Browse Topic: Counterfeit parts

Items (97)
Find
Predictive Obsolescence Management2026-26-07806/1/2026
In the field of Aerospace, which has a long Life-Cycle process [20-30Years], Component Obsolescence has become a major problem as it prevents Maintenance & sustenance of a product with committed life-cycle period. Obsolescence Management plays a vital role by deriving strategic plans on proactive obsolescence where the system needs to be supported for several decades. This abstract analyzes the obsolescence challenges in the Aviation industry especially in Avionics System impacted by component obsolescence and present the possible proactive obsolescence management in terms of Engineering, Technology, and business/cost elements. The Obsolescence problem cannot be avoided but the impact of obsolescence and mitigate the risk can be minimized by planning and managing response. The obsolescence risk assessment for the Bill Of Materials (BOM) is a paramount activity to manage obsolescence proactively and cost-effectively. Digital Transformation of analyzing the component obsolescence status and integrated with statistical model to predict the End of Life (EOL) of sub-system/System. The EOL predictions would aid Obsolescence management plan, with mitigation strategies including Form-Fit-Function (FFF) replacements, component life extension through refurbishment, Lead-Free Control plan, component counterfeit and collaborative frameworks for modular, open-standard designs. This approach aimed at reducing unplanned costs by up to 40% on DMSMS (Diminishing Manufacturing Sources and Material Shortages) Management Plan, aligning with IEC 62402 (International standard for obsolescence management) and ARINC 662-1 (Guidelines for obsolescence management in commercial aircraft).
Dharmananyala, Rohith, Munirathnam, Krishna, Marokeyfrancis, Joisyjose, Sadashivaiah, Nagesh, Kondamari, Harshitha
Counterfeit Materiel; Assuring Acquisition of Authentic and Conforming MaterielAS6174B (Current)2/17/2026
This SAE Standard provides requirements and guidance to: Develop a Materiel authenticity plan. Procure Materiel from reliable sources. Assure authenticity and conformance of procured Materiel, including methods such as certification, traceability, testing, and inspection appropriate to the Commodity/item in question. Control Materiel identified as counterfeit. Report Suspect or Counterfeit Materiel to other potential users and Authorities Having Jurisdiction.
G-21 Counterfeit Materiel Committee
Adapter Reducer, Beam Seal - Port Connection, Ring Locked Design, Installation and Removal ofAS5439A (Current)2/16/2026
This SAE Aerospace Standard (AS) provides the essential minimum design, installation, and removal standard for AS4383 adapter reducer and is applicable when specified on engineering drawings, or in procurement documents.
G-3, Aerospace Couplings, Fittings, Hose, Tubing Assemblies
Counterfeit Electrical, Electronic, and Electromechanical (EEE) Parts; Avoidance, Detection, Mitigation, and DispositionAS5553E (Current)11/13/2025
This standard is for use by organizations that procure and integrate EEE Parts. These organizations may provide EEE Parts that are not integrated into assemblies (e.g., spares and/or repair EEE Parts). Examples of such organizations include, but are not limited to, the following: Original Equipment Manufacturers; contract assembly manufacturers; maintenance, repair, and overhaul (MRO) organizations; and suppliers that provide EEE Parts or assemblies as part of a service. These requirements are intended to be applied (or flowed down as applicable) through the supply chain to all organizations that procure and integrate EEE Parts and/or systems, subsystems, or assemblies. The mitigation of Counterfeit EEE Parts in this standard is risk based. These mitigation steps will vary depending on the criticality of the application and desired performance and reliability of the equipment/hardware. The requirements of this document are used in conjunction with the organization’s higher-level quality standard(s) (e.g., AS 9100, ISO 9001, ASQ/ANSI E4, ASME NQA-1, AS9120, or equivalent) and other quality management system documents (e.g., AS9110 used by MRO organizations). They are not intended to stand alone, supersede, or cancel requirements found in other quality management system documents, requirements imposed by contracting authorities, or applicable laws and regulations unless an authorized exemption/variance has been obtained. This document is not intended to make a legal determination of fraud, for which appropriate legal counsel should be consulted for further action. For the purposes of this document, the term “risk” is synonymous with Counterfeit Risk.
G-19 Counterfeit Electronic Parts Committee
Counterfeit FPGA Characterization and Detection with Soft Sensors and Machine Learning2025-01-04579/16/2025
With ongoing microelectronic supply chain issues, the demand for genuine field-programmable gate arrays (FPGAs) is increasing – but so is the occurrence of counterfeit devices. Frequently, devices are used, salvaged from old systems, and repackaged as new. Recycled devices represent the largest class of counterfeit devices and are becoming more rampant with ongoing supply chain challenges. Therefore, it is often necessary to test whether a device is genuine before employing it in a new system. Current methods for evaluating devices are frequently destructive allowing for only small sample testing within lots. Other methods require complex external equipment and cannot be readily deployed throughout the supply chain. Graf Research Corporation has developed a methodology for using soft sensor telemetry bitstreams to characterize an FPGA device and subsequently classify whether a device is a repackaged counterfeit via statistical and machine learning models. The new method utilizes minimal external equipment, is non-destructive, and can be employed at any point throughout the supply chain. DISTRIBUTION A. Approved for public release; distribution unlimited. OPSEC9275.
Batchelor, Whitney, Crofford, Cody, Koiner, James, Winslow, Margaret, Taylor, Mia, Paar, Kevin, Harper, Scott
Counterfeit Electronic, Electrical and Electromechanical Parts: Avoidance, Detection, Mitigation, and Disposition - Authorized DistributionAS6496A (Current)12/3/2024
This SAE Aerospace Standard (AS) identifies the requirements for mitigating Counterfeit EEE parts in the Authorized Distribution Channel. If an organization is not performing Authorized Distribution but acting as another seller (such as an Authorized Reseller, Broker, or Independent Distributor), then only 3.3.1 applies.
