Browse Topic: Risk management
ABSTRACT Product Development (PD) remains a highly uncertain process for both commercial and DoD programs. The presence of multiple stakeholders (e.g., DoD and allied agencies, soldiers/users, PEO, contractors, manufacturing, service, logistics) with varying requirements, preferences, constraints, and evolving priorities make this particularly challenging for the DoD. These risks are well recognized by agencies, and it is widely understood that acquisition is about risk management and not certainties. However, almost all the DoD acquisition processes still require critical reviews, and most importantly, structured decision support for the fuzzy front-end of the acquisition process. What is lacking, are effective decision support tools that explicitly recognize the sequential milestone structure embedded with multi-stakeholder decision making in all acquisition programs. We describe the Resilient Program Management & Development (RPMD) framework to support complex decision making with
ABSTRACT Program Executive Office (PEO) Ground Combat Systems (GCS) initiated a Green Belt project in 2007 to develop a risk management process. The Integrated Product Team (IPT) built on Defense Acquisition University (DAU) and Department of Defense (DoD) risk management guidance to create a process for risk analysis, mitigation, and rules for Risk Review Board approval. To automate this process, the IPT eventually created an Army owned, customizable tool (Risk Recon) that matched the PEO GCS process. Risk Recon is used to track risks throughout the acquisition life-cycle. Changing the culture of the PEO has been the most significant challenge. Training and follow-up of risk progress is required to keep the process from becoming stagnant. Partnership with the Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEMs)s is an integral part of all programs and a balance is needed between how the PEO and its OEMs perform risk management and communicate those risks. The software requirements continue to
ABSTRACT Of the tests of any good theory or suppositional work, the most critical is whether it can forecast the need or accurately describe the number, timing, event and impact of the endeavor. In order to reduce the risk and to exponentially increase the rate of success a continual reevaluation of the data and reconfiguration of the plan will be required, must be properly front-loaded with the appropriate human capital. This is precisely where the application of Six Sigma, Project Management and, Six Sigma for Human Capital works’ intimately with Risk Management to mitigate error and insure the ultimate success of the effort. This is critical in business, critical in the field for greater energy efficiency for soldiers. Unified in concert as core disciplines, the identification of human capital for specialists required at any particular point in the project especially in the definition and design phases, is determined with greater accuracy. Critically predictable and integrated into
ABSTRACT This paper will discuss the systematic operations of utilizing the BOXARR platform as the ‘Digital Thread’ to overcome the inherent and hidden complexities in massive-scale interdependent systems; with particular emphasis on future applications in Military Ground Vehicles (MGVs). It will discuss how BOXARR can enable significantly improved capabilities in requirements-capture, optimized risk management, enhanced collaborative relationships between engineering and project/program management teams, operational analysis, trade studies, capability analysis, adaptability, resilience, and overall architecture design; all within a unified framework of BOXARR’s customizable modeling, visualization and analysis applications
ABSTRACT Current written system specifications have a high degree of uncertainty which causes specifications to be changed because they are incorrect, incomplete or do not possess the degree of rigor to make them precise. Even when generated by modeling methods such as UML/SySML or standards such as DoDAF, these functional specifications still lack any validation with respect to architecture, mission, and scenario impacts. The lack of consideration of these aspects creates design errors are usually exposed during the test and integration phases where the expense is greater to correct than in the early conceptual design phase. This paper will introduce the concept of Validated Executable Specifications (VES) that will enable Model Based Systems Engineering (MBSE) to validate early in the design process to reduce risk and save costs in a System of System (SoS) model
ABSTRACT The objective of this paper is to provide guidance on what to consider to implement Risk Management within an organization including what practices need to be in place to ensure that leadership will continue to support Risk Management over the long term. It also presents techniques to determine risk severity, risk mitigation methods, ideas for ensuring risk management helps achieve a program’s objectives, and techniques for incorporating risk measurement parameters into a program’s daily execution activities
ABSTRACT In light of the cancellation of MIL-STD 1629A on 4 August 1998 with no superseding document, this paper outlines the tailoring of an effective industry tool for risk identification and prioritization that will lead to more reliable weapon systems for the warfighter, with reduced total ownership costs. The canceled MIL-STD 1629A used Failure Mode Effects and Criticality Analysis (FMECA) which is similar in method to FMEA but with an added factor called Criticality for prioritization. In FMEA approach, criticality is addressed by the Risk Priority Number (RPN) and other ways to prioritize risk beyond those single criteria. Tank Automotive Research Development and Engineering Center (TARDEC), Systems Engineering Group (SEG) has tailored the FMEA’s Severity, Occurrence, and Detection ranking tables to suit DOD Systems by developing an additional scale (1 – 5) for severity and occurrence parameters for the existing industry scale (1 – 10). This will facilitate transitioning risks
