Identity-Anonymized CAN (IA-CAN) protocol is a secure CAN protocol, which provides the sender authentication by inserting a secret sequence of anonymous IDs (A-IDs) shared among the communication nodes. To prevent malicious attacks from the IA-CAN protocol, a secure and robust system error recovery mechanism is required. This article presents a central management method of IA-CAN, named the IA-CAN with a global A-ID, where a gateway plays a central role in the session initiation and system error recovery. Each ECU self-diagnoses the system errors, and (if an error happens) it automatically resynchronizes its A-ID generation by acquiring the recovery information from the gateway. We prototype both a hardware version of an IA-CAN controller and a system for the IA-CAN with a global A-ID using the controller to verify our concept.

This Recommended Practice defines the technical requirements for a terrestrial-based PNT system to improve vehicle (e.g., unmanned, aerial, ground, maritime) positioning/navigation solutions and ensure critical infrastructure security, complementing GNSS technologies.

Externally-connected Electronic Control Units (ECUs) contain millions of lines of code, which may contain security vulnerabilities. Hackers may exploit these vulnerabilities to gain code execution privileges, which affect public safety. Traditional Cybersecurity solutions fall short in meeting automotive ECU constraints such as zero false positives, intermittent connectivity, and low performance impact. A desirable solution would be deterministic, require minimum resources, and protect against known and unknown security threats. We integrated Autonomous Security on a BeagleBone Black (BBB) system to evaluate the feasibility of mitigating Cybersecurity risks against potential threats. We identified key metrics that should be measured, such as level of security, ease of integration and system performance impact. In this paper, we describe the integration and evaluation process and present its results. We show that Autonomous Security can provide this protection with zero false-positives while meeting automotive constraints.

In the automotive network architecture, the basic functions of gateway include routing, diagnostic, network management and so on. With the rapid development of connected vehicles, the cybersecurity has become an important topic in the automotive network. A spoof ECU can be used to hack the automotive network. In order to prevent the in-vehicle networks from attacking, the automotive gateway is an important part of the security architecture. A secure gateway should be able to authenticate the connected ECU and control the access to the critical network domain. The data and signals transferred between gateway and ECUs should be protected to against wiretap attacking. The purpose of this paper is to design a secure gateway for in-vehicle networks. In this paper, the designing process of the automotive secure gateway is presented. Based on the threat analysis, security requirements for automotive gateway are defined. Secure communication, key master, and firewall are proposed as the security mechanisms to protect the automotive gateway. Secure communication mechanisms contain the message authentication and data encryption. Key master is a gateway function to distribute and update the keys for the secure communication of connected ECUs. Firewall based on message filter is designed to isolate the untrusted network domain and trusted network domain. The security functions of the automotive gateway are validated in a simulated attacking environment. A microcontroller with HSM is used to implement the secure gateway. Considering the influences of security mechanisms, the network latency is tested and the results have proved the secure gateway is effective and efficient.

The ever-increasing complexity and connectivity of driver assist functions pose challenges for both Functional Safety and Cyber Security. Several of these challenges arise not only due to the new functionalities themselves but due to numerous interdependencies between safety and security. Safety and security goals can conflict, safety mechanisms might be intentionally triggered by attackers to impact functionality negatively, or mechanisms can compete for limited resources like processing power or memory to name just some conflict potentials. But there is also the potential for synergies, both in the implementation as well as during the development. For example, both disciplines require mechanisms to check data integrity, are concerned with freedom from interference and require architecture based analyses. So far there is no consensus in the industry on how to best deal with these interdependencies in automotive development projects. SAE J3061 introduces a process framework for Cyber Security development that is intentionally very similar to that for Functional Safety as defined in ISO 26262. While these parallel frameworks help to identify interdependencies and show that aligned processes are possible, a joint process seems unreasonable due to the vastly different implementation frameworks and methods. Using concrete examples, we show problems that can arise if Functional Safety and Cyber Security processes are not properly aligned and integrated into the overall development process. Based on this we then propose steps towards coordinated safety and security processes that can prevent such problems and show how such an approach at the same time allows to benefit from synergies.