The objective of this paper is to understand the effort required to integrate the hardware and software of in-vehicle cybersecurity systems. The in-vehicle cybersecurity method discussed is the SAE J1939-91C, which involves Network formation, Rekeying, and secure Message Exchange between Electronic Control Units (ECUs). The SAE J1939-91C network security protocol operates over a CAN-FD network to perform necessary cryptographic operations and key generation. To evaluate the method, test vectors were created to validate SAE J1939-91C key generations and cryptographic operations on the simulated ECU in-vehicle network system hardware (such as the Beacon or Pi devices). We introduce a lightweight, transport-agnostic benchmark comprising deterministic AES-CMAC test vectors and a simple verification utility, requiring no specialized hardware or build system. This minimal artifact set enables reproducible and machine-parsable validation of SAE J1939-91C security across diverse lab environments.