Browse Topic: Risk management

Items (254)
Systems Engineering is a method for developing complex products, aiming to improve cost and time estimates and ensure product validation against its requirements. This is crucial to meet customer needs and maintain competitiveness in the market. Systems Engineering activities include requirements, configuration, interface, deadlines, and technical risks management, as well as definition and decomposition of requirements, implementation, integration, and verification and validation testing. The use of digital tools in Systems Engineering activities is called Model-Based Systems Engineering (MBSE). The MBSE approach helps engineers manage system complexity, ensuring project information consistency, facilitating traceability and integration of elements throughout the product lifecycle. Its benefits include improved communication, traceability, information consistency, and complexity management. Major companies like Boeing already benefit from this approach, reducing their product
Azevedo, Marcos PauloLahoz, Carlos Henrique Netto
North American automakers and EV battery firms have five years to erase China's dominance in technology and manufacturing or they may face the reality of buying batteries from China for the foreseeable future. That was the message from battery-analysis company Voltaiq CEO Tal Sholklapper at a media briefing in Detroit. “We're in the final innings now,” Sholklapper said. “If the industry around batteries and electric vehicles and all the follow-on applications wants to make it, we're going to have to change the way we play
Clonts, Chris
ABSTRACT Product Development (PD) remains a highly uncertain process for both commercial and DoD programs. The presence of multiple stakeholders (e.g., DoD and allied agencies, soldiers/users, PEO, contractors, manufacturing, service, logistics) with varying requirements, preferences, constraints, and evolving priorities make this particularly challenging for the DoD. These risks are well recognized by agencies, and it is widely understood that acquisition is about risk management and not certainties. However, almost all the DoD acquisition processes still require critical reviews, and most importantly, structured decision support for the fuzzy front-end of the acquisition process. What is lacking, are effective decision support tools that explicitly recognize the sequential milestone structure embedded with multi-stakeholder decision making in all acquisition programs. We describe the Resilient Program Management & Development (RPMD) framework to support complex decision making with
Murat, AlperChinnam, Ratna BabuRana, SatyendraRapp, Stephen H.Hartman, Gregory D.Lamb, David A.Agusti, Rachel S.
ABSTRACT The objective of this paper is to provide guidance on what to consider to implement Risk Management within an organization including what practices need to be in place to ensure that leadership will continue to support Risk Management over the long term. It also presents techniques to determine risk severity, risk mitigation methods, ideas for ensuring risk management helps achieve a program’s objectives, and techniques for incorporating risk measurement parameters into a program’s daily execution activities
Khaled-Noveloso, Lubna
ABSTRACT The objective of this paper is two-fold. Firstly, to inform the audience on the inherent risk of shortage of raw materials used to produce high-tech devices, sources and the different levels of stakeholders involved in the transformation process – all of which is a subset of the supply chain. Secondly, given that we live in a complex global economy within which changes are occurring rapidly, we need to develop an awareness of risks in our surrounding business environment and develop the skillset necessary to manage risks well
Khaled-Noveloso, Lubna
ABSTRACT Curtiss-Wright has developed an advanced, open system architectural approach to Vehicle Electronics, based on our vast experience in providing military electronics to many programs for ground, sea, and air platforms. This experience has provided Curtiss-Wright with a unique understanding of key architectural concepts which provide for highly successful implementation of specific Vehicle Electronics suites to meet Ground Combat System program and platform requirements. This Open-Standard and COTS based Intra-Vehicle Network Reference Architecture was previously presented the paper “Ground Combat Systems Common Vehicle Electronics Architecture and Applications” (D. Jedynak, et al., 2010) and will be summarized and described in terms of the US Army’s VICTORY Architecture in this paper as a foundation for discussion. Clarification is provided for the differences between federated and distributed architectures with regard to function, and how physical and functional system
Jedynak, Mr. David
ABSTRACT The Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV) Family of Vehicles (FoV) is the central component of the Army’s long-term Tactical Wheeled Vehicle (TWV) strategy. The program’s objective is to balance critical weight and transportability restrictions within performance, protection, and payload requirements of the United States Army and Marine Corps. One of the challenges faced by the JLTV program is the need to balance the “Iron Triangle” of performance, protection, and payload while managing the disparate requirements of the domestic services and international partners. The JLTV team developed processes to manage the cost, performance, and schedule risks associated with each of the three contractors participating in the Technology Development phase. This paper will describe the risk management processes and tools developed on the JLTV program to manage and mitigate these contractor risks and extract those that could impact the entire program
Wood, Kenneth L.Vinarcik, Michael J.