G-19 Counterfeit Electronic Parts Committee
Compliance Verification Criterion Standard for AS6081A Counterfeit Electrical, Electronic, and Electromechanical (EEE) Parts: Avoidance, Detection, Mitigation, and Disposition - Independent DistributionAS6301A (Current)9/18/2024
This set of criteria is intended for use by accredited Certification Bodies (CBs) to establish compliance and grant certification to AS6081A. It may also be used by others to assess compliance to AS6081A requirements.
G-19 Counterfeit Electronic Parts Committee
AS5553C, Counterfeit Electrical, Electronic, and Electromechanical (EEE) Parts; Avoidance, Detection, Mitigation, and Disposition Verification CriteriaAS6462D (Current)12/20/2023
This document is intended for use during audits to the requirements of AS5553C. It may be used by all contracting organizations that procure EEE parts, whether such parts are procured directly or integrated into electronic assemblies or equipment as guidance for evaluating compliance to AS5553C.
G-19 Counterfeit Electronic Parts Committee
Guideline for Counterfeit Electrical, Electronic, and Electromechanical (EEE) Parts; Avoidance, Detection, Mitigation, and Disposition SystemsARP6328A (Current)9/7/2023
The content of ARP6328 contains guidance for implementing processes used for risk identification, mitigation, detection, avoidance, disposition, and reporting of counterfeit electrical, electronic, and electromechanical (EEE) parts and assemblies in accordance with AS5553 Revision D. This document may also be used in conjunction with other revisions of AS5553. This document retains guidance contained in the base document of AS5553, updated as appropriate to reflect current practices. This is not intended to stand alone, supersede, or cancel requirements found in other quality management system documents, requirements imposed by contracting authorities, or applicable laws and regulations unless an authorized exemption/variance has been obtained.
G-19 Counterfeit Electronic Parts Committee
Counterfeit Electrical, Electronic, and Electromechanical (EEE) Parts: Tools for Risk Assessment of Other than an Authorized Source (e.g., Independent Distributors)ARP6178A (Current)8/1/2023
This SAE Aerospace Recommended Practice (ARP) is a tool that organizations may use to evaluate a non-authorized supplier’s processes for the prevention, detection, containment, adjudication, and reporting of suspect counterfeit and counterfeit EEE parts. See 3.1.1 and 3.1.2, which reference the use of AS6081 when performing pre-visit self-assessment and on-site assessment of non-authorized suppliers. This ARP is applicable for all organizations that procure EEE parts from suppliers other than authorized sources (e.g., independent distributors).
G-19 Counterfeit Electronic Parts Committee
Counterfeit Electrical, Electronic, and Electromechanical (EEE) Parts: Avoidance, Detection, Mitigation, and Disposition - Independent DistributionAS6081A (Current)4/21/2023
This SAE Aerospace Standard (AS) standardizes practices to identify reliable sources to procure electrical, electronic, and electromechanical (EEE) parts, assess and mitigate the risk of distributing suspect counterfeit or counterfeit EEE parts, control suspect counterfeit or counterfeit EEE parts, and report incidents of suspect counterfeit and counterfeit EEE parts.
G-19 Counterfeit Electronic Parts Committee
Detecting Counterfeit Parts with Additive ManufacturingTBMG-475352/1/2023
Ensuring security and reliable authentication in manufacturing is a critical national concern, with the U.S. investing billions of dollars in manufacturing. Without such a method readily available, it can be nearly impossible to differentiate an authentic part or component from its counterfeit copy.
Techniques for Suspect/Counterfeit EEE Parts Detection by Radiological Test MethodsAS6171/5 (Current)6/28/2022
The intent of this document is to define the methodology for suspect parts inspection using radiological inspection. The purpose of radiology for suspect counterfeit part inspection is to detect deliberate misrepresentation of a part, either at the part distributor or original equipment manufacturer (OEM) level. Radiological inspection can also potentially detect unintentional damage to the part resulting from improper removal of part from assemblies, which may include, but not limited to, prolonged elevated temperature exposure during desoldering operations or mechanical stresses during removal. Radiological inspection of electronics includes film radiography and filmless radiography such as digital radiography (DR), real time radiography (RTR), and computed tomography (CT). Radiology is an important tool used in part verification of microelectronic devices. Radiographic analysis is performed on parts to verify that the internal package or die construction is consistent with an exemplar. In case an exemplar is not available, comparisons should be made within a homogenous sample population using the technical data available for that item. If AS6171/5 is invoked in the contract, the base document, AS6171 General Requirements shall also apply.
G-19A Test Laboratory Standards Development Committee
Techniques for Suspect/Counterfeit EEE Parts Detection by X-Ray Fluorescence Test MethodsAS6171/3 (Current)6/28/2022
XRF technique for counterfeit detection is applicable to electrical, electronic and electromechanical (EEE) parts as listed in AS6171 General Requirements. In general, the detection technique is meant for use on piece parts prior to assembly on a circuit board or on the parts that are removed from a circuit board. The applicability spans a large swath of active, passive and electromechanical parts. If AS6171/3 is invoked in the contract, the base document, AS6171 General Requirements shall also apply.
G-19A Test Laboratory Standards Development Committee
Techniques for Suspect/Counterfeit EEE Parts Detection by Raman Spectroscopy Test MethodsAS6171/8 (Current)6/28/2022
To define capabilities and limitations of Raman spectroscopy as it pertains to counterfeit detection of EEE parts and suggest possible applications to these ends. Additionally, this document outlines requirements associated with the application of Raman spectroscopy including: Operator training; Sample preparation; Data interpretation; Computerized spectral matching including pass/fail criteria; Equipment maintenance and; Reporting of data. If AS6171/8 is invoked in the contract, the base document, AS6171 General Requirements shall also apply.
G-19A Test Laboratory Standards Development Committee
Techniques for Suspect/Counterfeit EEE Parts Detection by Thermogravimetric Analysis (TGA) Test MethodsAS6171/10 (Current)6/28/2022
This test method provides the capabilities, limitations, and suggested possible applications of TGA as it pertains to the detection of counterfeit electronic components. Additionally, this document outlines requirements associated with the application of TGA including: equipment requirements, test sample requirements, methodology, control and calibration, data analysis, reporting, and qualification and certification. If AS6171/10 is invoked in the contract, the base document, AS6171 General Requirements shall also apply.
