Browse Topic: Aircraft certification
In the domain of aircraft certification, Development Assurance is what some would call a useful tool to gain confidence in the development of complex systems, and what others would call a necessary evil. But what does it actually do? Why is it necessary for certification of modern aircraft? What, epistemologically, does it bring to the table? This paper aims to show how Development Assurance (DA) activities, at all levels from aircraft to item, close the epistemological holes created when complex systems are chosen for implementation. It will map the different sources and types of uncertainty encountered in system and aircraft verification and explain how each type is dealt with within a certification context, working from simple mechanical systems up to complex and highly integrated systems using software and airborne electronic hardware and beyond. It will show that Development Assurance, far from being an arbitrary set of activities, systematically brings personal and corporate
Airworthiness certification of aircraft requires an Airworthiness Security Process (AWSP) to ensure safe operation under potential unauthorized interactions, particularly in the context of growing cyber threats. Regulatory authorities mandate the consideration of Intentional Unauthorized Electronic Interactions (IUEI) in the development of aircraft, airborne software, and equipment. As the industry increasingly adopts Model-Based Systems Engineering (MBSE) to accelerate development, we aim to enhance this effort by focusing on security scope definitions – a critical step within the AWSP for security risk assessment that establishes the boundaries and extent of security measures. However, our findings indicate that, despite the increasing use of model-based tools in development, these security scope definitions often remain either document-based or, when modeled, are presented at overly abstract levels, both of which limit their utility. Furthermore, we found that these definitions
Headquartered in San Juan, Puerto Rico, Unusual Machines describes itself as a “classic American technology company born from garage tinkerers and hobbyists, focused on serving the emerging drone industry with unique and innovative products.” The company recently launched a new low-cost flight controller for drones, the Riot Brave F7, that achieved “Blue UAS” certification from the Department of Defense's (DoD) Defense Innovation Unit (DIU) in August. The Riot Brave F7 - just $58 - features a STMF722RET6 processor equipped with Bosch accelerometer and barometer, and has 16Mb of built in Blackbox Memory. While the company developed Riot Brave F7 primarily as a low cost flight controller option for FPV drones, there are broader possibilities for it, including military applications.
The extent of automation and autonomy used in general aviation (GA) has been steadily increasing for decades, with the pace of development accelerating recently. This has huge potential benefits for safety given that it is estimated that 75% of the accidents in personal and on-demand GA are due to pilot error. However, an approach to certifying autonomous systems that relies on reversionary modes limits their potential to improve safety. Placing a human pilot in a situation where they are suddenly tasked with flying an airplane in a failed situation, often without sufficient situational awareness, is overly demanding. This consideration, coupled with advancing technology that may not align with a deterministic certification paradigm, creates an opportunity for new approaches to certifying autonomous and highly automated aircraft systems. The new paths must account for the multifaceted aviation approach to risk management which has interlocking requirements for airworthiness and
Additive manufacturing (AM) is currently being used to produce many aerospace components, with its inherent design flexibility enabling an array of unique and novel possibilities. But, in order to grow the application space of polymer AM, the industry has to provide an offering with improved mechanical properties. Several entities are working toward introducing continuous fibers embedded into either a thermoplastic or thermoset resin system. This approach can enable significant improvement in mechanical properties and could be what is needed to open new and exciting applications within the aerospace industry. However, as the technology begins to mature, there are a couple of unsettled issues that are beginning to come to light. The most common question raised is whether composite AM can achieve the performance of traditional composite manufacturing. If AM cannot reach this level, is there enough application potential to warrant the development investment? The answers are highly
This AIR provides a detailed example of the aircraft and systems development for a function of a hypothetical S18 aircraft. In order to present a clear picture, an aircraft function was broken down into a single system. A function was chosen which had sufficient complexity to allow use of all the methodologies, yet was simple enough to present a clear picture of the flow through the process. This function/system was analyzed using the methods and tools described in ARP4754A/ED-79A. The aircraft level function is “Decelerate Aircraft On Ground” and the system is the braking system. The interaction of the braking system functions with the aircraft are identified with the relative importance based on implied aircraft interactions and system availabilities at the aircraft level. This example does not include validation and verification of the aircraft level hazards and interactions with the braking system. However, the principles used at the braking system level can be applied at the