ABSTRACT In light of the cancellation of MIL-STD 1629A on 4 August 1998 with no superseding document, this paper outlines the tailoring of an effective industry tool for risk identification and prioritization that will lead to more reliable weapon systems for the warfighter, with reduced total ownership costs. The canceled MIL-STD 1629A used Failure Mode Effects and Criticality Analysis (FMECA) which is similar in method to FMEA but with an added factor called Criticality for prioritization. In FMEA approach, criticality is addressed by the Risk Priority Number (RPN) and other ways to prioritize risk beyond those single criteria. Tank Automotive Research Development and Engineering Center (TARDEC), Systems Engineering Group (SEG) has tailored the FMEA’s Severity, Occurrence, and Detection ranking tables to suit DOD Systems by developing an additional scale (1 – 5) for severity and occurrence parameters for the existing industry scale (1 – 10). This will facilitate transitioning risks
Rizk, Kadry
ABSTRACT Program Executive Office (PEO) Ground Combat Systems (GCS) initiated a Green Belt project in 2007 to develop a risk management process. The Integrated Product Team (IPT) built on Defense Acquisition University (DAU) and Department of Defense (DoD) risk management guidance to create a process for risk analysis, mitigation, and rules for Risk Review Board approval. To automate this process, the IPT eventually created an Army owned, customizable tool (Risk Recon) that matched the PEO GCS process. Risk Recon is used to track risks throughout the acquisition life-cycle. Changing the culture of the PEO has been the most significant challenge. Training and follow-up of risk progress is required to keep the process from becoming stagnant. Partnership with the Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEMs)s is an integral part of all programs and a balance is needed between how the PEO and its OEMs perform risk management and communicate those risks. The software requirements continue to
Rassette, CherylGraf, LisaOlsem, MikeDmoch, Barb
ABSTRACT Curtiss-Wright has developed an advanced, open system approach to Vehicle Electronics, based on our vast experience in providing military electronics to many programs for ground, sea, and air platforms. This experience has provided Curtiss-Wright with a unique understanding of key architectural concepts which provide for highly successful implementation of specific Vehicle Electronics suites to meet Ground Combat System program and platform requirements. This paper describes a Common Vehicle Electronics Architecture and key architectural concepts. The Network Centric Reference Architecture incorporates Open Systems approaches and leverages Commercial-off-the-Shelf (COTS) components. Some key concepts discussed include Interoperability, Risk Mitigation, Upgradeability / Obsolescence Mitigation, Scalability, Space, Weight and Power, and Cost (SWaP-C) optimization, as well as enabling technologies. Correlation with the emerging VICTORY Architecture is shown in the Network Centric
Jedynak, David C.Macpherson, MichaelDolbin, Bradley
ABSTRACT Of the tests of any good theory or suppositional work, the most critical is whether it can forecast the need or accurately describe the number, timing, event and impact of the endeavor. In order to reduce the risk and to exponentially increase the rate of success a continual reevaluation of the data and reconfiguration of the plan will be required, must be properly front-loaded with the appropriate human capital. This is precisely where the application of Six Sigma, Project Management and, Six Sigma for Human Capital works’ intimately with Risk Management to mitigate error and insure the ultimate success of the effort. This is critical in business, critical in the field for greater energy efficiency for soldiers. Unified in concert as core disciplines, the identification of human capital for specialists required at any particular point in the project especially in the definition and design phases, is determined with greater accuracy. Critically predictable and integrated into
Maholick, WilliamGodell, Carl J
ABSTRACT As the United States’ (US) Department of Defense (DoD) works to maintain our battlefield superiority in the ground domain, we rapidly integrate new electronic capabilities into vehicles that communicate and cooperate over vehicle-to-infrastructure networks. These new capabilities contribute to increasing the potential attack surface, as described in the 2018 Government Accountability Office (GAO) report on Weapon System Cyber Security [1]. To understand the increasingly complex attack surface and to reduce ground platform exposures through cyberspace, we need new engineering analysis and design techniques. Today, most engineering methodologies treat cybersecurity as an add-on to traditional process flows. For example, until recently, the International Council on Systems Engineering (INCOSE) gave little attention to cybersecurity in their industry definition of the Vee-Model used widely in defense contracting. We argue that until we give cybersecurity first-class status and
Lofy, CheriVriesenga, Mark
ABSTRACT This paper explores a holistic approach to increasing the cyber resiliency of Army and USMC ground vehicles. Today’s current approach to securing weapon systems focuses on complying with the Risk Management Framework and applying required security controls to obtain government authority to operate (ATO). This method of securing our weapon systems is better than nothing, but runs the risk of giving us a false sense of security. Citation: D. Woolrich, “Holistically Increasing Cyber Resilience of Ground Vehicles”, In Proceedings of the Ground Vehicle Systems Engineering and Technology Symposium (GVSETS), NDIA, Novi, MI, Aug. 13-15, 2019
Woolrich, David K.