G-19A Test Laboratory Standards Development Committee
Techniques for Suspect/Counterfeit EEE Parts Detection by Electrical Test MethodsAS6171/7 (Current)6/28/2022
The scope of this document is to: 1 Specify techniques to detect SC parts using electrical testing. 2 Provide various levels of electrical testing that can be used by the User to define test plans for detecting SC parts. 3 Provide minimum requirements for testing laboratories so that User/Requester can determine which test houses have the necessary capabilities. (For example: technical knowledge, equipment, procedures and protocols for performing electrical testing for verification analysis.) Note: User/Requester is defined in AS6171 General Requirements 4 Specify Burn-In and environmental tests. The environmental tests include Temperature Cycling for Active Devices and Thermal Shock for Passive Devices. Seal Tests are described and recommended for hermetic devices. The following terminology is used throughout this document: a Shall = is mandatory; b Should = is recommended; and c Will = is planned (is considered to be part of a standard process). If AS6171/7 is invoked in the contract, the base document, AS6171 General Requirements shall also apply.
G-19A Test Laboratory Standards Development Committee
Techniques for Suspect/Counterfeit EEE Parts Detection by Fourier Transform Infrared Spectroscopy (FTIR) Test MethodsAS6171/9 (Current)6/28/2022
This document defines capabilities and limitations of FTIR spectroscopy as it pertains to counterfeit electronic component detection and suggests possible applications to these ends. Additionally, this document outlines requirements associated with the application of FTIR spectroscopy including: operator training, sample preparation, various sampling techniques, data interpretation, computerized spectral matching including pass/fail criteria, equipment maintenance, and reporting of data. The discussion is primarily aimed at analyses performed in the mid-infrared (IR) from 400 to 4000 wavenumbers; however, many of the concepts are applicable to the near and far IR. If AS6171/9 is invoked in the contract, the base document, AS6171 General Requirements shall also apply.
G-19A Test Laboratory Standards Development Committee
Counterfeit Electrical, Electronic, and Electromechanical (EEE) Parts; Avoidance, Detection, Mitigation, and DispositionAS5553D (Historical)4/14/2022
This standard is for use by organizations that procure and integrate EEE parts. These organizations may provide EEE parts that are not integrated into assemblies (e.g., spares and/or repair EEE parts). Examples of such organizations include, but are not limited to: original equipment manufacturers; contract assembly manufacturers; maintenance, repair, and overhaul organizations; value-added resellers; and suppliers that provide EEE parts or assemblies as part of a service. The requirements of this standard are generic. These requirements are intended to be applied (or flowed down as applicable) through the supply chain to all organizations that procure EEE parts and/or systems, subsystems, or assemblies, regardless of type, size, and product provided. The mitigation of counterfeit EEE parts in this standard is risk-based and these mitigation steps will vary depending on the criticality of the application, desired performance and reliability of the equipment/hardware. The requirements of this document are intended to be used in conjunction with a higher-level quality standard (e.g., AS/EN/JISQ9100, ISO-9001, ANSI/ASQC E4, ASME NQA-1, AS9120, AS9003, or equivalent) and other quality management system documents. They are not intended to stand alone, supersede, or cancel requirements found in other quality management system documents, requirements imposed by contracting authorities, or applicable laws and regulations unless an authorized exemption/variance has been obtained. This document is not intended to make a legal determination of fraud, and appropriate legal counsel should be consulted for further action.
G-19 Counterfeit Electronic Parts Committee
Toward Privacy-Aware Traceability for Automotive Supply Chains11-04-02-00047/14/2021
The lack of traceability in today’s supply-chain system for auto components makes counterfeiting a significant problem leading to millions of dollars of lost revenue every year and putting the lives of customers at risk. Traditional solutions are usually built upon hardware such as radio-frequency identification (RFID) tags and barcodes, and these solutions cannot stop attacks from supply-chain (insider) parties themselves as they can simply duplicate products in their local database. This industry-academia collaborative work studies the benefits and challenges associated with the use of distributed ledger (or blockchain) technology toward preventing counterfeiting in the presence of malicious supply-chain parties. We illustrate that the provision of a distributed and append-only ledger jointly governed by supply-chain parties themselves makes permissioned blockchains such as Hyperledger Fabric a promising approach toward mitigating counterfeiting. Meanwhile, we demonstrate that the privacy of supply-chain parties can be preserved as competing supply-chain parties strive to protect their businesses from the prying eyes of competitors and counterparties. Besides, we show that the recall process can be achieved efficiently with the help of the blockchain. The proposed solution, Fordchain, overcomes the challenges to achieve the best of both worlds: a solution to the counterfeiting problem using distributed ledger technology while providing accountability and the privacy notions of interest for supply-chain parties. Although our efforts to build a blockchain-based counterfeiting prevention system aim at automotive supply chains, the lessons learned are highly applicable to other supply chains. We end-to-end implement our Fordchain solution in the Hyperledger Fabric framework, analyze it over AWS EC2 clusters, and illustrate that the performance of our solution is good enough to be applied in practice.
