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The Necessity to Perform a “Traditional” Fault Tree Analysis Process when Conducting a Model-based Safety Assessment
ISSN: 1946-3855, e-ISSN: 1946-3901
Published October 22, 2012 by SAE International in United States
Citation: Fritz, K., Kurz, N., and Peterson, E., "The Necessity to Perform a “Traditional” Fault Tree Analysis Process when Conducting a Model-based Safety Assessment," SAE Int. J. Aerosp. 5(1):214-223, 2012, https://doi.org/10.4271/2012-01-2130.
Fault tree analyses and the associated safety assessment process plays an essential role in demonstrating acceptable avionic system compliance to the system safety requirements derived from safety related regulations associated with the civil aircraft certification process (e.g. 14CFR/CS §25.1309). SAE ARP4754A and SAE ARP4761 are established industry guidelines for the safety process and fault tree methodology applicable to civil aircraft certification based on techniques which have now been in use for decades.
System model-based techniques, used for some time in system and software development, are now being applied in the safety assessment process. These system behavior models of functions with their associated dependencies and assignments have been supplemented with failure modes and effects to “automatically” generate fault tree like outputs. These system model-based fault trees are intended to become integral to the safety assessment process.
This paper contrasts the “traditional” fault tree analyses process with that for the system model-based approach for application during the development and verification stages of a project. Each approach will be evaluated for scope, capabilities, equivalence and their adequacy in showing compliance to certification safety process requirements.