ABSTRACT What does “exposure to risk” mean? How can acquisition programs get early warning of risk exposure? How is risk exposure related to the root causes and causal mechanisms of adverse program outcomes? How does risk early warning inform risk management? How is risk exposure related to the tradeoffs made between risk versus potential rewards? What technical and management contract data reporting requirements provide evidence of risk exposure, and how can risk leading indicators be computed? How can standard technical and management contract data reporting requirements be used to improve visibility into risk exposure? How can the magnitude of risk exposure be estimated? How does risk early warning complement traditional technical, cost and schedule risk assessment? How do risk early warning methods relate to typical proposal requirements and evaluation criteria? How are risk leading indicators related to system development leading indicators? How can risk early warning methods be
ABSTRACT Curtiss-Wright has developed an advanced, open system approach to Vehicle Electronics, based on our vast experience in providing military electronics to many programs for ground, sea, and air platforms. This experience has provided Curtiss-Wright with a unique understanding of key architectural concepts which provide for highly successful implementation of specific Vehicle Electronics suites to meet Ground Combat System program and platform requirements. This paper describes a Common Vehicle Electronics Architecture and key architectural concepts. The Network Centric Reference Architecture incorporates Open Systems approaches and leverages Commercial-off-the-Shelf (COTS) components. Some key concepts discussed include Interoperability, Risk Mitigation, Upgradeability / Obsolescence Mitigation, Scalability, Space, Weight and Power, and Cost (SWaP-C) optimization, as well as enabling technologies. Correlation with the emerging VICTORY Architecture is shown in the Network Centric
ABSTRACT This paper explores a holistic approach to increasing the cyber resiliency of Army and USMC ground vehicles. Today’s current approach to securing weapon systems focuses on complying with the Risk Management Framework and applying required security controls to obtain government authority to operate (ATO). This method of securing our weapon systems is better than nothing, but runs the risk of giving us a false sense of security. Citation: D. Woolrich, “Holistically Increasing Cyber Resilience of Ground Vehicles”, In Proceedings of the Ground Vehicle Systems Engineering and Technology Symposium (GVSETS), NDIA, Novi, MI, Aug. 13-15, 2019
ABSTRACT The Modular Active Protection System (MAPS) Science and Technology Objective (STO) program led by the CCDC- Ground Vehicle Systems Center (CCDC-GVSC) has undertaken and committed to delivering a product baseline that can readily support performance requirements for Vehicle Protection System (VPS) capabilities while meeting cybersecurity requirements. DoD investments in a cyber-secure common kit can provide many benefits to the DoD as each program (i.e., Abrams, Bradley, Stryker, AMPV) will be able to leverage the initial investments without having to create their own technical solution per platform. It is broadly acknowledged that implementing security controls early in the product’s life cycle provides better capabilities, reduces vulnerabilities, reduces program schedule, and reduces program cost compared to attempting to add cybersecurity later in the production and test phases. As the MAPS open-architecture enables programs to leverage occupant and vehicle protection
ABSTRACT Today’s platform systems (satellites, aircraft, surface ships, ground vehicles, and subsurface vehicles) have large numbers of electronic components including microprocessors, microcontrollers, sensors, actuators, and internal (onboard) and external (off-board) communication networks. Hardening and securing these systems is currently performed using checklist approaches like the Risk Management Framework (RMF) that derive from decades of information technology (IT) best practices. However, these approaches do not translate well to platforms because they inadequately address security issues that are unique to cyber-physical and the embedded nature of platform systems. In this paper, we describe key resilience concepts and two analytic models for improving platform cyber resilience. These models balance knowledge of offensive attack vectors with Resilience-in-Depth™ controls. The Platform Cyber Attack Model (PCAM) provides a multi-scale construct for identifying, describing, and
ABSTRACT As a network of interacting elements, cyber-physical systems (CPS) provide tremendous opportunities to advance system adaptability, flexibility and autonomy. However, they also present extremely complex and unique safety, security and reliability risks. The Department of Defense is seeking methods to deliver and support trusted systems and manage risks associated with mission-critical functionality. Technical thought leaders have discussed the need to address 10:1 more complex systems with 10:1 reduction in effort, using people from a 10:1 larger community than the “systems expert” group. This paper briefly summarizes the approach of Pattern-Based Systems Engineering (PBSE), which leverages the power of Model-Based Systems Engineering (MBSE) to rapidly deliver these benefits to the larger systems community. This order-of-magnitude improvement is especially necessary to address the rapidly increasing complexity of today’s and future cyber-physical systems. While applying PBSE
