Browse Topic: Counterfeit parts
This SAE Aerospace Standard (AS) identifies the requirements for mitigating Counterfeit EEE parts in the Authorized Distribution Channel. If an organization is not performing Authorized Distribution but acting as another seller (such as an Authorized Reseller, Broker, or Independent Distributor), then only 3.3.1 applies.
This set of criteria is intended for use by accredited Certification Bodies (CBs) to establish compliance and grant certification to AS6081A. It may also be used by others to assess compliance to AS6081A requirements.
This document is intended for use during audits to the requirements of AS5553C. It may be used by all contracting organizations that procure EEE parts, whether such parts are procured directly or integrated into electronic assemblies or equipment as guidance for evaluating compliance to AS5553C.
The content of ARP6328 contains guidance for implementing processes used for risk identification, mitigation, detection, avoidance, disposition, and reporting of counterfeit electrical, electronic, and electromechanical (EEE) parts and assemblies in accordance with AS5553 Revision D. This document may also be used in conjunction with other revisions of AS5553. This document retains guidance contained in the base document of AS5553, updated as appropriate to reflect current practices. This is not intended to stand alone, supersede, or cancel requirements found in other quality management system documents, requirements imposed by contracting authorities, or applicable laws and regulations unless an authorized exemption/variance has been obtained.
This SAE Aerospace Recommended Practice (ARP) is a tool that organizations may use to evaluate a non-authorized supplier’s processes for the prevention, detection, containment, adjudication, and reporting of suspect counterfeit and counterfeit EEE parts. See 3.1.1 and 3.1.2, which reference the use of AS6081 when performing pre-visit self-assessment and on-site assessment of non-authorized suppliers. This ARP is applicable for all organizations that procure EEE parts from suppliers other than authorized sources (e.g., independent distributors).
This SAE Aerospace Standard (AS) standardizes practices to identify reliable sources to procure electrical, electronic, and electromechanical (EEE) parts, assess and mitigate the risk of distributing suspect counterfeit or counterfeit EEE parts, control suspect counterfeit or counterfeit EEE parts, and report incidents of suspect counterfeit and counterfeit EEE parts.
Ensuring security and reliable authentication in manufacturing is a critical national concern, with the U.S. investing billions of dollars in manufacturing. Without such a method readily available, it can be nearly impossible to differentiate an authentic part or component from its counterfeit copy.
XRF technique for counterfeit detection is applicable to electrical, electronic and electromechanical (EEE) parts as listed in AS6171 General Requirements. In general, the detection technique is meant for use on piece parts prior to assembly on a circuit board or on the parts that are removed from a circuit board. The applicability spans a large swath of active, passive and electromechanical parts. If AS6171/3 is invoked in the contract, the base document, AS6171 General Requirements shall also apply.
This test method provides the capabilities, limitations, and suggested possible applications of TGA as it pertains to the detection of counterfeit electronic components. Additionally, this document outlines requirements associated with the application of TGA including: equipment requirements, test sample requirements, methodology, control and calibration, data analysis, reporting, and qualification and certification. If AS6171/10 is invoked in the contract, the base document, AS6171 General Requirements shall also apply.
This document defines capabilities and limitations of FTIR spectroscopy as it pertains to counterfeit electronic component detection and suggests possible applications to these ends. Additionally, this document outlines requirements associated with the application of FTIR spectroscopy including: operator training, sample preparation, various sampling techniques, data interpretation, computerized spectral matching including pass/fail criteria, equipment maintenance, and reporting of data. The discussion is primarily aimed at analyses performed in the mid-infrared (IR) from 400 to 4000 wavenumbers; however, many of the concepts are applicable to the near and far IR. If AS6171/9 is invoked in the contract, the base document, AS6171 General Requirements shall also apply.
