Browse Topic: Safety regulations and standards
Functional safety is driven by number of standards like in automotive its driven by ISO26262, in Aerospace its driven by DO-178C, and in Medical its driven by IEC 60601. Automotive electronic controllers must adhere to state-of-the-art functional safety standard provided by ISO26262. A critical functional safety requirement is the Fault Handling Time Interval (FHTI), which includes the Fault Detection Time Interval (FDTI) and Fault Reaction Time Interval (FRTI). The requirements for FHTI are derived from Failure Mode Effect Analysis (FMEA) conducted at the system level. Various fault categories are analyzed, including electrical faults (e.g., short to battery, short to ground, open circuits), systemic faults (e.g., sensor value stuck, sensor value beyond range), and communication faults (e.g., incorrect CAN message signal values). Controllers employ strategies such as debouncing and fault time maturity to detect these faults. Numerous FDTI requirements must be verified to ensure
This paper presents updates to a “meta-algorithm” for achieving safer AI driven systems by integrating systems theoretic process analysis, quantitative fault tree analysis, structured generation of safety metrics, and statistical hypothesis testing of metrics between simulation and reality. This paper presents updates to the meta-algorithm after its application in use cases involving commercial autonomous vehicle deployment.
This SAE Recommended Practice describes the test procedures for conducting quasi-static cab roof strength tests for heavy-truck applications. Its purpose is to establish recommended test procedures that will standardize the procedure for heavy trucks. Descriptions of the test setup, test instrumentation, photographic/video coverage, and test fixtures are included.
Current regulations (e.g., Title 14 of the United States Code of Federal Regulations, or 14 CFR) define design requirements for oxygen system provisions for protection of crewmembers and passengers following emergency events such as in-flight decompression. This aerospace information report (AIR) addresses the operational oxygen system requirements for a decompression incident that may occur at any point during a long-range flight, with an emphasis for a decompression at the equal time point (ETP). This AIR identifies fuel and oxygen management contingencies and presents possible solutions for the efficient, safe, and optimum fuel/oxygen flight continuation. Oxygen management is a critical concern for all aircraft, ranging from single-engine types operating above 10000 feet to complex, high-performance aircraft equipped with supplemental oxygen systems. Proper planning ensures compliance with regulations and supports pilot and passenger safety at higher altitudes. This document
This SAE Information Report applies to structural integrity, performance, drivability, and serviceability of personally licensed vehicles not exceeding 10000 pounds GVWR such as sedans, crossovers, SUVs, MPVs, light trucks, and van-type vehicles that are powered by gas and alternative fuel such as electric, plug-in hybrid, or hybrid technologies. It provides engineering direction to vehicle modifiers in a manner that does not limit innovation, and it specifies procedures for preparing vehicles to enhance safety during vehicle modifications. It further provides guidance and recommendations for the minimum acceptable design requirements and performance criteria on general and specific structural modifications, thereby allowing consumers and third-party payers the ability to obtain and purchase equipment that meets or exceeds the performance and safety of the OEM production vehicle.
This document applies to safety observers or spotters involved with the use of outdoor laser systems. It may be used in conjunction with AS4970.
Letter from the Guest Editors
Demonstrating deadline adherence for real-time tasks is a common requirement in all safety norms. Timing verification has to address two levels: the code level (worst-case execution time) and the scheduling level (worst-case response time). Determining which methodology is suited best depends on the characteristics of the target processor. All contemporary microprocessors try to maximize the instruction-level parallelism by sophisticated performance-enhancing features that make the execution time of a particular instruction dependent on the execution history. On multi-core systems, the execution time additionally is influenced by interference effects on shared resources caused by concurrent activities on the different cores, which are not controlled by the scheduling algorithm. In the avionics domain, the new FAA AC 20-193 / EASA AMC 20-193 guidance documents formalize predictability aspects of multi-core systems and derive adequate measures for timing verification. Timing verification
In the domain of aircraft certification, Development Assurance is what some would call a useful tool to gain confidence in the development of complex systems, and what others would call a necessary evil. But what does it actually do? Why is it necessary for certification of modern aircraft? What, epistemologically, does it bring to the table? This paper aims to show how Development Assurance (DA) activities, at all levels from aircraft to item, close the epistemological holes created when complex systems are chosen for implementation. It will map the different sources and types of uncertainty encountered in system and aircraft verification and explain how each type is dealt with within a certification context, working from simple mechanical systems up to complex and highly integrated systems using software and airborne electronic hardware and beyond. It will show that Development Assurance, far from being an arbitrary set of activities, systematically brings personal and corporate
With the surge in adoption of artificial intelligence (AI) in automotive systems, especially Advanced Driver Assistance Systems (ADAS) and autonomous vehicles (AV), comes an increase of AI-related incidents–several of which have ended in injuries and fatalities. These incidents all share a common deficiency: insufficient coverage towards safety, ethical, and/or legal requirements. Responsible AI (RAI) is an approach to developing AI-enabled systems that systematically take such requirements into account. Existing published international standards like ISO 21448:2022 (Safety of the Intended Functionality) and ISO 26262:2018 (Road Vehicles – Functional Safety) do offer some guidance in this regard but are far from being sufficient. Therefore, several technical standards are emerging concurrently to address various RAI-related challenges, including but not limited to ISO 8800 for the integration of AI in automotive systems, ISO/IEC TR 5469:2024 for the integration of AI in functional
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