ABSTRACT The use of lead-free components in electronic modules destined for defense applications requires a deep understanding of the reliability risks involved. In particular, pad cratering, tin whiskers, shock and vibration, thermal cycling and combined environments are among the top risks. Testing and failure analysis of representative assemblies across a number of scenarios, including with and without risk mitigations, were performed to understand reliability of lead-free assembly approaches, in comparison with leaded and mixed solder approaches. The results lead to an understanding of lead-free reliability and how to improve it, when required. This outcome is resulting in user acceptance of lead-free electronics, which is timely given the increasing scope of lead-free legislation
The extent of automation and autonomy used in general aviation (GA) has been steadily increasing for decades, with the pace of development accelerating recently. This has huge potential benefits for safety given that it is estimated that 75% of the accidents in personal and on-demand GA are due to pilot error. However, an approach to certifying autonomous systems that relies on reversionary modes limits their potential to improve safety. Placing a human pilot in a situation where they are suddenly tasked with flying an airplane in a failed situation, often without sufficient situational awareness, is overly demanding. This consideration, coupled with advancing technology that may not align with a deterministic certification paradigm, creates an opportunity for new approaches to certifying autonomous and highly automated aircraft systems. The new paths must account for the multifaceted aviation approach to risk management which has interlocking requirements for airworthiness and
In late 2022, the EU Medical Device Regulation (MDR) was expanded by the addition of the common specifications (CS) 2022/20346. The spe00cifications describe the aspects that must be examined for devices without an intended medical purpose. These aspects apply in addition to the classical MDR requirements and include certain aspects of risk management. In other words, even products that only serve aesthetic purposes, such as colored contact lenses, will be assessed in accordance with the strict MDR regulations and, in addition, will have to fulfill the requirements laid down in the CS 2022/2346
In autonomous driving vehicles with an automation level greater than three, the autonomous system is responsible for safe driving, instead of the human driver. Hence, the driving safety of autonomous driving vehicles must be ensured before they are used on the road. Because it is not realistic to evaluate all test conditions in real traffic, computer simulation methods can be used. Since driving safety performance can be evaluated by simulating different driving scenarios and calculating the criticality metrics that represent dangerous collision risks, it is necessary to study and define the criticality metrics for the type of driving scenarios. This study focused on the risk of collisions in the confluence area because it was known that the accident rate in the confluence area is much higher than on the main roadway. There have been several experimental studies on safe driving behaviors in the confluence area; however, there has been little study logically exploring the merging
The content of ARP6328 contains guidance for implementing processes used for risk identification, mitigation, detection, avoidance, disposition, and reporting of counterfeit electrical, electronic, and electromechanical (EEE) parts and assemblies in accordance with AS5553 Revision D. This document may also be used in conjunction with other revisions of AS5553. This document retains guidance contained in the base document of AS5553, updated as appropriate to reflect current practices. This is not intended to stand alone, supersede, or cancel requirements found in other quality management system documents, requirements imposed by contracting authorities, or applicable laws and regulations unless an authorized exemption/variance has been obtained
A research team has designed a fall-risk assessment system that enables doctors to create personalized risk-management strategies for patients based on their individual movement patterns at home
This technical report identifies the requirements for an LFCP for ADHP soldered electronic products built fully or partially with Pb-free materials and assembly processes. An LFCP documents the specific Pb-free materials and assembly processes used to assure customers their ADHP soldered electronic products will meet the applicable reliability requirements of the customer. This standard specifically addresses LFCPs for: a Pb-free components and mixed assembly: Products originally designed and qualified with SnPb solder and assembly processes that incorporate components with Pb-free termination finishes and/or Pb-free BGAs, i.e., assembling Pb-free parts using eutectic/near-eutectic SnPb processes (also known as mixed metallurgy). b COTS products: COTS products likely built with Pb-free materials and assembly processes. c Pb-free design and assembly: Products designed and qualified with Pb-free solder and assembly processes. This standard does not include detailed descriptions of the
This SAE Aerospace Standard (AS) standardizes practices to identify reliable sources to procure electrical, electronic, and electromechanical (EEE) parts, assess and mitigate the risk of distributing suspect counterfeit or counterfeit EEE parts, control suspect counterfeit or counterfeit EEE parts, and report incidents of suspect counterfeit and counterfeit EEE parts