ABSTRACT Current written system specifications have a high degree of uncertainty which causes specifications to be changed because they are incorrect, incomplete or do not possess the degree of rigor to make them precise. Even when generated by modeling methods such as UML/SySML or standards such as DoDAF, these functional specifications still lack any validation with respect to architecture, mission, and scenario impacts. The lack of consideration of these aspects creates design errors are usually exposed during the test and integration phases where the expense is greater to correct than in the early conceptual design phase. This paper will introduce the concept of Validated Executable Specifications (VES) that will enable Model Based Systems Engineering (MBSE) to validate early in the design process to reduce risk and save costs in a System of System (SoS) model
Fortney, George
ABSTRACT As a network of interacting elements, cyber-physical systems (CPS) provide tremendous opportunities to advance system adaptability, flexibility and autonomy. However, they also present extremely complex and unique safety, security and reliability risks. The Department of Defense is seeking methods to deliver and support trusted systems and manage risks associated with mission-critical functionality. Technical thought leaders have discussed the need to address 10:1 more complex systems with 10:1 reduction in effort, using people from a 10:1 larger community than the “systems expert” group. This paper briefly summarizes the approach of Pattern-Based Systems Engineering (PBSE), which leverages the power of Model-Based Systems Engineering (MBSE) to rapidly deliver these benefits to the larger systems community. This order-of-magnitude improvement is especially necessary to address the rapidly increasing complexity of today’s and future cyber-physical systems. While applying PBSE
Schindel, BillPeterson, Troy
ABSTRACT This paper will discuss the systematic operations of utilizing the BOXARR platform as the ‘Digital Thread’ to overcome the inherent and hidden complexities in massive-scale interdependent systems; with particular emphasis on future applications in Military Ground Vehicles (MGVs). It will discuss how BOXARR can enable significantly improved capabilities in requirements-capture, optimized risk management, enhanced collaborative relationships between engineering and project/program management teams, operational analysis, trade studies, capability analysis, adaptability, resilience, and overall architecture design; all within a unified framework of BOXARR’s customizable modeling, visualization and analysis applications
Smith, Robert E.Hamilton, Fraser
ABSTRACT What does “exposure to risk” mean? How can acquisition programs get early warning of risk exposure? How is risk exposure related to the root causes and causal mechanisms of adverse program outcomes? How does risk early warning inform risk management? How is risk exposure related to the tradeoffs made between risk versus potential rewards? What technical and management contract data reporting requirements provide evidence of risk exposure, and how can risk leading indicators be computed? How can standard technical and management contract data reporting requirements be used to improve visibility into risk exposure? How can the magnitude of risk exposure be estimated? How does risk early warning complement traditional technical, cost and schedule risk assessment? How do risk early warning methods relate to typical proposal requirements and evaluation criteria? How are risk leading indicators related to system development leading indicators? How can risk early warning methods be
Witus, GaryBryzik, WalterUmpfenbach, EdwardAddis, RebeccaTzau, JeromeRizk, Kadry
ABSTRACT The Modular Active Protection System (MAPS) Science and Technology Objective (STO) program led by the CCDC- Ground Vehicle Systems Center (CCDC-GVSC) has undertaken and committed to delivering a product baseline that can readily support performance requirements for Vehicle Protection System (VPS) capabilities while meeting cybersecurity requirements. DoD investments in a cyber-secure common kit can provide many benefits to the DoD as each program (i.e., Abrams, Bradley, Stryker, AMPV) will be able to leverage the initial investments without having to create their own technical solution per platform. It is broadly acknowledged that implementing security controls early in the product’s life cycle provides better capabilities, reduces vulnerabilities, reduces program schedule, and reduces program cost compared to attempting to add cybersecurity later in the production and test phases. As the MAPS open-architecture enables programs to leverage occupant and vehicle protection
Nowc, MattShvartsman, AndreyMoon, EdTucker, Lucas
ABSTRACT Today’s platform systems (satellites, aircraft, surface ships, ground vehicles, and subsurface vehicles) have large numbers of electronic components including microprocessors, microcontrollers, sensors, actuators, and internal (onboard) and external (off-board) communication networks. Hardening and securing these systems is currently performed using checklist approaches like the Risk Management Framework (RMF) that derive from decades of information technology (IT) best practices. However, these approaches do not translate well to platforms because they inadequately address security issues that are unique to cyber-physical and the embedded nature of platform systems. In this paper, we describe key resilience concepts and two analytic models for improving platform cyber resilience. These models balance knowledge of offensive attack vectors with Resilience-in-Depth™ controls. The Platform Cyber Attack Model (PCAM) provides a multi-scale construct for identifying, describing, and
