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Kishikawa, Takeshi
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Vulnerability of FlexRay and Countermeasures

SAE International Journal of Transportation Cybersecurity and Privacy

Panasonic Corporation, Japan-Takeshi Kishikawa, Ryo Hirano, Yoshihiro Ujiie, Tomoyuki Haga, Hideki Matsushima, Kazuya Fujimura, Jun Anzai
  • Journal Article
  • 11-02-01-0002
Published 2019-05-23 by SAE International in United States
The importance of in-vehicle network security has increased with an increase in automated and connected vehicles. Hence, many attacks and countermeasures have been proposed to secure the controller area network (CAN), which is an existent in-vehicle network protocol. At the same time, new protocols-such as FlexRay and Ethernet-which are faster and more reliable than CAN have also been proposed. European OEMs have adopted FlexRay as a control network that can perform the fundamental functions of a vehicle. However, there are few studies regarding FlexRay security. In particular, studies on attacks against FlexRay are limited to theoretical studies or simulation-based experiments. Hence, the vulnerability of FlexRay is unclear. Understanding this vulnerability is necessary for the application of countermeasures and improving the security of future vehicles. In this article, we highlight the vulnerability of FlexRay found in the experiments conducted on a real FlexRay network. Consequently, we clarify the conditions under which attackers masquerade as legitimate electronic control units (ECUs) and transmit spoofed FlexRay frames. We also confirm that a consumer vehicle’s functions such as steering, braking,…
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A Method for Disabling Malicious CAN Messages by Using a CMI-ECU

Panasonic Corp.-Yoshihiro Ujiie, Takeshi Kishikawa, Tomoyuki Haga, Hideki Matsushima, Tohru Wakabayashi, Masato Tanabe, Yoshihiko Kitamura, Jun Anzai
Published 2016-04-05 by SAE International in United States
Controller area network (CAN) technology is widely adopted in vehicles, but attention has been drawn recently to its lack of security mechanisms. Numerous countermeasures have been proposed, but none can be regarded as a generic solution, in part because all the proposed countermeasures require extensive modifications to existing in-vehicle systems.To arrive at a solution to this problem, we propose a new method of protecting CAN without the need to modify existing systems. In this paper, we explain the principle of our proposed method and the architecture of the electronic control unit (ECU) that implements it. We report the result of our experiments and show its efficacy against typical security threats faced by CAN.
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