Lu, Donghang, Moreno-Sanchez, Pedro, Mitra, Pramita, Feldman, Ken, Fodale, Josh, Kosofsky, Jason, Kate, Aniket
Methods to Address Specific Issues Related to COTS Electronic Components in Airborne Electronic HardwareARP7495 (Current)11/9/2020
This ARP is not a certification document; it contains no certification requirements beyond those already contained in existing certification documents. The purpose of this ARP is to provide more detailed descriptions of the 12 hardware-related COTS issues listed in Appendix B, and to provide recommendations on existing practices, processes, and methods to address them. This ARP also describes artifacts that may be used as evidence that the issues have been addressed. The recommended practices and artifacts may be used to facilitate communication between, for example, the provider and the user of the avionics systems into which COTS components are integrated, or between the applicant for certification and the certification body. This ARP does not claim that the recommended practices and artifacts described in this ARP are the only acceptable ones. They are, however, used widely today, and merit serious consideration where applicable in the avionics system design and certification processes. COTS components, by definition, typically have not been designed specifically for the aerospace applications or environments in which they will be used. In many cases, the design data for COTS components is limited or not available, compromising the ability of the integrator of the COTS components into aerospace systems to fully assess their functions and failure modes, and consequently their impact on the system performance (intended and unintended) and safety. Nevertheless, the organization that integrates COTS components into avionics systems is responsible to assure that the system is functional and airworthy. The avionics system design and development process, therefore, needs to take into account the use of COTS components, and the evidence and artifacts that are produced and used to demonstrate that the implementation satisfies the allocated requirements and provides the level of confidence, consistent with airworthiness requirements. Various methods may be considered to accomplish the above, broad categories of which include (but are not limited to): Design and conduct additional tests and analyses of the COTS component, beyond those conducted by its supplier, to assure that the COTS component will perform its allocated function reliably in its application; Modify the avionics system design to reduce operating and environmental stresses on the COTS component; Modify the avionics system design to provide assurance the system will perform its allocated function reliably, even if the COTS component were to fail; Modify the avionics system operating and maintenance practices to prevent premature failure of the avionics system; and Any additional practices needed by the application. The 12 issues addressed in this ARP are likely to be relevant for the foreseeable future; however, it also is likely that additional issues will emerge, as COTS component technology continues to progress, and as avionics system reliance on their use continues to increase.
APMC Avionics Process Management
Requirements for a COTS Assembly Management PlanEIA933C (Historical)8/3/2020
This document applies to the development of Plans for integrating and managing COTS assemblies in electronic equipment and Systems for the commercial, military, and space markets; as well as other ADHP markets that wish to use this document. For purposes of this document, COTS assemblies are viewed as electronic assemblies such as printed wiring assemblies, relays, disk drives, LCD matrices, VME circuit cards, servers, printers, laptop computers, etc. There are many ways to categorize COTS assemblies1, including the following spectrum: At one end of the spectrum are COTS assemblies whose design, internal parts2, materials, configuration control, traceability, reliability, and qualification methods are at least partially controlled, or influenced, by ADHP customers (either individually or collectively). An example at this end of the spectrum is a VME circuit card assembly. At the other end of the spectrum are COTS assemblies whose design, internal parts, materials, configuration control, and qualification methods are not controlled, or controllable, in any way by ADHP customers (either individually or collectively). An example is a disk drive targeted for an industry other than ADHP use. It is critical for the Plan owner to (1) review and understand the design, internal parts, materials, configuration control, reliability and qualification methods of all “as-received” COTS assemblies3, and their capabilities with respect to their application in the intended System and environment; (2) identify risks, and where necessary, (3) take additional action to mitigate the risks associated with the performance and reliability of the COTS assembly in the ADHP system.
APMC Avionics Process Management
Counterfeit Materiel, Assuring Acquisition of Authentic and Conforming FastenersAS6832 (Current)6/9/2020
The purpose of this document is to provide detailed requirements to preclude the use of suspect counterfeit or counterfeit fasteners. The requirements of this document are intended to supplement the requirements of a higher-level quality standard (e.g., AS/EN/JISQ9100, ISO 9001, ANSI/ASQC E4, ASME NQA-1, AS9120, AS9003, and ISO/TS 16949 or equivalent) and other quality management system documents. Fasteners are defined as United States Federal Supply Classification Group codes as shown in the following list: This document applies to metallic and non-metallic components that mechanically attach two or more objects: fasteners, screws, bolts, rivets (blind, solid, tubular), inserts, washers, nuts, latching handles, clamps, pins, nails, retainers, etc. If locking or treatment elements such as glue, adhesives, anti-galling, lubricant, or other materials are part of the fastener specifications, then those items are within the scope of this document. For metallic raw materials used in the manufacturing of fasteners, refer to AS6279. This document does not apply to connectors such as pneumatic or hydraulic fittings and electrical connectors. Appendices A, B, C, and D are guidance.
G-21 Counterfeit Materiel Committee
Products of Tomorrow: May 2020TBMG-368635/1/2020
This column presents technologies that have applications in commercial areas, possibly creating the products of tomorrow. To learn more about each technology, see the contact information provided for that innovation.
Marking Aircraft ComponentsTBMG-3568312/1/2019
Numbers are critical to the smooth functioning of the international aerospace industry. Regulatory authorities such as the Federal Aviation Authority (FAA) and the US Department of Defense (DoD) mandate that aero components be permanently marked to ensure authenticity and traceability throughout the supply chain and into service.
AS5553C, Counterfeit Electrical, Electronic, and Electromechanical (EEE) Parts; Avoidance, Detection, Mitigation, and Disposition Verification CriteriaAS6462C (Historical)11/14/2019
This document is intended for use during audits to the requirements of AS5553C. It may be used by all contracting organizations that procure EEE parts, whether such parts are procured directly or integrated into electronic assemblies or equipment as guidance for evaluating compliance to AS5553C.
G-19 Counterfeit Electronic Parts Committee
Supply Chain Vulnerabilities Impacting Commercial AviationT-1389/4/2019
Written by Kirsten Koepsel, a lawyer and engineer whose work has focused on aviation cybersecurity, Supply Chain Vulnerabilities Impacting Commercial Aviation addresses the big question facing aircraft manufacturers today: keep the work in house or outsource it? The ongoing battle between cost cutting and supply-chain control is ever more visible as aircraft OEMs have full order books and tight delivery schedules. Since the 1980s, commercial aviation, like many other industries, looked for ways of more economically sourcing parts and services. The new partnerships between OEMs and suppliers at multiple levels, did make the industry nimbler and more flexible. Yet, it also introduced a higher level of instability, risks and vulnerabilities to the aviation ecosystem. Supply Chain Vulnerabilities Impacting Commercial Aviation discusses the differences in requirements depending on the buyer of the aircraft (governmental or not), ranging from delivery delays to risks linked to cybersecurity and the Internet of Things (IoT), including possible problems with faulty sensors and counterfeit parts. The book also analyses the consequences of not having visibility into lower-tier suppliers, and how prepared they are when it comes to possible disruptions such as earthquakes or political unrest.