The intent of this document is to define the methodology for suspect parts inspection using radiological inspection. The purpose of radiology for suspect counterfeit part inspection is to detect deliberate misrepresentation of a part, either at the part distributor or original equipment manufacturer (OEM) level. Radiological inspection can also potentially detect unintentional damage to the part resulting from improper removal of part from assemblies, which may include, but not limited to, prolonged elevated temperature exposure during desoldering operations or mechanical stresses during removal. Radiological inspection of electronics includes film radiography and filmless radiography such as digital radiography (DR), real time radiography (RTR), and computed tomography (CT). Radiology is an important tool used in part verification of microelectronic devices. Radiographic analysis is performed on parts to verify that the internal package or die construction is consistent with an
The scope of this document is to: 1 Specify techniques to detect SC parts using electrical testing. 2 Provide various levels of electrical testing that can be used by the User to define test plans for detecting SC parts. 3 Provide minimum requirements for testing laboratories so that User/Requester can determine which test houses have the necessary capabilities. (For example: technical knowledge, equipment, procedures and protocols for performing electrical testing for verification analysis.) Note: User/Requester is defined in AS6171 General Requirements 4 Specify Burn-In and environmental tests. The environmental tests include Temperature Cycling for Active Devices and Thermal Shock for Passive Devices. Seal Tests are described and recommended for hermetic devices. The following terminology is used throughout this document: a Shall = is mandatory; b Should = is recommended; and c Will = is planned (is considered to be part of a standard process). If AS6171/7 is invoked in the contract
To define capabilities and limitations of Raman spectroscopy as it pertains to counterfeit detection of EEE parts and suggest possible applications to these ends. Additionally, this document outlines requirements associated with the application of Raman spectroscopy including: Operator training; Sample preparation; Data interpretation; Computerized spectral matching including pass/fail criteria; Equipment maintenance and; Reporting of data. If AS6171/8 is invoked in the contract, the base document, AS6171 General Requirements shall also apply.
This standard is for use by organizations that procure and integrate EEE parts. These organizations may provide EEE parts that are not integrated into assemblies (e.g., spares and/or repair EEE parts). Examples of such organizations include, but are not limited to: original equipment manufacturers; contract assembly manufacturers; maintenance, repair, and overhaul organizations; value-added resellers; and suppliers that provide EEE parts or assemblies as part of a service. The requirements of this standard are generic. These requirements are intended to be applied (or flowed down as applicable) through the supply chain to all organizations that procure EEE parts and/or systems, subsystems, or assemblies, regardless of type, size, and product provided. The mitigation of counterfeit EEE parts in this standard is risk-based and these mitigation steps will vary depending on the criticality of the application, desired performance and reliability of the equipment/hardware. The requirements
The lack of traceability in today’s supply-chain system for auto components makes counterfeiting a significant problem leading to millions of dollars of lost revenue every year and putting the lives of customers at risk. Traditional solutions are usually built upon hardware such as radio-frequency identification (RFID) tags and barcodes, and these solutions cannot stop attacks from supply-chain (insider) parties themselves as they can simply duplicate products in their local database. This industry-academia collaborative work studies the benefits and challenges associated with the use of distributed ledger (or blockchain) technology toward preventing counterfeiting in the presence of malicious supply-chain parties. We illustrate that the provision of a distributed and append-only ledger jointly governed by supply-chain parties themselves makes permissioned blockchains such as Hyperledger Fabric a promising approach toward mitigating counterfeiting. Meanwhile, we demonstrate that the
This document applies to the development of Plans for integrating and managing COTS assemblies in electronic equipment and Systems for the commercial, military, and space markets; as well as other ADHP markets that wish to use this document. For purposes of this document, COTS assemblies are viewed as electronic assemblies such as printed wiring assemblies, relays, disk drives, LCD matrices, VME circuit cards, servers, printers, laptop computers, etc. There are many ways to categorize COTS assemblies1, including the following spectrum: At one end of the spectrum are COTS assemblies whose design, internal parts2, materials, configuration control, traceability, reliability, and qualification methods are at least partially controlled, or influenced, by ADHP customers (either individually or collectively). An example at this end of the spectrum is a VME circuit card assembly. At the other end of the spectrum are COTS assemblies whose design, internal parts, materials, configuration control
This document is intended for use during audits to the requirements of AS5553C. It may be used by all contracting organizations that procure EEE parts, whether such parts are procured directly or integrated into electronic assemblies or equipment as guidance for evaluating compliance to AS5553C.
