Browse Topic: Safety regulations and standards
Since 2019, sex equity in traffic crashes has been a highly debated topic in vehicle safety, especially following the 2019 study by Forman et al. (1) claiming that female occupants face a 73 percent greater risk of serious injury in frontal crashes compared to male occupants. This was soon followed by a Consumer Reports Article by Keith Barry (2), which attempted to identify underlying factors contributing to the higher risk. These have been embraced by several parties since 2019. Firstly, it was alleged that vehicle design practice over the last four decades considered safety for the male population only and ignored that of the female as evidenced by the exclusive use of the mid-sized male Anthropomorphic Test Devices (ATDs) in Regulatory and Safety Ratings tests and not with an average sized female ATD. The absence of such an ATD for testing of vehicles “set the course for four decades’ worth of car safety design, with deadly consequences” (2). Secondly, although there is a
This SAE Aerospace Information Report (AIR) supplements ARP4754B/ED-79B by identifying the crucial elements to be considered when constructing the development assurance plans described in Section 3 (Development Assurance Planning) of ARP4754B/ED-79B for integrated systems. Section 4.6.4 of ARP4754B/ED-79B expands the aircraft/system integration and verification activities by emphasizing testing during integration to investigate for unintended behaviors. However, guidelines are needed for planning that are specifically aimed at the aircraft level and at integrating across system functions and boundaries. Until such guidelines are more comprehensively provided, this AIR presents a collection of lessons learned from past certification programs involving integrated systems, and as such it may be considered in conjunction with Sections 3 and 4 of ARP4754B/ED-79B. ARP4761A/ED-135 elaborates the safety activities by adding processes and methods such as the Aircraft or System Functional Hazard
Letter from the Editor-in-Chief
Letter from the Guest Editor
Specifications, test methods, and usage provisions for safety glazing materials used for glazing of motor vehicles and motor vehicle equipment operating on land highways.
The automotive industry is evolving from a reactive, independently self-determined approach to cybersecurity, complicated by a complex supply chain. Over time, this has resulted in a fragmented industry comprised of any number of proprietary solutions verses a standardized, regulated paradigm to facilitate a platform-oriented approach. This document, an update on collaborative work from the SAE Vehicle Electrical Hardware Security Task Force (TEVEES18B) and GlobalPlatform Automotive Task Force, outlines this transition strategy. An extensible number of additional examples of use cases of Global Platform Technologies are explored in this document.
This paper contains Part 2 of a two-part paper series proposing potential regulatory approaches for occupant safety in Automated / Autonomous Vehicles (AVs) with unique seating configurations (stagecoach and campfire seating). Part 2 focuses on interior safety sensing, associated messaging, and ride control approaches both prior to and during a ride. Assessments are also proposed after significant vehicle braking and crash events. The proposed conditions are to be assessed in a static vehicle environment with humans segmented by occupant size and an infant dummy. On the vehicle seat and on the vehicle floor occupant detection conditions are proposed along with restraint usage detection conditions for vehicle seat belt usage, Child Restraint Seat (CRS) usage, CRS seat belt usage, and Lower Anchors and Tethers for Children (LATCH) system usage. These conditions may be detected by sensors / computer algorithms and human monitoring and thus are technology agnostic. The topics of animal
Some Automated / Autonomous Vehicles (AVs) have unique seating configurations (stagecoach and campfire seating) which present expanded occupant safety challenges. Significant portions of the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards (FMVSS) do not yet align with AVs containing unique seating. This paper series takes the NHTSA occupant safety standard approach for conventional forward-facing seat vehicles where many compliance evaluations are in the frequently occupied front row and expands it to stagecoach and campfire AVs where the rear seating row is anticipated to be frequently occupied. The approaches proposed are from a logic-based safety-focused analysis and in many cases previously published material. The goal of this paper series is to offer regulatory proposals that enable equivalent performance for these AVs to existing forward-facing seating vehicle occupant safety standards and meet Executive Order 13045 on child safety
The rapid advancement of advanced driver assistance systems (ADAS), automated driving and electrification has significantly increased the software content and complexity within modern vehicles. Consequently, ensuring both high process quality and compliance or qualification with functional safety standards becomes critically important. Automotive Software Process Improvement and Capability Determination (ASPICE 4.0) focus on Process quality and Capability Maturity, while ISO 26262:2018 emphasizes engineering guidelines for functional safety and risk mitigation. The efficient integration of the process and standard remains a key challenge due to differences in their objectives, terminologies, and assessment criteria. The misalignment between ASPICE 4.0 and ISO 26262:2018 standard often results in duplicated efforts, rework of work products, and delays in product release schedules. This paper proposes a unified framework to bridge ASPICE 4.0 process areas with ISO 26262:2018 safety
A Detroit-based startup says its device can analyze brain activity to help figure out whether a driver is impaired. The impaired driver-detection business has been heating up since even before NHTSA announced in 2024 that it was working what would eventually be a mandate that vehicles be able to detect impaired drivers and mitigate the danger they represent to the motoring public.