As model-based systems engineering is proliferating throughout the aerospace industry as a method to manage the development of complex cyber-physical systems, opportunities to leverage formal methods for verification and validation purposes are significant. As a system model described in SysML can contain the level of semantics required to define strict system requirements, it is possible to create a translation tool to generate SRL (SADL (Semantic Application Design Language) Requirements Language) to leverage ASSERT™ (Analysis of Semantic Specifications and Efficient generation of requirements-based Tests) for verification and validation of the system requirements. SADL [13] is a controlled English grammar that translates directly into OWL (Web Ontology Language) [14]. As part of the validation of the SRL requirements, ASSERT™ leverages a theorem prover to look for conflict and completeness errors. For verification, ASSERT™ uses a Satisfiability Modulo Theories (SMT) solver for the
Advanced flight control system, aviation battery and motor technologies are driving the rapid development of eVTOL to offer possibilities for Urban Air Mobility. The safety and airworthiness of eVTOL aircraft and systems are the critical issues to be considered in eVTOL design process. Regarding to the flight control system, its complexity of design and interfaces with other airborne systems require detailed safety assessment through the development process. Based on SAE ARP4754A, a forward architecture design process with comprehensive safety assessment is introduced to achieve complete safety and hazard analysis. The new features of flight control system for eVTOL are described to start function capture and architecture design. Model-based system engineering method is applied to establish the functional architecture in a traceable way. SFHA and STPA methods are applied in a complementary way to identify the potential safety risk caused by failure and unsafe control action. PSSA with
ARP4761A and its EUROCAE counterpart, ED-135, present guidelines for performing safety assessments of civil aircraft, systems, and equipment. They may be used when addressing compliance with certification requirements (e.g., 14 CFR/CS Parts 23, 25, 27, and 29 and 14 CFR Parts 33, 35, CS-E, and CS-P). ARP4761A/ED-135 may also be used to assist a company in meeting its own internal safety assessment standards. While the safety assessment processes described are primarily associated with civil aircraft, systems, and equipment, these processes may be used in many other applications. The guidelines herein identify a systematic safety assessment process, but other processes may be equally effective. The processes described herein are usually applicable to the new designs or to existing designs that are affected by changes to design or functions. In the case of the implementation of existing design(s) in a derivative application, complementary means such as service experience in a similar
This SAE Aerospace Recommended Practice (ARP) provides recommendations for the development of aircraft and systems, taking into account aircraft functions and operating environment. It provides practices for ensuring the safety of the overall aircraft design, showing compliance with regulations, and assisting a company in developing and meeting its own internal standards. These practices include validation of requirements and verification of the design implementation for safety, certification, and product assurance. The guidelines in this document were developed in the context of U.S. Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations (14 CFR) Part 25 and European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) Certification Specification (CS) CS-25. They may be applicable in the context of other regulations, such as 14 CFR Parts 23, 27, 29, 33, and 35, and CS-23, CS-27, CS-29, CS-E, and CS-P. This document addresses the development cycle for aircraft and systems that implement aircraft and system functions. It
In an application first, the physics of why the sky is blue is used to measure gas flows without obstructive sensors. A longstanding industry partnership between Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University (Virginia Tech) and Pratt & Whitney has resulted in a new laser-optical technology that aims to revolutionize in-flight thrust measurement.
This standard covers all types of oxygen breathing equipment used in non-military aircraft. It is intended that this standard supplements the requirements of the detail specification or drawings of specific components or assemblies (e.g., regulators, masks, cylinders, etc.). Where a conflict exists between this standard and detail specifications, detail specifications shall take precedence.
This SAE Aerospace Standard (AS) provides general design and test requirements for a flat cut-off pressure compensated, variable delivery hydraulic pump for use in a civil aircraft hydraulic system with a rated system pressure up to 5000 psi (34500 kPa). NOTE: Hydraulic pumps may incorporate features such as a clutch in the input drive, which will not be covered by this standard.
This document contains minimum operational performance specification (MOPS) of active on-board INFLIGHT ICING DETECTION SYSTEMS (FIDS). This MOPS specifies FIDS operational performance which is the minimum necessary to satisfy regulatory requirements for the design and manufacture of the equipment to a minimum standard and guidance towards acceptable means of compliance when installed on an AIRCRAFT. Detection of ICE accreted on the AIRCRAFT during ground operations is not considered in this document. This MOPS was written for the use of FIDS on AIRCRAFT as defined in 1.3 and 2.3. Expected minimum performance specifications for FIDS and their functions are provided in Section 3. The minimum performance requirements as defined in Section 3 do not consider SYSTEM performance as installed on the AIRCRAFT. Performance in excess of the minimum performance may be required by the SYSTEM installed on an AIRCRAFT in order to meet regulatory or operational requirements. This topic is considered
The advent of electrified propulsion in the aerospace sector, captured in microcosm by the fast-emerging eVTOL market, both threatens to upset the establishment of major aerospace players and offers significant new opportunities for start-up companies. In all cases, it is forcing a marriage of system simulation and architecture definition techniques from markets already meeting these challenges, such as automotive. The demands of these aerospace applications are causing engineers on both sides to find the best blend of tools and approaches to meet their goals.