This standard is for use by organizations that procure and/or integrate and/or repair EEE parts and/or assemblies containing such items, including maintenance, repair, and overhaul (MRO) organizations. The requirements of this standard are generic and intended to be applied/flowed down, as applicable, through the supply chain, to all organizations that procure EEE parts and/or assemblies, regardless of type, size, and product provided. The mitigation of counterfeit EEE parts in this standard is risk-based, and these mitigation steps will vary depending on the criticality of the application, desired performance, and reliability of the equipment/hardware. The requirements of this document are intended to be used in conjunction with a higher-level quality standard (e.g., AS/EN/JISQ9100, ISO-9001, ANSI/ASQC E4, ASME NQA-1, AS9120, AS9003, and ISO/TS 16949 or equivalent) and other quality management system documents. They are not intended to stand alone, supersede, or cancel requirements
This set of criteria can be utilized to assess compliance to AS5553B, Aerospace Standard Counterfeit Electrical, Electronic and Electromechanical (EEE) Parts; Avoidance, Detection, Mitigation, and Disposition.
This SAE Aerospace Standard (AS) standardizes inspection and test procedures, workmanship criteria, and minimum training and certification requirements to detect Suspect/Counterfeit (SC) Electrical, Electronic, and Electromechanical (EEE) parts. The requirements of this document apply once a decision is made to use parts with unknown chain of custody that do not have pedigree back to the original component manufacturer or have been acquired from a broker or independent distributor, or when there are other known risk elements that result in the User/Requester to have concerns about potential SC EEE parts. The tests specified by this standard may also detect occurrences of malicious tampering, although the current version of this standard is not designed specifically for this purpose. This standard ensures consistency across the supply chain for test techniques and requirements based on assessed risk associated with the application, component, supplier, and other relevant risk factors
This document describes the requirements of the following test methods for counterfeit detection of electronic components: a Method A: General EVI, Sample Selection, and Handling b Method B: Detailed EVI, including Part Weight measurement c Method C: Testing for Remarking d Method D: Testing for Resurfacing e Method E: Part Dimensions measurement f Method F: Surface Texture Analysis using SEM The scope of this document is focused on leaded electronic components, microcircuits, multi-chip modules (MCMs), and hybrids. Other EEE components may require evaluations not specified in this procedure. Where applicable this document can be used as a guide. Additional inspections or criteria would need to be developed and documented to thoroughly evaluate these additional part types. If AS6171/2 is invoked in the contract, the base document, AS6171 General Requirements shall also apply.
This document applies to the development of Plans for integrating and managing electronic components in equipment for the military and commercial aerospace markets; as well as other ADHP markets that wish to use this document. Examples of electronic components, as described in this document, include resistors, capacitors, diodes, integrated circuits, hybrids, application specific integrated circuits, wound components, and relays. It is critical for the Plan owner to review and understand the design, materials, configuration control, and qualification methods of all “as-received” electronic components, and their capabilities with respect to the application; identify risks, and where necessary, take additional action to mitigate the risks. The technical requirements are in Clause 3 of this standard, and the administrative requirements are in Clause 4.
The verification matrix (VM) in this slash sheet is intended for use to establish compliance to AS6174A. This slash sheet is applicable to AS6174A. Nothing in this slash sheet, however, supersedes applicable laws and regulations, unless a specific exemption has been obtained through judicial/legal channels.
