Browse Topic: Liability
“Holy cats. What happens when this stuff goes wrong?” That's how mechanical engineer and attorney Jennifer Dukarski framed her tech talk about developments in vehicular artificial intelligence (AI) and machine learning at the 2023 SAE WCX conference in Detroit. She linked the discussion to General Motors' March announcement that it was exploring using ChatGPT as the driver interface in vehicles.
While many observers think that autonomy is right around the corner, there many unsettled issues. One such issue is availability, or how the vehicle behaves in the event of a failure of one of its systems such as those with the latest “by-wire” technologies. Handling of failures at a technical actuation level could involve many aspects, including time of operation after first fault, function/performance after first fault, and exposure after first fault. All of these and other issues are affected by software and electronic and mechanical hardware. Drive-by-wire and Automated Driving System Availability discusses the necessary systems approach required to address these issues. Establishing an industry path forward for these topics will simplify system development and provide a framework for consistent regulation and liability, which is an enabler for the launch of autonomous vehicles. Click here to access the full SAE EDGETM Research Report portfolio.
The field called System Safety evolved to satisfy the demand for an organized approach to safety management of complex new aerospace systems being developed in the 1960s. As technology has advanced and complexity has increased, its application spread to aviation, rail transportation, weapons, nuclear power, medical devices, oil and gas production, and almost every area of life where complex systems could lead to events having high consequences. System Safety is often defined as the application of engineering and management principles, criteria, and techniques to achieve acceptable mishap risks within the constraints of operational effectiveness, time, and cost throughout all phases of the system life cycle. The International System Safety Society states that for almost any system, product, or service, the most effective means of limiting product liability and accident risks is to implement an organized system safety function beginning in the conceptual design phase, and continuing through to its development, fabrication, testing, production, use, and ultimate disposal.
The On-Board Diagnostics II (OBD-II) port began as a means of extracting diagnostic information and supporting the right to repair. Self-driving vehicles and cellular dongles plugged into the OBD-II port were not anticipated. Researchers have shown that the cellular modem on an OBD-II dongle may be hacked, allowing the attacker to tamper with the vehicle brakes. ADAS, self-driving features and other vehicle functions may be vulnerable as well. The industry must balance the interests of multiple stakeholders including Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs) who are required to provide OBD function, repair shops which have a legitimate need to access the OBD functions, dongle providers and drivers. OEMs need the ability to protect drivers and manage liability by limiting how a device or software application may modify the operation of a vehicle. This paper outlines a technical approach based upon cryptographic authentication and granular access control policy which addresses the needs of stakeholders. This allows the OEM to protect the security of the vehicle by carefully controlling the functions a particular device plugged into the OBD-II port is able to perform. This allows device makers (diagnostic tools, insurance dongles, etc.) to have their products certified to work with the OEM’s vehicles. The result is the OEMs can protect driver safety and maintain the right to repair.
Achieving functional safety in mechatronic systems with growing product functionality is a major challenge in systems engineering. Following the current discussion, this challenge is mostly allocated to electronics and software development. For most of the scenarios this focus is feasible. Product design - the construction of the product - defines the properties and the appearance of the product by shape, material and assembly. So, the product design is often not under control of the safety management system. A hazardous deviation of part shape can be easily identified after the parts product or at least at its mounting. A wrong assembly is controlled by assembly documentation or data (e.g. screw torques) and identified at end of assembly line checks. The identification of a hazardous material choice depends on the product material class. Product materials can be separated into two classes: passive or active materials. Passive materials (e.g. car body) can be distinguished in as passive materials with constant shape (stiff) and variable shape (flexible) (e.g. damper, spring). The liability of those materials regarding their usage in the product is tested in labs in prototypes in prior. Active materials (e.g. fluids, gases), or functional materials fulfill, trigger or directly influence the functionality of the product. The choice of a functional material is not always made by the electronics engineering. Therefore, it is not under control of safety management processes. Never the less functional material, especially with radical behavior, underlie other safety regulation. Explosives for example, can be integrated in a product or system and are restricted by specific standards. This technology report reflects the verification methods of functional materials today. The responsibility of the product design engineer is discussed as well as the relevant standards. The challenge of achieving complete product compliance with functional materials is shown by the technology analysis of the Takata airbag recall. The required and available methods to control risks of functional materials choice and change are listed and rated. Gaps in existing engineering processes and regulations are identified. A strategy to close those gaps is explained.