Lofy, CheriVriesenga, Mark
ABSTRACT The use of lead-free components in electronic modules destined for defense applications requires a deep understanding of the reliability risks involved. In particular, pad cratering, tin whiskers, shock and vibration, thermal cycling and combined environments are among the top risks. Testing and failure analysis of representative assemblies across a number of scenarios, including with and without risk mitigations, were performed to understand reliability of lead-free assembly approaches, in comparison with leaded and mixed solder approaches. The results lead to an understanding of lead-free reliability and how to improve it, when required. This outcome is resulting in user acceptance of lead-free electronics, which is timely given the increasing scope of lead-free legislation
Straznicky, Ivan
In the context of insufficient international management experience, this study combines the current situation of Chinese aviation and the characteristics of unmanned aircraft (UA) operation, adopts the specific operations risk assessment (SORA) method, and conducts in-depth research on the trial operation risks of UA in urban low-altitude logistics scenarios, conducting effective evaluations and project practices. This study starts from two dimensions of ground risk and air risk, determines the boundaries required for safe operation of UA, and improves the robustness level of UA operation through ground risk mitigation measures and air risk mitigation measures. At the same time, a series of compliance verification methods are provided to meet 24 operational safety objectives (OSO) (including design characteristics, operational limitations, performance standards, safety characteristics, communication requirements, emergency response plans, etc.), ensuring that UA operation does not pose
Li, LiLiu, WeiweiFu, Jinhua
This document specifically pertains to cybersecurity for road vehicles. This document encompasses the entire vehicle lifecycle of key management. It has been developed by SAE Committee TEVEES18F, Vehicle Security Credentials Interoperability (VSCI), a subcommittee of SAE Committee TEVEES18A, Vehicle Cybersecurity Systems Engineering Committee. This committee is authorized under the scope and authority fo the SAE Electronic Design Automation Steering Committee (also known as the Electronic Systems Group) that is directly under the scope and authority fo the SAE Motor Vehicle Council. The SAE Motor Vehicle Council’s stated scope of influence and authority, as defined by the SAE includes, passenger car and light truck in conjunction with ISO/SAE 21434
Vehicle Electrical System Security Committee
This article proposes a new model for a cooperative and distributed decision-making mechanism for an ad hoc network of automated vehicles (AVs). The goal of the model is to ensure safety and reduce energy consumption. The use of centralized computation resource is not suitable for scalable cooperative applications, so the proposed solution takes advantage of the onboard computing resources of the vehicle in an intelligent transportation system (ITS). This leads to the introduction of a distributed decision-making mechanism for connected AVs. The proposed mechanism utilizes a novel implementation of the resource-aware and distributed–vector evaluated genetic algorithm (RAD-VEGA) in the vehicular ad hoc network of connected AVs as a solver to collaborative decision-making problems. In the first step, a collaborative decision-making problem is formulated for connected AVs as a multi-objective optimization problem (MOOP), with a focus on energy consumption and collision risk reduction as
Ghahremaninejad, RezaBilgen, Semih
The traditional approach to applying safety limits in electromechanical systems across various industries, including automated vehicles, robotics, and aerospace, involves hard-coding control and safety limits into production firmware, which remains fixed throughout the product life cycle. However, with the evolving needs of automated systems such as automated vehicles and robots, this approach falls short in addressing all use cases and scenarios to ensure safe operation. Particularly for data-driven machine learning applications that continuously evolve, there is a need for a more flexible and adaptable safety limits application strategy based on different operational design domains (ODDs) and scenarios. The ITSC conference paper [1] introduced the dynamic control limits application (DCLA) strategy, supporting the flexible application of diverse limits profiles based on dynamic scenario parameters across different layers of the Autonomy software stack. This article extends the DCLA
Garikapati, DivyaLiu, YitingHuo, Zhaoyuan