This standard includes ISO 9001:20152 quality management system requirements and specifies additional aviation, space, and defense industry requirements, definitions, and notes. It is emphasized that the requirements specified in this standard are complementary (not alternative) to customer and applicable statutory and regulatory requirements. If there is a conflict between the requirements of this standard and customer or applicable statutory or regulatory requirements, the latter shall take precedence. This International Standard specifies requirements for a quality management system when an organization: a needs to demonstrate its ability to consistently provide products and services that meet customer and applicable statutory and regulatory requirements, and b aims to enhance customer satisfaction through the effective application of the system, including processes for improvement of the system and the assurance of conformity to customer and applicable statutory and regulatory
This method outlines the requirements, capabilities, and limitations associated with the application of Design Recovery for the detection of counterfeit electronic parts including: Operator training; Sample preparation; Imaging techniques; Data interpretation; Design/functional matching; Equipment maintenance and; Reporting of data. The method is primarily aimed at analyses performed by circuit delayering and imaging with a scanning electron microscope or optical microscope; however, many of the concepts are applicable to other microscope and probing techniques to recover design data. The method is not intended for the purpose of manufacturing copies of a device, but rather to compare images or recover the design for determination of authenticity. If AS6171/11 is invoked in the contract, the base document, AS6171 General Requirements shall also apply.
This method standardizes inspection, test procedures and minimum training and certification requirements to detect Suspect/Counterfeit (SC) Electrical, Electronic, and Electromechanical (EEE) components or parts utilizing Delid/Decapsulation Physical Analysis. The methods described in this document are employed to either delid or remove the cover from a hermetically sealed package or to remove the encapsulation or coating of an EEE part, in order to examine the internal structure and to determine if the part is suspect counterfeit. Information obtained from this inspection and analysis may be used to: a prevent inclusion of counterfeit parts in the assembly b identify defective parts c aid in disposition of parts that exhibit anomalies This test method should not be confused with Destructive Physical Analysis as defined in MIL-STD-1580. MIL-STD-1580 describes destructive physical analysis procedures for inspection and interpretation of quality issues. Due to the destructive nature of
Through the use of ultra-high frequency ultrasound, typically above 10 MHz, Acoustic Microscopy (AM) non-destructively finds and characterizes physical features and latent defects (visualization of interior features in a layer by layer process) - such as material continuity and discontinuities, sub-surface flaws, cracks, voids, delaminations and porosity. AM observed features and defects can be indicators that the components were improperly handled, stored, altered or previously used. If AS6171/6 is invoked in the contract, the base document, AS6171 General Requirements shall also apply.
This document describes the requirements of the following test methods for counterfeit detection of electronic components: a Method A: General External Visual Inspection (EVI), Sample Selection, and Handling b Method B: Detailed EVI c Method C: Testing for Remarking and Resurfacing d Method D: Surface Texture Analysis by SEM NOTE: The scope of this document was focused on leaded electronic components, microcircuits, multi-chip modules (MCMs), and hybrids. Other electronic components may require evaluations not specified in this procedure. Where applicable this document can be used as a guide but additional inspections or criteria would need to be developed and documented to thoroughly evaluate these additional part types.