Koepsel, Kirsten M.
Terms, Definitions, and Acronyms Counterfeit Materiel or Electrical, Electronic, and Electromechanical PartsAIR6273 (Current)7/30/2019
The SAE Aerospace Information Report (AIR) provides standardized terms, definitions, and acronyms that may be used in the G-19 and G-21 documents, unless otherwise specified in those documents. The SAE International series of documents that address the mitigation of suspect and counterfeit parts will reference this document in their respective Applicable Documents sections. This AIR is for use by organizations that procure and/or use materiel or EEE parts. The terms and definitions of this AIR are intended to be used in conjunction with other G-19 and G-21 standards.
G-19 Counterfeit Electronic Parts Committee
Counterfeit Electrical, Electronic, and Electromechanical (EEE) Parts; Avoidance, Detection, Mitigation, and DispositionAS5553C (Historical)3/26/2019
This standard is for use by organizations that procure and/or integrate and/or repair EEE parts and/or assemblies containing such items, including maintenance, repair, and overhaul (MRO) organizations. The requirements of this standard are generic and intended to be applied/flowed down, as applicable, through the supply chain, to all organizations that procure EEE parts and/or assemblies, regardless of type, size, and product provided. The mitigation of counterfeit EEE parts in this standard is risk-based, and these mitigation steps will vary depending on the criticality of the application, desired performance, and reliability of the equipment/hardware. The requirements of this document are intended to be used in conjunction with a higher-level quality standard (e.g., AS/EN/JISQ9100, ISO-9001, ANSI/ASQC E4, ASME NQA-1, AS9120, AS9003, and ISO/TS 16949 or equivalent) and other quality management system documents. They are not intended to stand alone, supersede, or cancel requirements found in other quality management system documents, requirements imposed by contracting authorities, or applicable laws and regulations unless an authorized exemption/variance has been obtained. This document is not intended to make a legal determination of fraud, and appropriate legal counsel should be consulted for further action.
G-19 Counterfeit Electronic Parts Committee
AS5553B, Counterfeit Electrical, Electronic and Electromechanical (EEE) Parts; Avoidance, Detection, Mitigation, and Disposition Verification CriteriaAS6462B (Historical)3/26/2019
This set of criteria can be utilized to assess compliance to AS5553B, Aerospace Standard Counterfeit Electrical, Electronic and Electromechanical (EEE) Parts; Avoidance, Detection, Mitigation, and Disposition.
G-19 Counterfeit Electronic Parts Committee
Counterfeit Parts and Their Impact on the Supply Chain, Second EditionT-13611/15/2018
Why should the supply chain be concerned if their buyers or subcontractors are purchasing counterfeit electronic parts or if their products contain counterfeit electronic parts? If these parts end up in items that are safety critical and security-risk sensitive such as aviation, space, and defense products, whole secure systems can be comprised. As organizations have become aware of counterfeit parts, one of their responses may be to test upon acceptance or prior to receipt. But testing alone may not detect all counterfeits. Possible sources of counterfeits include products that did not meet quality control requirements and were not destroyed, overruns sold into the market place, unauthorized production shifts, theft, and e-waste. The counterfeited electronic part ends up in the supply chain when ordered by an unsuspecting buyer, who does not confirm the originating source of the part. The second edition of Counterfeit Parts and Their Impact on the Supply Chain expands on the latest insights of what is really happening in the world of supply chains, quality monitoring and testing, counterfeiting mitigation and avoidance strategy. It brings new light into the consequences of weak supply-chain monitoring and how costs, reliability and reputation are negatively impacted by counterfeit products and components.
Koepsel, Kirsten M.
Requirements for Accreditation Bodies when Accrediting Test Laboratories Performing Detection of Suspect/Counterfeit in Accordance with AS6171 General Requirements and the Associated Test MethodsAS6810 (Current)5/16/2018
The criteria defined herein shall be utilized by an ISO/IEC 17025 Accreditation Body (AB) to establish conformance with AS6171 Test Methods Standard; General Requirements, Suspect/Counterfeit, Electrical, Electronic, and Electromechanical Parts and associated AS6171 Test Methods requested/included on the scope of accreditation.
G-19A Test Laboratory Standards Development Committee
Test Methods Standard; General Requirements, Suspect/Counterfeit, Electrical, Electronic, and Electromechanical PartsAS6171A (Current)4/18/2018
This SAE Aerospace Standard (AS) standardizes inspection and test procedures, workmanship criteria, and minimum training and certification requirements to detect Suspect/Counterfeit (SC) Electrical, Electronic, and Electromechanical (EEE) parts. The requirements of this document apply once a decision is made to use parts with unknown chain of custody that do not have pedigree back to the original component manufacturer or have been acquired from a broker or independent distributor, or when there are other known risk elements that result in the User/Requester to have concerns about potential SC EEE parts. The tests specified by this standard may also detect occurrences of malicious tampering, although the current version of this standard is not designed specifically for this purpose. This standard ensures consistency across the supply chain for test techniques and requirements based on assessed risk associated with the application, component, supplier, and other relevant risk factors. The requirements of this document supplement the requirements of a higher-level quality standard (e.g., AS9100, AS9003, AS9120, ISO 9001) and other quality management system documents. They are not intended to stand alone, supersede, or cancel requirements found in other quality management system documents, or requirements imposed by contracting authorities. This standard should be implemented when other risk mitigation methods for avoiding the use of SC EEE parts (e.g., acquiring all parts from Authorized Sources, redesigning the system, having obsolete parts emulated, etc.) are either unavailable or inadequate. This standard mitigates the technical risk of performing insufficient inspection and test to determine suspect counterfeit EEE parts. This standard is not intended to be used to assess quality or reliability issues that may arise because of component production issues or due to mishandling, improper storage, or other attributes specific to quality or reliability. The following terminology is used throughout this document and associated AS6171 Slash Sheets: a Shall = is mandatory; b Should = is recommended; and c Will = is planned (is considered to be part of a standard process). This standard should be utilized when parts are not available from sources with known traceability to the Original Component Manufacturer (OCM), Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) for electromechanical parts, or authorized manufacturer. The requirements of this document specify testing based on acceptable levels of risk for a program or customer, to identify anomalies or performance issues that may indicate suspect counterfeit and counterfeit activity. No amount of testing can confirm an item as authentic; this would require that there be a known, unbroken chain of custody to the OCM/OEM or authorized manufacturer. Therefore, organizations should attempt to obtain parts from sources that have known traceability to the OCM or authorized manufacturer to avoid receiving counterfeit parts. All intermediaries from the origin (i.e., OCM/OEM or authorized manufacturer) to the final destination should consist of Trusted Suppliers, and transportation should be provided by logistics carriers that have documented processes and procedures to avoid tampering or substitution during the journey to the parts’ final destination. A preference should be given to parts with known pedigree over parts with unknown pedigree to avoid counterfeit parts. This standard does not apply to parts obtained directly from a Trustworthy Authorized Supplier with traceability to the OCM/OEM or authorized manufacturer. This standard does not have specific test methods to determine if an item is a Fraudulent Part beyond what is considered counterfeit. Test data on anomalies can be gathered for potential legal determination of fraudulent intent or negligence. This document does not make a legal determination of fraud, and appropriate legal counsel should be consulted for further action. Unless otherwise specified in the SOW or PO by the User/Requester, the information in the Appendices is not considered mandatory.