Military and aerospace applications have become increasingly complex real-time systems. Multi-core SoCs improve performance but create new challenges in maintaining and verifying deterministic behavior. Connected systems require exceptional security to protect code from external cyberattacks. Evolving functional safety and reliability standards that keep raising the bar mean developers need to begin comprehensive testing sooner if they are going to meet tighter design schedules. Finally, certifying these complex systems has become even more difficult. To help OEMs meet these challenges, the RISC-V architecture has been designed with unique capabilities that support reliability and security in the development of safety-critical applications. With its open instruction set architecture, modularity, and extensibility, RISC-V accelerates the design of functionally safe systems while reducing the complexity, cost, and risk associated with certification to standards like DO-178C and ISO 26262
This document provides information on provisions for passengers with disabilities on board commercial aircraft. In this context the term "provision of medical oxygen" shall be understood as application of oxygen on board an aircraft not linked to (post) decompression in the sense of Airworthiness Requirements FAR/CS 25 and Operational Regulations of FAR 121/135. Information about available equipment and physiological treatment in clinical practice will be provided in this document. It covers the use of oxygen concentrators according to guidance of FAR Advisory Circular AC120-95.
This paper presents a comprehensive testing framework and safety evaluation for Vehicle-to-Vehicle (V2V) charging systems, incorporating advanced theoretical modeling and experimental validation of a modern, integrated 3-in-1 combo unit (PDU, DCDC, OBC). The proliferation of electric vehicles has necessitated the development of resilient and flexible charging solutions, with V2V technology emerging as a critical decentralized infrastructure component. This study establishes a rigorous mathematical framework for power flow analysis, develops novel safety protocols based on IEC 61508 and ISO 26262 functional safety standards, and presents comprehensive experimental validation across 47 test scenarios. The framework encompasses five primary test categories: functional performance validation, power conversion efficiency optimization, electromagnetic compatibility (EMC) assessment, thermal management evaluation, and comprehensive fault-injection testing including Byzantine fault scenarios
A crash energy absorption technique and method improve the safety and structural integrity of electric vehicle battery packs during collisions, complying with global regulations. This analysis details an assembly featuring a battery housing for mounting battery cells, a crash member connected to the battery housing's periphery, and flexural members linked to the crash member. The flexural members are designed to absorb impact forces by deforming and storing potential energy during sudden impacts. This approach ensures energy is stored within the flexural elements and then transferred to the battery cells through progressive crushing. The design effectively delays intrusion, enhances battery safety, and minimizes cell-level damage. This solution improves occupant safety and prevents thermal runaway incidents while maintaining the battery's overall performance and reliability in EVs.
This study presents a structured evaluation framework for reasonably foreseeable misuse in automated driving systems (ADS), grounded in the ISO 21448 Safety of the Intended Functionality (SOTIF) lifecycle. Although SOTIF emphasizes risks that arise from system limitations and user behavior, the standard lacks concrete guidance for validating misuse scenarios in practice. To address this gap, we propose an end-to-end methodology that integrates four components: (1) hazard modeling via system–theoretic process analysis (STPA), (2) probabilistic risk quantification through numerical simulation, (3) verification using high-fidelity simulation, and (4) empirical validation via driver-in-the-loop system (DILS) experiments. Each component is aligned with specific SOTIF clauses to ensure lifecycle compliance. We apply this framework to a case of driver overreliance on automated emergency braking (AEB) at high speeds—a condition where system intervention is intentionally suppressed. Initial
Perception radar company Arbe was at IAA Mobility in Munich this year to press the case that customers can and should trust automated vehicles. One reason is the global trend of stricter regulations from the NHTSA, Euro NCAP, and in China, which now require automated vehicles to safely meet demanding use cases that are not covered by current sensors, according to Arbe co-founder and CTO Noam Arkind. Arkind told SAE Media that one such category is detecting vulnerable road users (VRU) in poor weather and lighting conditions. “We know from recent tests that a lot of Chinese cars, for example, failed VRU detections in the dark,” he said. “Camera alone doesn't really have reliable pedestrian detection in a dark situation. Radar is a great sensor. It's very sensitive. It's not dependent on weather conditions or lighting conditions, but it's noisy, it's low resolution, and it's hard to use.”
Functional safety is driven by number of standards like in automotive its driven by ISO26262, in Aerospace its driven by DO-178C, and in Medical its driven by IEC 60601. Automotive electronic controllers must adhere to state-of-the-art functional safety standard provided by ISO26262. A critical functional safety requirement is the Fault Handling Time Interval (FHTI), which includes the Fault Detection Time Interval (FDTI) and Fault Reaction Time Interval (FRTI). The requirements for FHTI are derived from Failure Mode Effect Analysis (FMEA) conducted at the system level. Various fault categories are analyzed, including electrical faults (e.g., short to battery, short to ground, open circuits), systemic faults (e.g., sensor value stuck, sensor value beyond range), and communication faults (e.g., incorrect CAN message signal values). Controllers employ strategies such as debouncing and fault time maturity to detect these faults. Numerous FDTI requirements must be verified to ensure
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