The proper investigation of crashes involving commercial vehicles is critical for fairly assessing liability and damages, if they exist. In addition to traditional physics based approaches, the digital records stored within heavy vehicle electronic control modules (ECMs) are useful in determining the events leading to a crash. Traditional methods of extracting digital data use proprietary diagnostic and maintenance software and require a functioning ECM. However, some crashes induce damage that renders the ECM inoperable, even though it may still contain data. As such, the objective of this research is to examine the digital record in an ECM and understand its meaning. The research was performed on a Detroit Diesel DDEC V engine control module. The data extracted from the flash memory chips include: Last Stop Record, two Hard Brake events, and the Daily Engine Usage Log. The procedure of extracting and reading the memory chips is explained. Details regarding decoding the memory contents to determine meaning are given for the aforementioned datasets. This research revealed higher fidelity data in memory for the Daily Engine Usage Log when compared to the DDEC Reports output. Should an ECM be inoperable, the techniques presented can help investigators extract previously unobtainable information.
John F. Kennedy Space Center, Florida A number of NASA centers have used polychlorinated biphenyl (PCB)-containing materials that have subsequently ended up in surrounding sediment systems. Each center is evaluating remediation technologies that may have application to their environmental problems; however, there are only limited options available for application to sediments containing PCBs. Currently, the most utilized option is dredging followed by disposal in a Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA)-regulated landfill. This is an expensive option with long-term liability implications for simply enacting a waste transfer remedy (as opposed to a waste destruction alternative), as well as possible contaminant re-introduction into the water table. PCB contamination in sediment systems is a global issue, posing ecological and human health risks.
A growing array of electronic devices are available to healthcare providers, patients, and their families, including glucose meters, blood pressure monitors, automated external defibrillators (AEDs), and many others. To ensure safe, reliable performance of these devices, their designers must factor in circuit protection requirements from the earliest stages of the circuit design process. For example, a seemingly minor electrostatic discharge could easily render a portable medical device useless if it’s not properly protected, exposing the patient to the danger of misleading (or no) readings and the device’s manufacturer to legal liability if inaccurate results lead to improper treatment.
Functions such as adaptive cruise control, crash protection systems, active body control and ESP are increasing in complexity and taking an ever more active role in controlling the car. These functions are realized by systems of sensors, actuators and interconnected electronic control units. The systems must be designed to function under a variety of operating conditions and must adhere to a number of mechanical, hardware and software constraints. In order to be able to manage the emerging product liability risks associated with such systems as well as ensuring the high level of quality required of automotive systems, significant improvements to engineering processes are necessary. In this article, we describe our experiences in adapting companies' development processes to conform to safety standards and to cope with the challenges mentioned above. We detail key success factors in overcoming these challenges and provide practical examples from working with global OEMs and tier-one suppliers on implementing safety standards in E/E development.
The need to address environmental challenges by aviation industry is apparently obvious. As evidenced within the industry, it takes a three pronged strategy - more efficient aircraft, improving operational efficiencies and development of sustainable biofuels. In terms of actual growth of airline business, the two major drivers are domestic air service expansion within BRIC economies and rapid spread of Low Cost Carrier (LLC) models. Focusing not only on environmental challenges, even sustainable business development and growth of LCC depends critically on ATF substitution by alternative fuels. The inherent need for carbon subsidy and airline-airport partnership towards sustainable substitution with bio-alternatives is discussed in first part of the paper. A framework for such an airline airport win-win partnership is delineated. In the second half of the paper, focus shifts to complexity of operationalisation of blended ATF strategy for airlines as well as manufacturer from a sophisticated operational safety and liability perspective. The need for aircraft manufacturer and airline cum airport partnerships for globally acceptable and operational safety for partial drop-in substitution on the lines of biofuel certification standardisation and usability is examined. The authors highlight that carbon neutral strategy by aviation industry is not just critical in terms of environmental dimension but as would be evidenced in the coming decades critical in terms of capitalistic interests as well.
At the moment the documentation of failure inhibition matrices and the fault path management for different controller types and different vehicle projects are mainly maintained manually in individual Excel tables. This is not only time consuming but also gives a high potential for fault liability. In addition there is also no guarantee that the calibration of these failure inhibition matrices and its fault path really works. Conflicting aims between costs, time and fault liability require a new approach for the calibration, documentation and testing of failure inhibition matrices and the complete Diagnostic System Management (DSM) calibration. The standardization and harmonization of the Diagnostic System Management calibration for different calibration projects and derivates is the first step to reduce time and costs. Creating a master calibration for the conjoint fault paths and labels provides a significant reduction of efforts. The failure inhibition matrix and fault path documentation can be automated with a tool, which uses a data set and non calibratable ECU configurations to create a document that satisfies the authority requirements and contains an overview of the interdependences of all fault paths. In order to accomplish this, the already established matrices can be used to create a master inhibition matrix that can then be compared with inhibition configurations in current calibration projects. The differences between the “Master Calibration” (MC) and a derivative calibration can be detected and visualized with the help of powerful comparison features. If necessary, recognized problems can be efficiently resolved and implemented into the derivative calibration either manually or automatically. Fault paths that do not exist in the “Master Calibration” can be found very quickly and than calibrated in a derivate specific manner.
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