theoretic process analysis (STPA), (2) probabilistic risk quantification through numerical simulation, (3) verification using high-fidelity simulation, and (4) empirical validation via driver-in-the-loop system (DILS) experiments. Each component is aligned with specific SOTIF clauses to ensure lifecycle compliance. We apply this framework to a case of driver overreliance on automated emergency braking (AEB) at high speeds—a condition where system intervention is intentionally suppressed. Initial
This standard is for use by organizations that procure and integrate EEE Parts. These organizations may provide EEE Parts that are not integrated into assemblies (e.g., spares and/or repair EEE Parts). Examples of such organizations include, but are not limited to, the following: Original Equipment Manufacturers; contract assembly manufacturers; maintenance, repair, and overhaul (MRO) organizations; and suppliers that provide EEE Parts or assemblies as part of a service. These requirements are intended to be applied (or flowed down as applicable) through the supply chain to all organizations that procure and integrate EEE Parts and/or systems, subsystems, or assemblies. The mitigation of Counterfeit EEE Parts in this standard is risk based. These mitigation steps will vary depending on the criticality of the application and desired performance and reliability of the equipment/hardware. The requirements of this document are used in conjunction with the organization’s higher-level
This document applies to the development of Plans for integrating and managing electronic components in equipment for the military and commercial aerospace markets, as well as other ADHP markets that wish to use this document. Examples of electronic components described in this document include resistors, capacitors, diodes, integrated circuits, hybrids, application specific integrated circuits, wound components, and relays. It is critical for the Plan owner to review and understand the design, materials, configuration control, and qualification methods of all “as-received” electronic components and their capabilities with respect to the application; and to identify risks and, where necessary, take additional action to mitigate the risks. The technical requirements are in Section 3 of this standard and the administrative requirements are in Section 4.
Systems Engineering is a method for developing complex products, aiming to improve cost and time estimates and ensure product validation against its requirements. This is crucial to meet customer needs and maintain competitiveness in the market. Systems Engineering activities include requirements, configuration, interface, deadlines, and technical risks management, as well as definition and decomposition of requirements, implementation, integration, and verification and validation testing. The use of digital tools in Systems Engineering activities is called Model-Based Systems Engineering (MBSE). The MBSE approach helps engineers manage system complexity, ensuring project information consistency, facilitating traceability and integration of elements throughout the product lifecycle. Its benefits include improved communication, traceability, information consistency, and complexity management. Major companies like Boeing already benefit from this approach, reducing their product
North American automakers and EV battery firms have five years to erase China's dominance in technology and manufacturing or they may face the reality of buying batteries from China for the foreseeable future. That was the message from battery-analysis company Voltaiq CEO Tal Sholklapper at a media briefing in Detroit. “We're in the final innings now,” Sholklapper said. “If the industry around batteries and electric vehicles and all the follow-on applications wants to make it, we're going to have to change the way we play.”
The extent of automation and autonomy used in general aviation (GA) has been steadily increasing for decades, with the pace of development accelerating recently. This has huge potential benefits for safety given that it is estimated that 75% of the accidents in personal and on-demand GA are due to pilot error. However, an approach to certifying autonomous systems that relies on reversionary modes limits their potential to improve safety. Placing a human pilot in a situation where they are suddenly tasked with flying an airplane in a failed situation, often without sufficient situational awareness, is overly demanding. This consideration, coupled with advancing technology that may not align with a deterministic certification paradigm, creates an opportunity for new approaches to certifying autonomous and highly automated aircraft systems. The new paths must account for the multifaceted aviation approach to risk management which has interlocking requirements for airworthiness and
In late 2022, the EU Medical Device Regulation (MDR) was expanded by the addition of the common specifications (CS) 2022/20346. The spe00cifications describe the aspects that must be examined for devices without an intended medical purpose. These aspects apply in addition to the classical MDR requirements and include certain aspects of risk management. In other words, even products that only serve aesthetic purposes, such as colored contact lenses, will be assessed in accordance with the strict MDR regulations and, in addition, will have to fulfill the requirements laid down in the CS 2022/2346.