This document describes an assessment of the effectiveness of a specified test plan used to screen for counterfeit parts. The assessment includes the determination of the types of defects detected using a specified test plan along with the related counterfeit type coverage. The output of this evaluation will produce Counterfeit Defect Coverage (CDC), Counterfeit Type Coverage (CTC), Not-Covered Defects (NCDs), and Under-Covered Defects (UCDs). This information will be supplied to the test laboratory’s customer in both the test report and the Certificate of Quality Conformance (CoQC). This evaluation method does not address the effectiveness of detecting tampered type devices. The Test Evaluation Method also describes an Optimized Test Sequence Selection, in which a test sequence is selected that maximizes the CDC utilizing test cost and time as constraints, for any tier level except the Critical Risk Level. The constraints can be adjusted until the desired CDC is achieved. The output
This SAE Aerospace Standard (AS) standardizes inspection and test procedures, workmanship criteria, and minimum training and certification requirements to detect Suspect/Counterfeit (SC) Electrical, Electronic, and Electromechanical (EEE) parts. The requirements of this document apply once a decision is made to use parts with unknown chain of custody that do not have pedigree back to the original component manufacturer, or have been acquired from a broker or independent distributor, or when there are other known risk elements that result in the User/Requester to have concerns about potential SC EEE parts. The tests specified by this standard may also detect occurrences of malicious tampering, although the current version of this standard is not designed specifically for this purpose. This standard ensures consistency across the supply chain for test techniques and requirements based on assessed risk associated with the application, component, supplier, and other relevant risk factors
This standard is for use by organizations that procure and/or integrate EEE parts and/or assemblies containing such items. The requirements of this standard are generic and intended to be applied/flowed down, as applicable, through the supply chain to all organizations that procure EEE parts and/or assemblies, regardless of type, size, and product provided. The mitigation of counterfeit EEE parts in this standard is risk-based and these mitigation steps will vary depending on the application, desired performance, and reliability of the equipment/hardware. The requirements of this document are intended to supplement the requirements of a higher level quality standard (e.g., AS/EN/JISQ9100, ISO-9001, ANSI/ASQC E4, ASME NQA-1, AS9120, AS9003, and ISO/TS 16949 or equivalent) and other quality management system documents. They are not intended to stand alone, supersede, or cancel requirements found in other quality management system documents, requirements imposed by contracting authorities
This document contains guidance for implementing a counterfeit mitigation program in accordance with AS5553. The information contained in this document is intended to supplement the requirements of a higher level quality standard (e.g., AS9100) and other quality management system documents. This is not intended to stand alone, supersede, or cancel requirements found in other quality management system documents, requirements imposed by contracting authorities, or applicable laws and regulations unless an authorized exemption/variance has been obtained.
Counterfeit parts and materials pose a serious threat to the United States defense supply chain. The National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) of 2012 (Section 818) laid out strict guidelines for DoD prime contractors for detection and avoidance of counterfeit electronic parts1. The Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) identified six federal supply groups in their supply chains that are at high risk for counterfeiting including electrical and electronic components, bearings, hardware and abrasives, pipes and fittings, engine accessories, and vehicle components2. DLA is championing development of anti-counterfeiting technologies that also provide traceability for the parts in its supply chain. A solution called QuanTEK developed by Chromo Logic LLC, involves novel optical imaging methods and has been found to work on a broad class of the DLA identified high-risk federal supply groups.
Since it is impossible to be all inclusive and cover every aspect of the design/validation process, this document can be used as a basis for preparation of a more comprehensive and detailed plan that reflects the accumulated "lessons learned" at a particular company. The following areas are addressed in this document: 1 Contemporary perspective including common validation issues and flaws. 2 A Robustness Validation (RV) process based on SAE J1211 handbook and SAE J2628. 3 Design checklists to aid in such a RV process.
This document applies to the development of Plans for integrating and managing COTS assemblies in electronic equipment and Systems for the commercial, military, and space markets; as well as other ADHP markets that wish to use this document. For purposes of this document, COTS assemblies are viewed as small electronic assemblies such as printed wiring assemblies, relays, disk drives, LCD matrices, VME circuit cards, servers, printers, laptop computers, etc. There are many ways to categorize COTS assemblies1, including the following spectrum: At one end of the spectrum are COTS assemblies whose design, internal parts2, materials, configuration control, and qualification methods are at least partially controlled, or influenced, by aerospace customers (either individually or collectively). An example at this end of the spectrum is a VME circuit card assembly. While the design, internal parts, materials, configuration control, and qualification methods are controlled by the assembly
Items per page:
50
1 – 50 of 94