This document establishes the general requirements for the quality management of aircraft ground deicing/anti-icing systems and processes. It covers the areas of: Quality system, documentation, and control of records; Management responsibility; Resource management; Product realization; and Measurement, analysis, and improvement. This document defines these areas and their key aspects so they can be practically managed, and that deicing operations can become safer with time. In alignment with AS6285 and AS6286, the primary focus of this standard is on the deicing/anti-icing of aircraft using deicing and anti-icing fluids.
The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) defined the aircraft certification requirements concerning the fungus testing for aircraft components. The fungus testing, focused currently mostly on the materials composing the component, has a relatively long duration, could lead to false failures, and disregards the operation conditions in the aircraft. The present study introduces aerospace engineering and certification personnel to information used to develop a successful fungus analysis to use for aircraft certification and recommends academia future fungus studies specific to the aerospace industry. The article includes a literature review of fungus research in the context of aircraft, with a focus on bay and engine components certification, and presents empirical data about the survivability of fungi on aircraft engine components.
This ARP provides detailed information, guidance, and methods in support of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Advisory Circular (AC) 20-136. AC 20-136 provides a means, but not the only means, for demonstrating compliance with Title 14 of the Code of Federal Regulations (14 CFR) 23.1306 (Amendment 23-61), 23.2515 (Amendment 23-64), 25.1316, 27.1316, and 29.1316. It is also intended for this ARP to provide the same information, guidance, and methods, to the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) certification specifications CS 23.1306 (Amendment 23/4), 23.2515 (Amendment 23/5), 25.1316, 27.1316, and 29.1316, and associated Acceptable Means of Compliance (AMC) 20-136. This ARP provides references relevant to identifying: (1) acceptance criteria for the indirect effects of lightning compliance approaches, (2) verification (analysis and test) methods including those associated with multiple stroke and multiple burst, (3) recommended design options to optimize needed system immunity
This AIR provides a detailed example of the aircraft and systems development for a function of a hypothetical S18 aircraft. In order to present a clear picture, an aircraft function was broken down into a single system. A function was chosen which had sufficient complexity to allow use of all the methodologies, yet was simple enough to present a clear picture of the flow through the process. This function/system was analyzed using the methods and tools described in ARP4754A/ED-79A. The aircraft level function is “Decelerate Aircraft On Ground” and the system is the braking system. The interaction of the braking system functions with the aircraft are identified with the relative importance based on implied aircraft interactions and system availabilities at the aircraft level. This example does not include validation and verification of the aircraft level hazards and interactions with the braking system. However, the principles used at the braking system level can be applied at the
This document describes a process that may be used to perform the ongoing safety assessment for (1) GAR aircraft and components (hereafter, aircraft), and (2) commercial operators of GAR aircraft. The process described herein is intended to support an overall safety management program. It is to help a company establish and meet its own internal standards. The process described herein identifies a systematic means, but not the only means, to assess continuing airworthiness. Ongoing safety management is an activity dedicated to assuring that risk is identified and properly eliminated or controlled. The safety management process includes both safety assessment and economic decision-making. While economic decision-making (factors related to scheduling, parts, and cost) is an integral part of the safety management process, this document addresses only the ongoing safety assessment process. This ongoing safety assessment process includes safety problem identification and corrective action
Flight in icing for transport category aircraft certification presents a particularly challenging set of considerations to establish adequate safety commensurate with the associated risk while balancing design complexity and efficiency. A review highlighting important aspects of the regulatory evolution and guiding principles for flight in icing certification is presented, including the current standards and recent rulemaking activity. While historical icing certification relied on a simple yet subjective requirement to demonstrate that an aircraft is capable of operating safely within the prescribed icing envelopes, the certification requirements associated with demonstrating an adequate level of safety have progressively evolved into more explicit quantitative performance and qualitative handling qualities standards now scattered throughout the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFRs) Part 25 Subpart B Flight standards which are largely
This AIR lists and describes a collection of regulations, policy, and guidance documents applicable to design approval applicants, aircraft operating certificate holders, and maintenance repair and overhaul (MRO) organizations. The aircraft industry should consider these rules when installing IVHM technology for use in aircraft maintenance. This is a starting basis and should not be considered as complete when certification of an IVHM system is expected. The AIR’s objectives are: 1 To set the foundation for aircraft certification applicants seeking to design IVHM solutions as part of the type certificate (TC), supplemental type certificate (STC), amended TC, or amended STC activities; and 2 To set the foundation for aircraft operating certificate holders to engage with regulators to get authorization for using IVHM applications as part of an aircraft maintenance program. NOTE: This AIR’s scope is limited to the United States (U.S.) Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) information only
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