G-19A Test Laboratory Standards Development Committee
Additive Manufacturing Unique SerializationTBMG-283062/1/2018
Current methods of identifying a unique part involve adding a unique serial number to the part. There are many reasons that manufactured parts receive a serial number. They enable traceability of a part throughout its lifecycle, and ensure the part is not a counterfeit; however, labels and stamped codes can be removed or replicated.
Techniques for Suspect/Counterfeit EEE Parts Detection by External Visual Inspection, Remarking and Resurfacing, and Surface Texture Analysis Using SEM Test MethodsAS6171/2A (Current)5/11/2017
This document describes the requirements of the following test methods for counterfeit detection of electronic components: a Method A: General EVI, Sample Selection, and Handling b Method B: Detailed EVI, including Part Weight measurement c Method C: Testing for Remarking d Method D: Testing for Resurfacing e Method E: Part Dimensions measurement f Method F: Surface Texture Analysis using SEM The scope of this document is focused on leaded electronic components, microcircuits, multi-chip modules (MCMs), and hybrids. Other EEE components may require evaluations not specified in this procedure. Where applicable this document can be used as a guide. Additional inspections or criteria would need to be developed and documented to thoroughly evaluate these additional part types. If AS6171/2 is invoked in the contract, the base document, AS6171 General Requirements shall also apply.
G-19A Test Laboratory Standards Development Committee
Requirements for an Electronic Components Management PlanEIASTD4899C (Historical)5/9/2017
This document applies to the development of Plans for integrating and managing electronic components in equipment for the military and commercial aerospace markets; as well as other ADHP markets that wish to use this document. Examples of electronic components, as described in this document, include resistors, capacitors, diodes, integrated circuits, hybrids, application specific integrated circuits, wound components, and relays. It is critical for the Plan owner to review and understand the design, materials, configuration control, and qualification methods of all “as-received” electronic components, and their capabilities with respect to the application; identify risks, and where necessary, take additional action to mitigate the risks. The technical requirements are in Clause 3 of this standard, and the administrative requirements are in Clause 4.
APMC Avionics Process Management
Compliance Verification Matrix (VM) Slash Sheet for AS6174A, Counterfeit Materiel; Assuring Acquisition of Authentic and Conforming MaterielAS6174/1 (Historical)4/11/2017
The verification matrix (VM) in this slash sheet is intended for use to establish compliance to AS6174A. This slash sheet is applicable to AS6174A. Nothing in this slash sheet, however, supersedes applicable laws and regulations, unless a specific exemption has been obtained through judicial/legal channels.
G-21 Counterfeit Materiel Committee
Additive manufacturing17MEIP03_023/1/2017
How 3D printing will transform the A&D support chain 3D printing, or additive manufacturing (AM), is quickly becoming a ‘must have’ for aerospace and defense (A&D) manufacturers rather than just a luxury R&D project with the A&D sector now contributing 12 percent of 3D printing's $3.1 billion global revenue. A&D companies began experimenting with 3D printing as early as 1988, and industry leaders are now starting to recognize the unique capabilities of 3D printing, and searching for ways to exploit them. The U.S. Navy is currently working on 3D manufacturing at sea, which would revolutionize the military support chain, while in civil aviation, companies such as Boeing and Airbus have been using the process to manufacture components for over two years. In the future, 3D printers will allow commercial aviation manufacturers to print parts for aircraft under construction, in addition to defense manufacturers and service providers producing replacement parts on demand for damaged equipment to support defense operations. Despite the increased uptake of 3D printing in A&D we have only glimpsed the tip of a large and growing iceberg.
Additive Manufacturing: How 3D Printing Will Transform the A&D Support ChainTBMG-2608912/1/2016
3D printing, or additive manufacturing (AM), is quickly becoming a 'must have' for aerospace and defense (A&D) manufacturers rather than just a luxury R&D project with the A&D sector now contributing 12 percent of 3D printing's $3.1 billion global revenue. A&D companies began experimenting with 3D printing as early as 1988, and industry leaders are now starting to recognize the unique capabilities of 3D printing, and searching for ways to exploit them. The U.S. Navy is currently working on 3D manufacturing at sea, which would revolutionize the military support chain, while in civil aviation, companies such as Boeing and Airbus have been using the process to manufacture components for over two years.