This document establishes the minimum training and qualification requirements for ground-based aircraft deicing/anti-icing methods and procedures. All guidelines referred to herein are applicable only in conjunction with the applicable documents. Due to aerodynamic and other concerns, the application of deicing/anti-icing fluids shall be carried out in compliance with engine and aircraft manufacturers’ recommendations. The scope of training should be adjusted according to local demands. There are a wide variety of winter seasons and differences of the involvement between deicing operators, and therefore the level and length of training should be adjusted accordingly. However, the minimum level of training shall be covered in all cases. As a rule of thumb, the amount of time spent in practical training should equal or exceed the amount of time spent in classroom training
Automotive electronics and enterprise IT are converging and thus open the doors for advanced hacking. With their immediate safety impact, cyberattacks on such systems will endanger passengers. Today, there are various methods of security verification and validation in the automotive industry. However, we realize that vulnerability detection is incomplete and inefficient with classic security testing. In this article, we show how an enhanced Grey-Box Penetration Test (GBPT) needs less test cases while being more effective in terms of coverage and indicating less false positives
DevSecOps evolved to address the need for building in security continuously across the software development lifecycle so that teams could deliver secure applications with speed and quality. Incorporating testing, triage, and risk mitigation earlier in the continuous integration, continuous delivery (CI/CD) workflow prevents the time-intensive, and often costly, repercussions of making a fix post system deployment. This concept is part of “shifting left,” which moves security testing toward developers, enabling them to fix security issues in their code in near real time rather than “bolting on security” toward the end of the development. When development organizations code with security in mind from the outset, it's easier and less costly to catch and fix vulnerabilities before they go too far into production or after release
DevSecOps evolved to address the need for building in security continuously across the software development lifecycle so that teams could deliver secure applications with speed and quality. Incorporating testing, triage, and risk mitigation earlier in the continuous integration, continuous delivery (CI/CD) workflow prevents the time-intensive, and often costly, repercussions of making a fix post system deployment
Data is information that has been recorded in a form or format convenient to move or process. It is important to distinguish between data and the format. The format is a structured way to record information, such as engineering drawings and other documents, software, pictures, maps, sound, and animation. Some formats are open source, others proprietary. Regardless of the format, there are three broad types of data. Table 1 lists these types of data and provides examples. DM, from the perspective of this standard, consists of the disciplined processes and systems utilized to plan for, acquire, and provide management and oversight for product and product-related business data, consistent with requirements, throughout the product and data life cycles. Thus, this standard primarily addresses product data and the business data required for stakeholder collaboration extending through the supply chain during product acquisition and sustainment life cycle. This standard has broader application
This standard applies to the aerospace and defense industries and their supply chains
While battery range and charging times are getting the most attention when it comes to electric vehicle (EV) charging systems, safety and reliability are a critical part of the equation. Using the right current-sensing methodology can go far to address these concerns
Coastal and riverine shorelines are dynamic landscapes that change continually in response to environmental forces. The combination of static infrastructure with dynamic and diverse landscapes creates management challenges for navigation, storm damage reduction, and ecosystem health that are exacerbated during natural disasters. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) flood risk management (FRM) mission strives to reduce the nation's flood risk and increase resilience to disasters. FRM is inherently interdisciplinary, requiring accurate identification of environmental, physical, and infrastructure features that can reduce risk from flood and coastal storm disasters
This standard is for use by organizations that procure and integrate EEE parts. These organizations may provide EEE parts that are not integrated into assemblies (e.g., spares and/or repair EEE parts). Examples of such organizations include, but are not limited to: original equipment manufacturers; contract assembly manufacturers; maintenance, repair, and overhaul organizations; value-added resellers; and suppliers that provide EEE parts or assemblies as part of a service. The requirements of this standard are generic. These requirements are intended to be applied (or flowed down as applicable) through the supply chain to all organizations that procure EEE parts and/or systems, subsystems, or assemblies, regardless of type, size, and product provided. The mitigation of counterfeit EEE parts in this standard is risk-based and these mitigation steps will vary depending on the criticality of the application, desired performance and reliability of the equipment/hardware. The requirements
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