The Analysis of Dual-Credit Regulation Based on the Dynamic Game Theory

2021-01-0787

04/06/2021

Features
Event
SAE WCX Digital Summit
Authors Abstract
Content
China's auto market has developed rapidly in recent years and has become the world's largest auto market. The rapid increase in sales of passenger cars has brought a series of environmental and energy problems. In response to these problems, “The Parallel Management Method for Corporate Average Fuel Consumption and New Energy Vehicles Credits” (Dual-credit Regulation) has been enacted in 2018. However, some problems about the regulation were gradually exposed with the NEV subsidies decreasing, such as too much surplus new energy vehicle credit. To promote the development of NEV, the reform of dual credit regulation was issued in June,2020. Based on the reform of the" dual-credit " regulation in 2020, this paper proposes the three-stage dynamic game model to solve the auto market’s Nash Equilibrium, then analyzes and predicts the impact of the " dual-credit " reform on the development of China’s 2020 automotive industry, aimed at providing some references for the reform of “dual-credit” regulation.
Meta TagsDetails
DOI
https://doi.org/10.4271/2021-01-0787
Pages
8
Citation
Pengyu, C., Lin, G., Zhan, Z., and Yin, Y., "The Analysis of Dual-Credit Regulation Based on the Dynamic Game Theory," SAE Technical Paper 2021-01-0787, 2021, https://doi.org/10.4271/2021-01-0787.
Additional Details
Publisher
Published
Apr 6, 2021
Product Code
2021-01-0787
Content Type
Technical Paper
Language
English