Browse Topic: Liability
“Holy cats. What happens when this stuff goes wrong?” That's how mechanical engineer and attorney Jennifer Dukarski framed her tech talk about developments in vehicular artificial intelligence (AI) and machine learning at the 2023 SAE WCX conference in Detroit. She linked the discussion to General Motors' March announcement that it was exploring using ChatGPT as the driver interface in vehicles
This SAE Aerospace Standard (AS) standardizes practices to identify reliable sources to procure electrical, electronic, and electromechanical (EEE) parts, assess and mitigate the risk of distributing suspect counterfeit or counterfeit EEE parts, control suspect counterfeit or counterfeit EEE parts, and report incidents of suspect counterfeit and counterfeit EEE parts
The procedures contained in this specification cover the laboratory testing of replaceable halogen incandescent bulbs for use in automotive road illumination. The following tests are intended to be run under the following conditions. New bulb design Design or process change made to an existing bulb, which could affect the outcome of the test The completion of one calendar year, accept as noted in the following Test Schedule Table. Test Title Yearly Physical Dimensions X Mean Spherical Candela (MSCD) X External Visual Examination X Color X Leak/Sealability Through Terminals and Seals X Deflection X Fluid Compatibility Terminal Retention X Resonant Frequencies Aged Resonant Frequency Salt Spray Outgassing Temperatures Requirement Laboratory Life at 14.0 VDC X Luminous Intensity Maintenance X Vibration Durability Shock Aged Vibration Durability Terminal Requirements DRL (SAE J2087
While many observers think that autonomy is right around the corner, there many unsettled issues. One such issue is availability, or how the vehicle behaves in the event of a failure of one of its systems such as those with the latest “by-wire” technologies. Handling of failures at a technical actuation level could involve many aspects, including time of operation after first fault, function/performance after first fault, and exposure after first fault. All of these and other issues are affected by software and electronic and mechanical hardware. Drive-by-wire and Automated Driving System Availability discusses the necessary systems approach required to address these issues. Establishing an industry path forward for these topics will simplify system development and provide a framework for consistent regulation and liability, which is an enabler for the launch of autonomous vehicles. Click here to access the full SAE EDGETM Research Report portfolio
The On-Board Diagnostics II (OBD-II) port began as a means of extracting diagnostic information and supporting the right to repair. Self-driving vehicles and cellular dongles plugged into the OBD-II port were not anticipated. Researchers have shown that the cellular modem on an OBD-II dongle may be hacked, allowing the attacker to tamper with the vehicle brakes. ADAS, self-driving features and other vehicle functions may be vulnerable as well. The industry must balance the interests of multiple stakeholders including Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs) who are required to provide OBD function, repair shops which have a legitimate need to access the OBD functions, dongle providers and drivers. OEMs need the ability to protect drivers and manage liability by limiting how a device or software application may modify the operation of a vehicle. This paper outlines a technical approach based upon cryptographic authentication and granular access control policy which addresses the needs of
Achieving functional safety in mechatronic systems with growing product functionality is a major challenge in systems engineering. Following the current discussion, this challenge is mostly allocated to electronics and software development. For most of the scenarios this focus is feasible. Product design - the construction of the product - defines the properties and the appearance of the product by shape, material and assembly. So, the product design is often not under control of the safety management system. A hazardous deviation of part shape can be easily identified after the parts product or at least at its mounting. A wrong assembly is controlled by assembly documentation or data (e.g. screw torques) and identified at end of assembly line checks. The identification of a hazardous material choice depends on the product material class. Product materials can be separated into two classes: passive or active materials. Passive materials (e.g. car body) can be distinguished in as
This document contains guidance for implementing a counterfeit mitigation program in accordance with AS5553. The information contained in this document is intended to supplement the requirements of a higher level quality standard (e.g., AS9100) and other quality management system documents. This is not intended to stand alone, supersede, or cancel requirements found in other quality management system documents, requirements imposed by contracting authorities, or applicable laws and regulations unless an authorized exemption/variance has been obtained
This handbook is intended to assist the user to understand the ANSI/EIA-649B standard principles and functions for Configuration Management (CM) and how to plan and implement effective CM. It provides CM implementation guidance for all users (CM professionals and practitioners within the commercial and industry communities, DoD, military service commands, and government activities (e.g., National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)) with a variety of techniques and examples. Information about interfacing with other management systems and processes are included to ensure the principles and functions are applied in each phase of the life cycle for all product categories