Counterfeit Parts & Materials Risk MitigationTB0003A (Current)11/8/2016
This Technical Bulletin covers the following areas of concern. Prevention: Actions recommended for procuring parts and materials with a full warranty; Actions recommended for minimizing risks and protecting your Program from counterfeiting; Actions recommended when buying from a non-authorized supplier. Detection: Actions recommended when procuring parts from an unauthorized supplier or otherwise suspect that a part or material at risk of being counterfeit has been procured. Risk Mitigation: Actions recommended when no reasonable alternatives exist (e.g., a redesign is required, an unacceptable schedule delay will result, the program or customer cannot bear the additional cost) and the decision has been made to procure from a non-authorized supplier.
CE-12 Solid State Devices
Quality Management Systems – Requirements for Aviation, Space, and Defense DistributorsAS9120B (Current)11/1/2016
This standard includes ISO 9001:20152 quality management system requirements and specifies additional aviation, space, and defense industry requirements, definitions, and notes. It is emphasized that the requirements specified in this standard are complementary (not alternative) to customer and applicable statutory and regulatory requirements. If there is a conflict between the requirements of this standard and customer or applicable statutory or regulatory requirements, the latter shall take precedence. This International Standard specifies requirements for a quality management system when an organization: a needs to demonstrate its ability to consistently provide products and services that meet customer and applicable statutory and regulatory requirements, and b aims to enhance customer satisfaction through the effective application of the system, including processes for improvement of the system and the assurance of conformity to customer and applicable statutory and regulatory requirements. All the requirements of this International Standard are generic and are intended to be applicable to any organization, regardless of its type or size, or the products and services it provides.
G-14 Americas Aerospace Quality Standards Committee (AAQSC)
Test Methods Standard; General Requirements, Suspect/Counterfeit, Electrical, Electronic, and Electromechanical PartsAS6171 (Historical)10/30/2016
This SAE Aerospace Standard (AS) standardizes inspection and test procedures, workmanship criteria, and minimum training and certification requirements to detect Suspect/Counterfeit (SC) Electrical, Electronic, and Electromechanical (EEE) parts. The requirements of this document apply once a decision is made to use parts with unknown chain of custody that do not have pedigree back to the original component manufacturer, or have been acquired from a broker or independent distributor, or when there are other known risk elements that result in the User/Requester to have concerns about potential SC EEE parts. The tests specified by this standard may also detect occurrences of malicious tampering, although the current version of this standard is not designed specifically for this purpose. This standard ensures consistency across the supply chain for test techniques and requirements based on assessed risk associated with the application, component, supplier, and other relevant risk factors. The requirements of this document supplement the requirements of a higher level quality standard (e.g., AS9100, AS9003, AS9120, ISO 9001) and other quality management system documents. They are not intended to stand alone, supersede, or cancel requirements found in other quality management system documents, or requirements imposed by contracting authorities. This standard should be implemented when other risk mitigation methods for avoiding the use of SC EEE parts (e.g., acquiring all parts from Authorized Sources, redesigning the system, having obsolete parts emulated, etc.) are either unavailable or inadequate. This standard mitigates the technical risk of performing insufficient inspection and test to determine suspect counterfeit EEE parts. This standard is not intended to be used to assess quality or reliability issues that may arise because of component production issues or due to mishandling, improper storage, or other attributes specific to quality or reliability. The following terminology is used throughout this document and associated AS6171 Slash Sheets: a Shall = is mandatory; b Should = is recommended; and c Will = is planned (is considered to be part of a standard process). This standard should be utilized when parts are not available from sources with known traceability to the Original Component Manufacturer (OCM), Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) for electromechanical parts, or authorized manufacturer. The requirements of this document specify testing based on acceptable levels of risk for a program or customer, to identify anomalies or performance issues that may indicate suspect counterfeit and counterfeit activity. No amount of testing can confirm an item as authentic; this would require that there be a known, unbroken chain of custody to the OCM/OEM or authorized manufacturer. Therefore, organizations should attempt to obtain parts from sources that have known traceability to the OCM or authorized manufacturer to avoid receiving counterfeit parts. All intermediaries from the origin (i.e., OCM/OEM or authorized manufacturer) to the final destination should consist of Trusted Suppliers, and transportation should be provided by logistics carriers that have documented processes and procedures to avoid tampering or substitution during the journey to the parts’ final destination. A preference should be given to parts with known pedigree over parts with unknown pedigree to avoid counterfeit parts. This standard does not apply to parts obtained directly from a Trustworthy Authorized Supplier with traceability to the OCM/OEM or authorized manufacturer. This standard does not have specific test methods to determine if an item is a Fraudulent Part beyond what is considered counterfeit. Test data on anomalies can be gathered for potential legal determination of fraudulent intent or negligence. This document does not make a legal determination of fraud, and appropriate legal counsel should be consulted for further action. Unless otherwise specified in the SOW or PO by the User/Requester, the information in the Appendices is not considered mandatory.
G-19A Test Laboratory Standards Development Committee
Techniques for Suspect/Counterfeit EEE Parts Detection by External Visual Inspection, Remarking and Resurfacing, and Surface Texture Analysis Test MethodsAS6171/2 (Historical)10/30/2016
This document describes the requirements of the following test methods for counterfeit detection of electronic components: a Method A: General External Visual Inspection (EVI), Sample Selection, and Handling b Method B: Detailed EVI c Method C: Testing for Remarking and Resurfacing d Method D: Surface Texture Analysis by SEM NOTE: The scope of this document was focused on leaded electronic components, microcircuits, multi-chip modules (MCMs), and hybrids. Other electronic components may require evaluations not specified in this procedure. Where applicable this document can be used as a guide but additional inspections or criteria would need to be developed and documented to thoroughly evaluate these additional part types.
