Browse Topic: Safety regulations and standards
Letter from the Guest Editors
In the domain of aircraft certification, Development Assurance is what some would call a useful tool to gain confidence in the development of complex systems, and what others would call a necessary evil. But what does it actually do? Why is it necessary for certification of modern aircraft? What, epistemologically, does it bring to the table? This paper aims to show how Development Assurance (DA) activities, at all levels from aircraft to item, close the epistemological holes created when complex systems are chosen for implementation. It will map the different sources and types of uncertainty encountered in system and aircraft verification and explain how each type is dealt with within a certification context, working from simple mechanical systems up to complex and highly integrated systems using software and airborne electronic hardware and beyond. It will show that Development Assurance, far from being an arbitrary set of activities, systematically brings personal and corporate
Demonstrating deadline adherence for real-time tasks is a common requirement in all safety norms. Timing verification has to address two levels: the code level (worst-case execution time) and the scheduling level (worst-case response time). Determining which methodology is suited best depends on the characteristics of the target processor. All contemporary microprocessors try to maximize the instruction-level parallelism by sophisticated performance-enhancing features that make the execution time of a particular instruction dependent on the execution history. On multi-core systems, the execution time additionally is influenced by interference effects on shared resources caused by concurrent activities on the different cores, which are not controlled by the scheduling algorithm. In the avionics domain, the new FAA AC 20-193 / EASA AMC 20-193 guidance documents formalize predictability aspects of multi-core systems and derive adequate measures for timing verification. Timing verification
With the surge in adoption of artificial intelligence (AI) in automotive systems, especially Advanced Driver Assistance Systems (ADAS) and autonomous vehicles (AV), comes an increase of AI-related incidents–several of which have ended in injuries and fatalities. These incidents all share a common deficiency: insufficient coverage towards safety, ethical, and/or legal requirements. Responsible AI (RAI) is an approach to developing AI-enabled systems that systematically take such requirements into account. Existing published international standards like ISO 21448:2022 (Safety of the Intended Functionality) and ISO 26262:2018 (Road Vehicles – Functional Safety) do offer some guidance in this regard but are far from being sufficient. Therefore, several technical standards are emerging concurrently to address various RAI-related challenges, including but not limited to ISO 8800 for the integration of AI in automotive systems, ISO/IEC TR 5469:2024 for the integration of AI in functional
With the trend of increasing technological complexity, software content and mechatronic implementation, there are increasing risks from systematic failures and random hardware failures, which is to be considered within the scope of functional safety. ISO 26262 series of standards provides guidance to mitigate these risks by providing appropriate requirements and processes. To develop a safe product with respect to above mentioned complexities, it is very critical to develop a safe system and hence a thorough and robust “Technical Safety Concept” is very important to ensure absence of unreasonable risk due to hazards caused by malfunctions of E/E systems. ISO26262-Part 4 provides guidelines for “Product development at the system level”, to design safety-related systems that include one or more electrical and/or electronic (E/E) systems and that are installed in series production road vehicles. Defining requirements at system level for each individual technology and systematically
Verification and validation (V&V) is the cornerstone of safety in the automotive industry. The V&V process ensures that every component in a vehicle functions according to its specifications. Automated driving functionality poses considerable challenges to the V&V process, especially when data-driven AI components are present in the system. The aim of this work is to outline a methodology for V&V of AI-based systems. The backbone of this methodology is bridging the semantic gap between the symbolic level at which the operational design domain and requirements are typically specified, and the sub-symbolic, statistical level at which data-driven AI components function. This is accomplished by combining a probabilistic model of the operational design domain and an FMEA of AI with a fitness-for-purpose model of the system itself. The fitness-for-purpose model allows for reasoning about the behavior of the system in its environment, which we argue is essential to determine whether the
This document derives from the Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards (FMVSS) 105 and 135 vehicle test protocols as single-ended inertia-dynamometer test procedures. The test sequences enable brake output measurement, friction material effectiveness, and corner performance in a controlled and repeatable environment. This SAE Document also includes optional sections for parking brake output performance for rear brakes with hydraulic or Electric Park Brakes (EPB). It applies to brake corners from vehicles covered by the FMVSS 105 and 135 when using the appropriate brake hardware and test parameters. The FMVSS 135 applies to all passenger cars and light trucks up to 3500 kg of gross vehicle weight (GVWR). The FMVSS 105 applies to all passenger cars, multi-purpose vehicles, buses, and trucks above 3500 kg of GVWR. This document does not include testing for school bus applications or vehicles equipped with hydraulic brakes with a GVWR above 4540 kg. This document does not evaluate or
With the current trend of including the evaluation of the risk of brain injuries in vehicle crashes due to rotational kinematics of the head, two injury criteria have been introduced since 2013 – BrIC and DAMAGE. BrIC was developed by NHTSA in 2013 and was suggested for inclusion in the US NCAP for frontal and side crashes. DAMAGE has been developed by UVa under the sponsorship of JAMA and JARI and has been accepted tentatively by the EuroNCAP. Although BrIC in US crash testing is known and reported, DAMAGE in tests of the US fleet is relatively unknown. The current paper will report on DAMAGE in NCAP-like tests and potential future frontal crash tests involving substantial rotation about the three axes of occupant heads. Distribution of DAMAGE of three-point belted occupants without airbags will also be discussed. Prediction of brain injury risks from the tests have been compared to the risks in the real world. Although DAMAGE correlates well with MPS in the human brain model across
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