In autonomous driving vehicles with an automation level greater than three, the autonomous system is responsible for safe driving, instead of the human driver. Hence, the driving safety of autonomous driving vehicles must be ensured before they are used on the road. Because it is not realistic to evaluate all test conditions in real traffic, computer simulation methods can be used. Since driving safety performance can be evaluated by simulating different driving scenarios and calculating the criticality metrics that represent dangerous collision risks, it is necessary to study and define the criticality metrics for the type of driving scenarios. This study focused on the risk of collisions in the confluence area because it was known that the accident rate in the confluence area is much higher than on the main roadway. There have been several experimental studies on safe driving behaviors in the confluence area; however, there has been little study logically exploring the merging
The content of ARP6328 contains guidance for implementing processes used for risk identification, mitigation, detection, avoidance, disposition, and reporting of counterfeit electrical, electronic, and electromechanical (EEE) parts and assemblies in accordance with AS5553 Revision D. This document may also be used in conjunction with other revisions of AS5553. This document retains guidance contained in the base document of AS5553, updated as appropriate to reflect current practices. This is not intended to stand alone, supersede, or cancel requirements found in other quality management system documents, requirements imposed by contracting authorities, or applicable laws and regulations unless an authorized exemption/variance has been obtained.
A research team has designed a fall-risk assessment system that enables doctors to create personalized risk-management strategies for patients based on their individual movement patterns at home.
This technical report identifies the requirements for an LFCP for ADHP soldered electronic products built fully or partially with Pb-free materials and assembly processes. An LFCP documents the specific Pb-free materials and assembly processes used to assure customers their ADHP soldered electronic products will meet the applicable reliability requirements of the customer. This standard specifically addresses LFCPs for: a Pb-free components and mixed assembly: Products originally designed and qualified with SnPb solder and assembly processes that incorporate components with Pb-free termination finishes and/or Pb-free BGAs, i.e., assembling Pb-free parts using eutectic/near-eutectic SnPb processes (also known as mixed metallurgy). b COTS products: COTS products likely built with Pb-free materials and assembly processes. c Pb-free design and assembly: Products designed and qualified with Pb-free solder and assembly processes. This standard does not include detailed descriptions of the
This SAE Aerospace Standard (AS) standardizes practices to identify reliable sources to procure electrical, electronic, and electromechanical (EEE) parts, assess and mitigate the risk of distributing suspect counterfeit or counterfeit EEE parts, control suspect counterfeit or counterfeit EEE parts, and report incidents of suspect counterfeit and counterfeit EEE parts.
This document establishes the minimum training and qualification requirements for ground-based aircraft deicing/anti-icing methods and procedures. All guidelines referred to herein are applicable only in conjunction with the applicable documents. Due to aerodynamic and other concerns, the application of deicing/anti-icing fluids shall be carried out in compliance with engine and aircraft manufacturers’ recommendations. The scope of training should be adjusted according to local demands. There are a wide variety of winter seasons and differences of the involvement between deicing operators, and therefore the level and length of training should be adjusted accordingly. However, the minimum level of training shall be covered in all cases. As a rule of thumb, the amount of time spent in practical training should equal or exceed the amount of time spent in classroom training.
Automotive electronics and enterprise IT are converging and thus open the doors for advanced hacking. With their immediate safety impact, cyberattacks on such systems will endanger passengers. Today, there are various methods of security verification and validation in the automotive industry. However, we realize that vulnerability detection is incomplete and inefficient with classic security testing. In this article, we show how an enhanced Grey-Box Penetration Test (GBPT) needs less test cases while being more effective in terms of coverage and indicating less false positives.
DevSecOps evolved to address the need for building in security continuously across the software development lifecycle so that teams could deliver secure applications with speed and quality. Incorporating testing, triage, and risk mitigation earlier in the continuous integration, continuous delivery (CI/CD) workflow prevents the time-intensive, and often costly, repercussions of making a fix post system deployment. This concept is part of “shifting left,” which moves security testing toward developers, enabling them to fix security issues in their code in near real time rather than “bolting on security” toward the end of the development. When development organizations code with security in mind from the outset, it's easier and less costly to catch and fix vulnerabilities before they go too far into production or after release.
DevSecOps evolved to address the need for building in security continuously across the software development lifecycle so that teams could deliver secure applications with speed and quality. Incorporating testing, triage, and risk mitigation earlier in the continuous integration, continuous delivery (CI/CD) workflow prevents the time-intensive, and often costly, repercussions of making a fix post system deployment.
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