G-19A Test Laboratory Standards Development Committee
Techniques for Suspect/Counterfeit EEE Parts Detection by Delid/Decapsulation Physical Analysis Test MethodsAS6171/4 (Current)10/30/2016
This method standardizes inspection, test procedures and minimum training and certification requirements to detect Suspect/Counterfeit (SC) Electrical, Electronic, and Electromechanical (EEE) components or parts utilizing Delid/Decapsulation Physical Analysis. The methods described in this document are employed to either delid or remove the cover from a hermetically sealed package or to remove the encapsulation or coating of an EEE part, in order to examine the internal structure and to determine if the part is suspect counterfeit. Information obtained from this inspection and analysis may be used to: a prevent inclusion of counterfeit parts in the assembly b identify defective parts c aid in disposition of parts that exhibit anomalies This test method should not be confused with Destructive Physical Analysis as defined in MIL-STD-1580. MIL-STD-1580 describes destructive physical analysis procedures for inspection and interpretation of quality issues. Due to the destructive nature of the test method that allows access to materials, design and layout information, the method may also enable observation of trends in design and material or process changes undertaken by the device manufacturer. If AS6171/4 is invoked in the contract, the base document, AS6171 General Requirements shall also apply.
G-19A Test Laboratory Standards Development Committee
Suspect/Counterfeit Test Evaluation MethodAS6171/1 (Current)10/30/2016
This document describes an assessment of the effectiveness of a specified test plan used to screen for counterfeit parts. The assessment includes the determination of the types of defects detected using a specified test plan along with the related counterfeit type coverage. The output of this evaluation will produce Counterfeit Defect Coverage (CDC), Counterfeit Type Coverage (CTC), Not-Covered Defects (NCDs), and Under-Covered Defects (UCDs). This information will be supplied to the test laboratory’s customer in both the test report and the Certificate of Quality Conformance (CoQC). This evaluation method does not address the effectiveness of detecting tampered type devices. The Test Evaluation Method also describes an Optimized Test Sequence Selection, in which a test sequence is selected that maximizes the CDC utilizing test cost and time as constraints, for any tier level except the Critical Risk Level. The constraints can be adjusted until the desired CDC is achieved. The output of the Optimized Test Sequence Selection also includes CTC, NCDs, and UCDs. If AS6171/1 is invoked in the contract, the base document, AS6171 General Requirements shall also apply.
G-19A Test Laboratory Standards Development Committee
Techniques for Suspect/Counterfeit EEE Parts Detection by Design Recovery Test MethodsAS6171/11 (Current)10/30/2016
This method outlines the requirements, capabilities, and limitations associated with the application of Design Recovery for the detection of counterfeit electronic parts including: Operator training; Sample preparation; Imaging techniques; Data interpretation; Design/functional matching; Equipment maintenance and; Reporting of data. The method is primarily aimed at analyses performed by circuit delayering and imaging with a scanning electron microscope or optical microscope; however, many of the concepts are applicable to other microscope and probing techniques to recover design data. The method is not intended for the purpose of manufacturing copies of a device, but rather to compare images or recover the design for determination of authenticity. If AS6171/11 is invoked in the contract, the base document, AS6171 General Requirements shall also apply.
G-19A Test Laboratory Standards Development Committee
Techniques for Suspect/Counterfeit EEE Parts Detection by Acoustic Microscopy (AM) Test MethodsAS6171/6 (Current)10/30/2016
Through the use of ultra-high frequency ultrasound, typically above 10 MHz, Acoustic Microscopy (AM) non-destructively finds and characterizes physical features and latent defects (visualization of interior features in a layer by layer process) - such as material continuity and discontinuities, sub-surface flaws, cracks, voids, delaminations and porosity. AM observed features and defects can be indicators that the components were improperly handled, stored, altered or previously used. If AS6171/6 is invoked in the contract, the base document, AS6171 General Requirements shall also apply.
G-19A Test Laboratory Standards Development Committee
Guideline for Development of Counterfeit Electronic Parts; Avoidance, Detection, Mitigation, and Disposition SystemsARP6328 (Historical)9/12/2016
This document contains guidance for implementing a counterfeit mitigation program in accordance with AS5553. The information contained in this document is intended to supplement the requirements of a higher level quality standard (e.g., AS9100) and other quality management system documents. This is not intended to stand alone, supersede, or cancel requirements found in other quality management system documents, requirements imposed by contracting authorities, or applicable laws and regulations unless an authorized exemption/variance has been obtained.
G-19 Counterfeit Electronic Parts Committee
Counterfeit Electrical, Electronic, and Electromechanical (EEE) Parts; Avoidance, Detection, Mitigation, and DispositionAS5553B (Historical)9/12/2016
This standard is for use by organizations that procure and/or integrate EEE parts and/or assemblies containing such items. The requirements of this standard are generic and intended to be applied/flowed down, as applicable, through the supply chain to all organizations that procure EEE parts and/or assemblies, regardless of type, size, and product provided. The mitigation of counterfeit EEE parts in this standard is risk-based and these mitigation steps will vary depending on the application, desired performance, and reliability of the equipment/hardware. The requirements of this document are intended to supplement the requirements of a higher level quality standard (e.g., AS/EN/JISQ9100, ISO-9001, ANSI/ASQC E4, ASME NQA-1, AS9120, AS9003, and ISO/TS 16949 or equivalent) and other quality management system documents. They are not intended to stand alone, supersede, or cancel requirements found in other quality management system documents, requirements imposed by contracting authorities, or applicable laws and regulations unless an authorized exemption/variance has been obtained. This document is not intended to make a legal determination of fraud, and appropriate legal counsel should be consulted for further action.
G-19 Counterfeit Electronic Parts Committee
Using Optical Imaging to Combat Counterfeit ComponentsTBMG-243023/1/2016
Counterfeit parts and materials pose a serious threat to the United States defense supply chain. The National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) of 2012 (Section 818) laid out strict guidelines for DoD prime contractors for detection and avoidance of counterfeit electronic parts1. The Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) identified six federal supply groups in their supply chains that are at high risk for counterfeiting including electrical and electronic components, bearings, hardware and abrasives, pipes and fittings, engine accessories, and vehicle components2. DLA is championing development of anti-counterfeiting technologies that also provide traceability for the parts in its supply chain. A solution called QuanTEK developed by Chromo Logic LLC, involves novel optical imaging methods and has been found to work on a broad class of the DLA identified high-risk federal supply groups.
Items per page:
1 – 50 of 97