The extent of automation and autonomy used in general aviation (GA) has been steadily increasing for decades, with the pace of development accelerating recently. This has huge potential benefits for safety given that it is estimated that 75% of the accidents in personal and on-demand GA are due to pilot error. However, an approach to certifying autonomous systems that relies on reversionary modes limits their potential to improve safety. Placing a human pilot in a situation where they are suddenly tasked with flying an airplane in a failed situation, often without sufficient situational awareness, is overly demanding. This consideration, coupled with advancing technology that may not align with a deterministic certification paradigm, creates an opportunity for new approaches to certifying autonomous and highly automated aircraft systems. The new paths must account for the multifaceted aviation approach to risk management which has interlocking requirements for airworthiness and
Dietrich, Anna MracekRajamani, Ravi
“New Space" is reshaping the economic landscape of the space industry and has far-reaching implications for technological innovation, business models, and market dynamics. This change, aligned with the digitalization in the world economy, has given rise to innovations in the downstream space segment. This “servitization” of the space industry, essentially, has led to the transition from selling products like satellites or spacecraft, to selling the services these products provide. This also connects to applications of various technologies, like cloud computing, artificial intelligence, and virtualization. Redefining Space Commerce: The Move Toward Servitization discusses the advantages of this shift (e.g., cost reduction, increased access to space for smaller organizations and countries), as well as the challenges, such as maintaining safety and security, establishing standardization and regulation, and managing risks. The implications of this may be far-reaching, affecting not only
Khan, Samir
In late 2022, the EU Medical Device Regulation (MDR) was expanded by the addition of the common specifications (CS) 2022/20346. The spe00cifications describe the aspects that must be examined for devices without an intended medical purpose. These aspects apply in addition to the classical MDR requirements and include certain aspects of risk management. In other words, even products that only serve aesthetic purposes, such as colored contact lenses, will be assessed in accordance with the strict MDR regulations and, in addition, will have to fulfill the requirements laid down in the CS 2022/2346
The United Nation Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE) Regulation 155—Cybersecurity and Cybersecurity Management System (UN R155) mandates the development of cybersecurity management systems (CSMS) as part of a vehicle’s lifecycle. An inherent component of the CSMS is cybersecurity risk management and assessment. Validation and verification testing is a key activity for measuring the effectiveness of risk management, and it is mandated by UN R155 for type approval. Due to the focus of R155 and its suggested implementation guideline, ISO/SAE 21434:2021—Road Vehicle Cybersecurity Engineering, mainly centering on the alignment of cybersecurity risk management to the vehicle development lifecycle, there is a gap in knowledge of proscribed activities for validation and verification testing. This research provides guidance on automotive cybersecurity testing and verification by providing an overview of the state-of-the-art in relevant automotive standards, outlining their transposition
Roberts, AndrewMarksteiner, StefanSoyturk, MujdatYaman, BerkayYang, Yi
In autonomous driving vehicles with an automation level greater than three, the autonomous system is responsible for safe driving, instead of the human driver. Hence, the driving safety of autonomous driving vehicles must be ensured before they are used on the road. Because it is not realistic to evaluate all test conditions in real traffic, computer simulation methods can be used. Since driving safety performance can be evaluated by simulating different driving scenarios and calculating the criticality metrics that represent dangerous collision risks, it is necessary to study and define the criticality metrics for the type of driving scenarios. This study focused on the risk of collisions in the confluence area because it was known that the accident rate in the confluence area is much higher than on the main roadway. There have been several experimental studies on safe driving behaviors in the confluence area; however, there has been little study logically exploring the merging
Imaseki, TakashiSugasawa, FukashiKawakami, ErikoMouri, Hiroshi
The content of ARP6328 contains guidance for implementing processes used for risk identification, mitigation, detection, avoidance, disposition, and reporting of counterfeit electrical, electronic, and electromechanical (EEE) parts and assemblies in accordance with AS5553 Revision D. This document may also be used in conjunction with other revisions of AS5553. This document retains guidance contained in the base document of AS5553, updated as appropriate to reflect current practices. This is not intended to stand alone, supersede, or cancel requirements found in other quality management system documents, requirements imposed by contracting authorities, or applicable laws and regulations unless an authorized exemption/variance has been obtained