The proper investigation of crashes involving commercial vehicles is critical for fairly assessing liability and damages, if they exist. In addition to traditional physics based approaches, the digital records stored within heavy vehicle electronic control modules (ECMs) are useful in determining the events leading to a crash. Traditional methods of extracting digital data use proprietary diagnostic and maintenance software and require a functioning ECM. However, some crashes induce damage that renders the ECM inoperable, even though it may still contain data. As such, the objective of this research is to examine the digital record in an ECM and understand its meaning. The research was performed on a Detroit Diesel DDEC V engine control module. The data extracted from the flash memory chips include: Last Stop Record, two Hard Brake events, and the Daily Engine Usage Log. The procedure of extracting and reading the memory chips is explained. Details regarding decoding the memory
This document provides guidance in the developing, managing, controlling and transmitting of data in the current electronic environment
John F. Kennedy Space Center, Florida A number of NASA centers have used polychlorinated biphenyl (PCB)-containing materials that have subsequently ended up in surrounding sediment systems. Each center is evaluating remediation technologies that may have application to their environmental problems; however, there are only limited options available for application to sediments containing PCBs. Currently, the most utilized option is dredging followed by disposal in a Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA)-regulated landfill. This is an expensive option with long-term liability implications for simply enacting a waste transfer remedy (as opposed to a waste destruction alternative), as well as possible contaminant re-introduction into the water table. PCB contamination in sediment systems is a global issue, posing ecological and human health risks
A growing array of electronic devices are available to healthcare providers, patients, and their families, including glucose meters, blood pressure monitors, automated external defibrillators (AEDs), and many others. To ensure safe, reliable performance of these devices, their designers must factor in circuit protection requirements from the earliest stages of the circuit design process. For example, a seemingly minor electrostatic discharge could easily render a portable medical device useless if it’s not properly protected, exposing the patient to the danger of misleading (or no) readings and the device’s manufacturer to legal liability if inaccurate results lead to improper treatment
Functions such as adaptive cruise control, crash protection systems, active body control and ESP are increasing in complexity and taking an ever more active role in controlling the car. These functions are realized by systems of sensors, actuators and interconnected electronic control units. The systems must be designed to function under a variety of operating conditions and must adhere to a number of mechanical, hardware and software constraints. In order to be able to manage the emerging product liability risks associated with such systems as well as ensuring the high level of quality required of automotive systems, significant improvements to engineering processes are necessary. In this article, we describe our experiences in adapting companies' development processes to conform to safety standards and to cope with the challenges mentioned above. We detail key success factors in overcoming these challenges and provide practical examples from working with global OEMs and tier-one
This SAE Aerospace Standard standardizes practices to: a identify reliable sources to procure parts, b assess and mitigate risk of distributing fraudulent/counterfeit parts, c control suspect or confirmed fraudulent/counterfeit parts, d and report suspect and confirmed fraudulent/counterfeit parts to other potential users and Authority Having Jurisdiction
The need to address environmental challenges by aviation industry is apparently obvious. As evidenced within the industry, it takes a three pronged strategy - more efficient aircraft, improving operational efficiencies and development of sustainable biofuels. In terms of actual growth of airline business, the two major drivers are domestic air service expansion within BRIC economies and rapid spread of Low Cost Carrier (LLC) models. Focusing not only on environmental challenges, even sustainable business development and growth of LCC depends critically on ATF substitution by alternative fuels. The inherent need for carbon subsidy and airline-airport partnership towards sustainable substitution with bio-alternatives is discussed in first part of the paper. A framework for such an airline airport win-win partnership is delineated. In the second half of the paper, focus shifts to complexity of operationalisation of blended ATF strategy for airlines as well as manufacturer from a
At the moment the documentation of failure inhibition matrices and the fault path management for different controller types and different vehicle projects are mainly maintained manually in individual Excel tables. This is not only time consuming but also gives a high potential for fault liability. In addition there is also no guarantee that the calibration of these failure inhibition matrices and its fault path really works. Conflicting aims between costs, time and fault liability require a new approach for the calibration, documentation and testing of failure inhibition matrices and the complete Diagnostic System Management (DSM) calibration. The standardization and harmonization of the Diagnostic System Management calibration for different calibration projects and derivates is the first step to reduce time and costs. Creating a master calibration for the conjoint fault paths and labels provides a significant reduction of efforts. The failure inhibition matrix and fault path
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