G-19 Counterfeit Electronic Parts Committee
Recently, lean manufacturing (LM) practices are being combined with tools and techniques that belong to other areas of knowledge such as risk management (RM). Value stream mapping (VSM) is a well-known tool in showing the value, the value stream, and the flow, which represents the three lean principles. VSM and RM, when used in tandem with one another, are more advantageous in covering VSM issues such as the variability of production processes. In this article, a conceptual model that integrates the two is shown and explained. The model helps to generate scenarios of current state map (CSM) and future state map (FSM) in a dynamic way by identifying current and potential risks. These risks might happen in the future, bringing with it negative ramifications including not reaching the main objectives within the defined time. The model has been tested in a coffee production company belonging to health and food sector. The proposed model specified the ranges of variability through the
Araibi, Alaa SalahuddinShaiful, A. I. M.Shadhar, Mohanad Hatem
A research team has designed a fall-risk assessment system that enables doctors to create personalized risk-management strategies for patients based on their individual movement patterns at home
This technical report identifies the requirements for an LFCP for ADHP soldered electronic products built fully or partially with Pb-free materials and assembly processes. An LFCP documents the specific Pb-free materials and assembly processes used to assure customers their ADHP soldered electronic products will meet the applicable reliability requirements of the customer. This standard specifically addresses LFCPs for: a Pb-free components and mixed assembly: Products originally designed and qualified with SnPb solder and assembly processes that incorporate components with Pb-free termination finishes and/or Pb-free BGAs, i.e., assembling Pb-free parts using eutectic/near-eutectic SnPb processes (also known as mixed metallurgy). b COTS products: COTS products likely built with Pb-free materials and assembly processes. c Pb-free design and assembly: Products designed and qualified with Pb-free solder and assembly processes. This standard does not include detailed descriptions of the
G-24 Pb-free Risk Management Committee for ADHP
Autonomy is a key enabling factor in uncrewed aircraft system (UAS) and advanced air mobility (AAM) applications ranging from cargo delivery to structure inspection to passenger transport, across multiple sectors. In addition to guiding the UAS, autonomy will ensure that they stay safe in a large number of off-nominal situations without requiring the operator to intervene. While the addition of autonomy enables the safety case for the overall operation, there is a question as to how we can assure that the autonomy itself will work as intended. Specifically, we need assurable technical approaches, operational considerations, and a framework to develop, test, maintain, and improve these capabilities. We make the case that many of the key autonomy functions can be realized in the near term with readily assurable, even certifiable, design approaches and assurance methods, combined with risk mitigations and strategically defined concepts of operations. We present specific autonomy functions
Bartlett, PaulChamberlain, LyleSingh, SanjivCoblenz, Lauren
This SAE Aerospace Standard (AS) standardizes practices to identify reliable sources to procure electrical, electronic, and electromechanical (EEE) parts, assess and mitigate the risk of distributing suspect counterfeit or counterfeit EEE parts, control suspect counterfeit or counterfeit EEE parts, and report incidents of suspect counterfeit and counterfeit EEE parts
G-19 Counterfeit Electronic Parts Committee
This document establishes the minimum training and qualification requirements for ground-based aircraft deicing/anti-icing methods and procedures. All guidelines referred to herein are applicable only in conjunction with the applicable documents. Due to aerodynamic and other concerns, the application of deicing/anti-icing fluids shall be carried out in compliance with engine and aircraft manufacturers’ recommendations. The scope of training should be adjusted according to local demands. There are a wide variety of winter seasons and differences of the involvement between deicing operators, and therefore the level and length of training should be adjusted accordingly. However, the minimum level of training shall be covered in all cases. As a rule of thumb, the amount of time spent in practical training should equal or exceed the amount of time spent in classroom training
G-12T Training and Quality Programs Committee
Automotive electronics and enterprise IT are converging and thus open the doors for advanced hacking. With their immediate safety impact, cyberattacks on such systems will endanger passengers. Today, there are various methods of security verification and validation in the automotive industry. However, we realize that vulnerability detection is incomplete and inefficient with classic security testing. In this article, we show how an enhanced Grey-Box Penetration Test (GBPT) needs less test cases while being more effective in terms of coverage and indicating less false positives
Ebert, ChristofRay, RuschilJohn, JeromeWang, Zhen
DevSecOps evolved to address the need for building in security continuously across the software development lifecycle so that teams could deliver secure applications with speed and quality. Incorporating testing, triage, and risk mitigation earlier in the continuous integration, continuous delivery (CI/CD) workflow prevents the time-intensive, and often costly, repercussions of making a fix post system deployment
DevSecOps evolved to address the need for building in security continuously across the software development lifecycle so that teams could deliver secure applications with speed and quality. Incorporating testing, triage, and risk mitigation earlier in the continuous integration, continuous delivery (CI/CD) workflow prevents the time-intensive, and often costly, repercussions of making a fix post system deployment. This concept is part of “shifting left,” which moves security testing toward developers, enabling them to fix security issues in their code in near real time rather than “bolting on security” toward the end of the development. When development organizations code with security in mind from the outset, it's easier and less costly to catch and fix vulnerabilities before they go too far into production or after release
This SAE Aerospace Recommended Practice (ARP) describes a method to measure, track, and characterize the history of powder feedstock when consumed in the production of parts via additive manufacturing (AM). The history captured as part of this ARP includes AM process exposure, feedstock consumption, blending, and losses associated with the totality of the AM workflow. This document also outlines a two-part metric schema for used powder feedstock consequential of its process exposure history. This metric schema also enables aligning risk determination and usage practices for used powder when based on a correlation between tabulated values in the scheme and user-identified metrics. These correlated metrics with schema values may also be used when establishing powder blending workflows or identifying end-of-life for feedstock
AMS AM Additive Manufacturing Metals
Today’s vehicles provide a wide range of functions. Some offer comfort support for driving scenarios and others offer a higher level of safety to the driver. Increasing complex systems drives the need for reliable engineering to avoid or at least detect and mitigate malfunctions which would lead to any person being injured. Following state of the art for definition, design, and implementation of any system must therefore always be the target. The need to meet stringent safety requirements of the ISO 26262 Standard is presenting new challenges. In particular, the solutions must ensure that automotive electronic systems always operate safely throughout the vehicle life cycle. Functional safety relies on the safety mechanisms within the design that monitor and verify the correct functional operation of the design while the system is in use. The ability of these safety mechanisms to cover the potential faults determines the overall diagnostic coverage of the design. As a solution that
Chiyedu Rajasimha, RashmiArjun, VishwanathGowdra Chandrashekhar, Hemanth
Data is information that has been recorded in a form or format convenient to move or process. It is important to distinguish between data and the format. The format is a structured way to record information, such as engineering drawings and other documents, software, pictures, maps, sound, and animation. Some formats are open source, others proprietary. Regardless of the format, there are three broad types of data. Table 1 lists these types of data and provides examples. DM, from the perspective of this standard, consists of the disciplined processes and systems utilized to plan for, acquire, and provide management and oversight for product and product-related business data, consistent with requirements, throughout the product and data life cycles. Thus, this standard primarily addresses product data and the business data required for stakeholder collaboration extending through the supply chain during product acquisition and sustainment life cycle. This standard has broader application
EIDM Enterprise Information and Data Management
This standard applies to the aerospace and defense industries and their supply chains
E-1 Environmental Committee
While battery range and charging times are getting the most attention when it comes to electric vehicle (EV) charging systems, safety and reliability are a critical part of the equation. Using the right current-sensing methodology can go far to address these concerns
Coastal and riverine shorelines are dynamic landscapes that change continually in response to environmental forces. The combination of static infrastructure with dynamic and diverse landscapes creates management challenges for navigation, storm damage reduction, and ecosystem health that are exacerbated during natural disasters. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) flood risk management (FRM) mission strives to reduce the nation's flood risk and increase resilience to disasters. FRM is inherently interdisciplinary, requiring accurate identification of environmental, physical, and infrastructure features that can reduce risk from flood and coastal storm disasters
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